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ABSTRACT: In this Article, we offer both a legal and a pragmatic framework
for defending against copyright trolls. Lawsuits alleging online copyright
infringement by John Doe defendants have accounted for roughly half of all
copyright cases filed in the United States over the past three years. In the typical
case, the plaintiffs claims of infringement rely on a poorly substantiated form
pleading and are targeted indiscriminately at noninfringers as well as
infringers. This practice is a subset of the broader problem of opportunistic
litigation, but it persists due to certain unique features of copyright law and
the technical complexity of Internet technology. The plaintiffs bringing these
cases target hundreds or thousands of defendants nationwide and seek quick
settlements priced just low enough that it is less expensive for the defendant to
pay rather than to defend the claim, regardless of the claim's merits.
We report new empirical data on the continued growth of this form of
copyright trolling in the United States. We also undertake a detailed analysis
of the legal and factual underpinnings of these cases. Despite their underlying
weakness, plaintiffs have exploited information asymmetries, the high cost of
federal court litigation, and the extravagant threat of statutory damages for
copyright infringement to leverage settlements from the guilty and the innocent
alike. We analyze the weaknesses of the typical plaintiffs case and integrate
that analysis into a strategy roadmap for both defense lawyers and pro se
defendants. In short, as our title suggests, we provide a useful guide to the
defense against the dark arts of copyright trolling.
* Matthew Sag is a Law Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and the
Associate Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. Jake Haskell is a recent
graduate of Loyola University Chicago School of Law and an attorney practicing intellectual
property law in Chicago. We acknowledge the generous research funding of the Institute for
Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola and the database access provided by Lex Machina. We
thank Tonjajacobi, and Spencer Waller for their many insights and comments and Wade Formo
for additional research. The views presented in this Article are strictly our own. We emphasize
that although this Article contains advice about the law, it is not legal advice, and we disclaim any
inference of an attorney-client relationship between the reader and ourselves.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past six years, a small group of copyright owners has deluged
the federal court system with lawsuits against John Doe defendants alleging
online copyright infringement. These lawsuits are sometimes directed against
a single defendant, sometimes thousands. This new wave of file-sharing
lawsuits is, in our view, copyright trolling because of the opportunistic way in
which they seek to monetize assertions of infringement. More importantly, we
regard these suits as a kind of trolling because the plaintiffs' claims of
infringement rely on poorly substantiated form pleadings and are targeted
indiscriminately at noninfringers as well as infringers. Plaintiffs have realized
that there is no need to invest in a case that could actually be proven in court
or in forensic systems that reliably identify infringement without a large ratio
of false positives. The lawsuits described in this Article are filed primarily to
generate a list of targets for collection and are unlikely to withstand the
scrutiny of contested litigation. Sometimes the plaintiffs get lucky and target
an actual infringer who is motivated to settle. Even when the infringement has
not occurred or where the infringer has been misidentified, a combination of
the threat of statutory damages-up to $150,000 for a single download-
tough talk, and technological doublespeak are usually enough to intimidate
even innocent defendants into settling.
The plaintiffs play a numbers game, targeting hundreds or thousands of
defendants and seeking quick settlements priced just low enough that it is less
expensive for the defendant to pay than to defend the claim. This game is
profitable, whether the lawsuits are targeted at actual infringers or not. It is
difficult to overstate the extent to which copyright trolling has come to
dominate the federal copyright docket. In this Article, we report new
empirical data on the continued growth of copyright trolling in the United
States. We show that around io,ooo copyright lawsuits have been filed against
John Doe defendants in the last six years and that these suits have accounted
for almost half of all the copyright cases filed in the United States between
2014 and 2016.1 However, counting cases filed grossly understates the
1. We discuss the data infra Part II. It is enough to note here that copyright lawsuits against
John Doe defendants outnumbered all other copyright claims in 29 federal districts in either
2015 or 2016. In 2016,John Doe cases accounted for more than half of copyright cases filed in
the following federal districts: Arizona; the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Districts of
California; Colorado; Connecticut; District of Columbia; the Northern District of Illinois; the
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significance of copyright trolling, since an individual lawsuit may contain
dozens, even thousands, of individual defendants.- This places the true
number of defendants in the hundreds of thousands. Many of these
defendants are noninfringers.
The infringement claims made in these file-sharing cases are a Potemkin
village: Their impressive facade is only paper thin.s Despite their underlying
weakness, plaintiffs have exploited information asymmetries, the high cost of
federal court litigation, and the extravagant threat of statutory damages for
copyright infringement to leverage settlements from the guilty and the
innocent alike. We believe that copyright trolling remains profitable primarily
because the sorts of lawyers who would normally defend clients from this kind
of victimization do not know enough about the law and the technology
involved to put up a good fight. Furthermore, the lawyers who do have the
right kind of expertise are usually too expensive to make defending these
cases worthwhile. A handful of public-spirited defense lawyers have bridged
this divide and are successfully defending these cases, but it is only when their
knowledge and experience becomes widely diffused that these particular
copyright trolls will recede into the darkness from whence they came. Our
purpose in writing this Article is to accelerate that process. Specifically, we
analyze the weaknesses of the typical plaintiffs case and integrate that analysis
into a strategy roadmap for defense lawyers or even resourceful pro se
defendants.
In this Article, we offer both a legal and a pragmatic framework for
defending against copyright trolls. Part II establishes the essential
background. It situates the current wave of file-sharing litigation in the
broader context of trends in copyright litigation over the past two decades. It
also provides a general overview of a typical file-sharing troll's case. Part III
undertakes a comprehensive and methodical review of the weaknesses of a
typical plaintiffs' case. Part IV divides file-sharing litigation into four distinct
stages and maps out strategic considerations for defending against copyright
trolls in each stage.
Western District of Kentucky; Maryland; Nevada; NewJersey; the Northern District of New York;
the Eastern and Middle Districts of North Carolina; Oregon; the Eastern District of Pennsylvania;
the Southern District of Texas; Utah; the Eastern District of Virginia; and the Western District of
Washington. In addition to those listed for 2016, John Doe cases accounted for more than half
of copyright cases filed in the Middle District of Florida, the Eastern and Western Districts of
Michigan, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the Northern and Southern Districts
of Ohio, and the Middle District of Pennsylvania in 2015.
2. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Damages and Profits for Copyright
Infringement; and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Dig. Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-5698, No. 1 1-cv-04397,
2o 1 WL 4048465 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 201 1) (naming 5,698 John Doe defendants); Complaint
for Copyright Infringement at i, Ott v. Does 1-15,551, No. 1:11-cv-oo553, 201 1 WL 2491677
(D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2011) (naming 15,551 John Doe defendants).
3. The term "Potemkin Village" is derived from the sham villages created in 18th-century
Russia to impress Empress Catherine H1 on her tours of the country. See Thomas Seifrid, "Illusion"
and Its Workings in Modern Russian Culture, 45 SLAvic & E. EuR.J. 205, 205 (2001).
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II. ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND
A. THE CURREvT WAVE OF FILE-SHARING LITIGATION
A cursory review of the copyright dockets of federal district courts shows
that something very strange is going on. Although software companies, record
labels, and motion picture studios conduct a fair amount of copyright
litigation, in a large number of districts, cases filed by otherwise obscure
LLCs-such as Malibu Media and PTG Nevada-make up more than half the
copyright caseload.4 In 2015, the Iowa Law Review published an empirical
study of copyright trolling by one of the authors of this Article.5 That article
explains how copyright law's generous approach to statutory damages and
certain structural features of civil litigation have led to an extraordinary
number of John Doe lawsuits alleging online copyright infringement.6 We
have updated the data from that first empirical study and the results are
presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows the frequency ofJohn Doe copyright lawsuits from 1994
to 2016. These John Doe lawsuits are almost exclusively related to allegations
of illegal file sharing, which explains why they were virtually nonexistent prior
to 2004. As indicated in Figure i, there are two distinct waves of file-sharing
litigation-one ranging from 2004 to 2oo8, the other beginning in 201o and
continuing to the present day. In 2003 the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") began a widely publicized campaign of lawsuits against
individual file sharers, characterized as "a teaching tool"7 or "the enforcement
phase" of the RIAA's education program.8
4. For districts in which file-sharing cases against John Doe defendant outnumber other
copyright cases, see supra note 1. There are 15 districts in which cases by the top six plaintiffs-
Malibu Media, LLC; LHF Productions, Inc.; Manny Film, LLC; Cobbler Nevada, LLC; Plastic The
Movie, Ltd; and Dallas Buyers Club, LLC--outnumber all other copyright suits for 2015 and 2016
combined. These districts are the Eastern, Northern, and Southern Districts of California; the
District of Columbia; the Northern District of Illinois; Maryland; the Eastern and Western Districts
of Michigan; NewJersey; the Northern District of New York; the Northern and Southern Districts of
Ohio; the Eastern and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania; and the Eastern District of Virginia.
5. See generally Matthew Sag, Copyright Tmrling, an Enpirical Study, 1 oo IOWAL. REV. 1105 (2015).
6. Id.
7. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 963 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
8. Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won't Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade After Napster,
40 RUTGERs L.J. 565, 6o2 (2009) (quoting Press Release, RIAA, Recording Industry Begins Suing
P2P File Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), http://tech-
insider.org/internet/research/200 3 /ogo8.html).
2018]
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Figure 1: Copyright Cases Filed in U.S. District Courts (1994-2016)9
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The RIAA wound down this program in 2oo8, after over 35,000
individuals had been targeted with letters of demand.1o The RIAA and its
members are not copyright trolls because the industry's end-user litigation
strategy was focused on deterrence. It was designed to channel potential
infringers back into the legitimate market, not as a way to monetize
infringement as an end in itself. In 2010, others took up where the RIAA left
off.
We refer to the current wave of file-sharing litigation as the "BitTorrent
monetization era"-because the alleged infringement mostly involves the
BitTorrent file-sharing protocol and because it appears the objective of the
suits is to monetize infringement (or the assertion of infringement), as
opposed to the pursuit of compensation or deterrence. This difference in
motivation is important. In the normal paradigm of litigation, plaintiffs
pursue their rights in court to seek compensation or to deter future
wrongdoing. Litigation thus rights a private wrong and also performs a public
good. The plaintiffs (or possibly the lawyers and litigation service providers)
9. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER records, 1994-20 16 (on file with the
authors); see also Sag, supra note 5, at 16 (explaining methodology used to collect and analyze
the records); Matthew Sag, IPLitigation in US. District Courts: 1994-2014, lo1 IOWA L. REV. 1065,
1070-71 (2016) (explaining methodology and updating analysis of copyright data in the context
of broader trends in IP litigation).
1o. See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J.,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1 22966o3883602"137 (last updated Dec. 19, 2008, 12:o iAM).
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behind the current wave of file-sharing litigation are more interested in taking
advantage of copyright law's generous statutory damages provisions to
monetize little more than the assertion of infringement.-
Copyright litigation has increased dramatically since the BitTorrent
monetization era began in 20O. As we show in Table 1, although the number
of cases filed in 2010 was small, lawsuits filed against John Doe defendants
made up more than 52% of copyright cases in in the United States by 2014
and 58% in 2015. The number of suits dropped slightly after Malibu Media
lost a case on summary judgment in February 2016, but the rate of filing is
increasing again."2 Even so, between 2014 and 2016 copyright trolling
accounted for 49.8% of the federal copyright docket. To focus more clearly
on the BitTorrent monetization era, Table i shows the number of copyright
cases filed in U.S. district courts from 2010 to 2016 and the number and
percentage ofJohn Doe copyright cases filed in such years.
Table i: Copyright andJohn Doe Cases (201O-2016)'3
Cases: Cases: Percent:Year Copyright John Doe John Doe
2010 1,983 77 4%
2011 2,348 452 19%
2012 3,230 1,401 43%
2013 3,833 1,776 46%
2014 4,272 2,204 52%
2015 5,079 2,930 58%
2016 3,681 1,362 37%
As we noted in the Introduction, these figures show only cases filed, not
the number of defendants.14 John Doe suits have named as many as 15,000
defendants, but over the past three years almost all cases have had I to 5o
11. We invoke the triad of plaintiffs, lawyers, and litigation service providers to reflect our
uncertainty as to whether the true principals directing the current wave of John Doe are the
named plaintiffs, their lawyers, or the litigation service providers who claim to identify supposed
instances of copyright infringement.
12. On February 8, 2ost6, the court granted the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment
in Malibu Media LLC v.John Doe, No. 1:1 3-cv-o6312, 2016 WL 4 6 4 0 4 5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2016).
This appears to have precipitated a dispute between Malibu Media and its main litigation counsel.
See Complaint at i, Malibu Media, LLC v. Lipscomb, Eisenberg & Baker, PL, No. 2:16-cv-04715-
R-FFM (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2016) (alleging professional negligence and other causes of action).
13. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER records, 2010-2016 (on file with the
authors); see supra note 9.
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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defendants.'5 Our analysis of the federal court filing records indicates that in
2016 the average number of defendants in each of the John Doe cases was,
on a conservative estimate, 4.7 overall and 8.8 excluding Malibu Media
cases.' 6 In other words, although there were 1,362 John Doe copyright cases
filed last year, 6,483 individual defendants were targeted.'7 Based on these
findings, our best estimate is that the number of U.S. households who have
received a settlement demand letter from the plaintiffs we regard as copyright
trolls is in the hundreds of thousands.
Although the BitTorrent cases now dominate the federal copyright
docket, there are only a handful of key players to consider. As shown in Table
2, the pornography distributer Malibu Media accounts for 62% of the John
Doe cases in the 2015-2016 period alone. Another five companies-LHF
Productions, Inc.; Manny Film, LLC; Cobbler Nevada, LLC; Plastic The
Movie, Ltd.; and Dallas Buyers Club, LLC-collectively account for another
20%. Thus, the current wave of BitTorrent monetization lawsuits is a niche
industry, rather than a general response to the problem of online copyright
infringement.
Table 2: Plaintiffs in CopyrightJohn Doe Cases (2015-2016)
Plaintiff Cases Filed Percent
(Cumulative)
Malibu Media, LLC 2646 61.7%
LHF Productions, Inc. 225 66.9%
Manny Film, LLC 215 71.9%
Cobbler Nevada, LLC 2o8 76.7%
Plastic The Movie, Limited 137 79.9%
Dallas Buyers Club, LLC 110 82.5%
Me2 Productions 82 84.4%
Criminal Productions, Inc. 66 85.9%
Clear Skies Nevada, LLC 66 87.4%
Good Man Productions, Inc. 62 88.8%
15. See, e.g., Complaint, Dall. Buyers Club, LLC v. Does 1-56, No. 1:14-cv-o7044 (N.D. Ill. Sept
11, 2014); First Amended Complaint, Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Doe No. i, No. 6:14-cv-008 i6-MC, 2014
WL 8333643 (D. Or.June 20, 2014); Complaint for Copyright Infringement, Countryman Nev., LLC
v. Does 1-5o, No. 1:14-cv-01384, 2014 WL 9 1620 5 (N.D. M11. Feb. 26, 2014).
16. Data on file with authors.
17. By running an algorithm over the entire set of cases, we are able to determine that, at a
minimum, over 170,000 IP addresses have been targeted since 201o. However, this figure
significantly undercounts the number of defendants because it only accounts for the number
disclosed by the plaintiff in the title of the case. For example, some cases are captioned "Some
Film, LLC v. John Does 1-76" while some cases are captioned simply "Some Film, LLC v. John
Does," and we were unable to inspect each record to determine the true number of defendants.
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Plaintiff Cases Filed Percent
(Cumulative)
QOTD Film Investment Ltd. 40 89.7%
Fathers & Daughters Nevada, LLC 37 90.6%
CELL Film Holdings, LLC 35 91.4%
Glacier Films (USA), Inc. 34 92.2%
Cook Productions, LLC 33 93.0%
PTG Nevada, LLC 31 93.7%
Survivor Productions, Inc. 29 94.4%
Poplar Oaks, Inc. 23 94.9%
I.T. Productions, LLC 19 95.3%
Elargo Holdings, LLC 13 95.6%
KillerJoe Nevada, LLC 11 95.9%
Automata Productions, Inc. 11 96.2%
September Productions, Inc. 1o 96.4%
Countryman Nevada, LLC 7 96.6%
All other plaintiffs 140 99.9%
The business model that underpins the recent explosion in copyright
litigation can be reduced to a few simple steps. The basic method is as follows:
(1) Monitor online file-sharing networks and collect evidence of
possible infringement. For the time being, it is best to think of
this as a "black box" process that produces lists of alleged
infringements and associated Internet Protocol ("IP")
addresses.' 8
(2) File a complaint alleging copyright infringement byJohn Does
identified only by their IP addresses in the appropriate federal
district court.
(3) Seek a court order to compel Internet Service Providers
("ISPs")'9 to provide individual account holder information
matching the IP address.
18. An IP address is an identifier assigned to a device connected to a TCP/IP network. The
IP addresses discussed in this Article are most often connected to the routers that connect
consumer Internet access accounts to the Internet.
19. An ISP is an organization that provides services for accessing and using the Internet.
2018]
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(4) Contact account holders by letter and threaten to seek very
large awards of statutory damages but offer to settle for
amounts ranging from two to eight thousand dollars. °
(5) Settle as many cases as possible, and abandon virtually all the
rest.
(6) Repeat.
This formula has been profitable enough that one company, Malibu
Media, filed 5,982 individual cases between 2012 and 2016, paying well over
$2.3 million in federal court filing fees. 1 As we explain in more detail in the
remainder of this Article, these lawsuits are filed primarily to generate a list of
targets for collection; these are not cases that have been built to stand up to
the scrutiny of litigation. In fact, of the 1 o,ooo cases filed in the last six years,
the only ones in which the plaintiff has prevailed on the merits are those in
which the defendants have admitted to committing acts that constitute
infringement.22 It is impossible to know for sure how many innocent
individuals have settled these cases, and upon what terms. However, our
discussions with numerous defense lawyers over the past three years suggest
that these cases settle from anywhere between $1,ooo and $8,ooo and that
these lawyers believe that as many as one-third of their clients are innocent.2 3
Usually, we would treat such self-serving anecdotal data with a grain of salt;
however, we have reviewed a number of these cases in detail and these
estimates seem plausible, if imprecise.
B. AN OVERVIEw OF THE PLANTIFF'S CASE
To date, the academic literature on copyright trolling has focused on
broad public policy issues relating to statutory damages, civil procedure, and
the appropriateness of allowing non-rights holders to profit from copyright
enforcement litigation.24 These are all worthy issues, but by focusing on the
20. Contact does not mean serve a summons. In fact, plaintiffs often go out of their way to
delay formal service of process until the court runs out of patience.
21. Prior to May 1, 2013, filing fees were $35 o , at which time they were increased to $400.
Based on the PACER records, we calculate that Malibu's initial filing fees for 2012 to 2o16 would
have been $2,355,100.
22. See infra Part lV.D.
23. We spoke to several defense lawyers over the past two years, and their experiences have
informed our research. However, these conversations were conducted in confidence, and we
cannot report what we were told beyond this general summary.
24. Compare Sag, supra note 5 (arguing that copyright's statutory damages regime encourages
opportunistic litigation), with Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Jonah B. Gelbach, DebunAing the Myth of
the Copyright Troll Apocalypse, 1o IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 43, 44 (2o16) (arguing that file-sharing
litigation is simply another form of aggregate litigation and is no different to similar suits in antitrust,
securities litigation, drug and medical device liability, and mass accidents). See generally James
DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutoy
Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 79 (2012) (arguing that statutory damages create perverse
incentives in the copyright context); Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses,
58o [Vol. 103:571
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more generalizable policy questions that are the usual bread-and-butter of law
reviews, the academic community has neglected two very important realities
on the ground.'5 The first reality is that the BitTorrent cases have victimized
a substantial number of noninfringers-this seems to be a feature of the
plaintiffs' business model, not a bug. The second is that, although it would
not be particularly difficult to amass credible and reliable evidence of online
infringement over peer-to-peer networks, the plaintiffs do not appear to have
done so in the cases we have studied.
In the typical case, the plaintiff asserts that it has evidence the defendant
participated in something called a BitTorrent swarm, thereby illegally copying
the plaintiffs copyrighted work. BitTorrent is a popular communications
protocol for transferring large files over peer-to-peer file-sharing networks,
and although it has many lawful uses, it is widely used for illegal file sharing.2
6
The plaintiff claims to be able to identify the defendant by his or her IP
address. The plaintiff says that it can prove the defendant participated in the
swarm and made a copy of the work because the plaintiffs technology
provider has exchanged part of the relevant file with a device associated with
the defendant's IP address.
The modus operandi of the typical plaintiff in file-sharing litigation has
evolved considerably over the past six years. Initially, these cases relied on the
courts' permissive attitude to joinder and social embarrassment related to
pornography.27 Pornography is still well represented thanks to Malibu Media,
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53 (2014) (discussing problems created by copyright trolls);Jason R. LaFond,
PersonalJurisdiaion andJoinderin Mass Copyright Troll Litigation. 71 MD. L. REv. ENDNOTES 51 (2012)
(discussing procedural aspects of copyright trolling).
25. Professor Sag includes himself in this criticism.
26. ROBERT LAYrON & PAUL WATYERS, INTERNET COMMERCE SEC. LAB., INVESTIGATION INTO THE
EXTENT OF INFRINGING CONTENT ON BTTORRENT NETWORKS 3, 21 (201 o), https://concen.org/old
forum/attachment.php?aid=419 o (concluding that 97.9% of nonpornographic files distributed via
BitTorrent tracker websites were infringing copyright).
27. This point was made most famously in Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, where Judge Wright
commented that "[t]he federal courts are not cogs in a plaintiffs copyright-enforcement business
model. The Court will not idly watch what is essentially an extortion scheme, for a case that
plaintiff has no intention of bringing to trial." Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does i-io, No. 2:12-
cv-o0 3 62 3 -OD-PJWx, 2012 WL 5382304, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2012). More recently, Judge
Alsup noted that even with single-defendant cases "[t]he damages exposure in this case, as with
Malibu Media's many other cases, is significant, so a defendant may feel pressure to settle even a
meritless case. Coupled with the taboo nature of the subject matter, there remains potential for
abuse." Malibu Media, LLC v.John Doe, No. 3:1 5 -cv-04 4 4 1-WHA, 2016 WL 3383758, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 2o, 2016); see also Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe, No. 3:13-cv-oo2o5, 2o3 WL
4821911, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 1O, 2013) (sanctioning Malibu Media attorney Schulz for
"attaching an apparently unrelated and embarrassing" material to the plaintiffs complaints);
Sunlust Pictures, LLC v. Does 1-75, No. 1:12-cv-01546, 2012 WL 3717768, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
27, 2012) ("Judges within this district have recognized that plaintiffs in these types of cases might
unfairly threaten to disclose defendants' identities in order to improperly leverage settlement
negotiations."); Hard Drive Prods. v. Does 1-48, No. 1:11-cv-o9o62, 2012 WL 2196038, at *6
(N.D. II. June 14, 2012) (warning plaintiff to consider Rule 11 before naming defendant who
disputed that he had illegally downloaded pornographic movie).
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but Malibu Media is now the only pornography plaintiff of any significance.. 8
The other main plaintiffs own the rights to general release motion pictures of
varying quality.29 Several of the most prolific plaintiffs still rely on joinder to
reduce their overhead and economize on filing fees, but they join much
smaller groups of defendants than in the 2010-2013 period and claim to rely
on geolocation technology to address questions relating to personal
jurisdiction.so
No doubt, the lawyers who file these cases will read this Article and make
some adjustments to their strategy. Anyone who played Dungeons & Dragons
knows that trolls regenerate from their wounds,s' and any fan of Harry Potter
knows that "[t]he Dark Arts ... are many, varied, ever-changing, and
eternal."32 Some modifications may be purely cosmetic, but it is possible that
others may be a welcome development. We have no interest in foreclosing the
possibility of file-sharing litigation per se, and we would welcome a more
targeted approach in which claims were well-pleaded, backed up with
adequate evidence, and directed overwhelmingly at actual infringers of
copyright.
III. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE
In this Part, we undertake a methodical survey of the weaknesses of the
typical plaintiff's case. For ease of exposition, we have divided our analysis of
the weaknesses of the plaintiffs' claims into two categories: issues that would
remain even if we accepted that the plaintiffs' technology does what they say
it does-i.e., "Outside the Black Box"; and issues relating to the black box
process plaintiffs use to target particular IP addresses-i.e., "Inside the Black
Box."
A. OuTmE THE BLACK Box
For the sake of completeness, we begin with a preliminary discussion of
establishing copyright ownership and lack of authorization. However, the
main issues outside the black box relate to plaintiffs' reliance on joinder,
personal jurisdiction, and IP addresses.
28. See inftaAppendix A (listing top plaintiffs for the 2015-2016 period).
29. Dallas Buyers Club was nominated for six Oscars. Dallas Buyers Club: Awards, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tto7 9 o6 3 6/awards (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). London Has
Fallen has a Rotten Tomatoes critics rating of 25%. London Has Fallen, ROTTEN TOMATOES,
https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/london-has-fallen (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
30. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 2, PTG Nev., LLC v. Chan,
No. 1:16-cv-o1621, 2016 WL 8541574 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 29, 2016) (pleading the use of geolocation
technology).
31. GARY GYGAX, ADVANCED DUNGEONS & DRAGONS: MONSTER MANUAL 97 (4 th ed. 1979),
http://archmagev.com/ istEd/Rulebooks/AD&D%2olst%2o-%2o2009%2o-%2oMonster%2o
Manual.pdf.
32. J.K. ROWLING, HARRYPOTTERAND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE 177 (2005).
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1. Ownership of a Valid Copyright
Section io6(i) of the Copyright Act gives the copyright owner the
exclusive right "to reproduce the copyright [] work in copies."ss To establish a
violation of this right, a plaintiff must prove "(1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original" without authorization.34 The plaintiff can usually establish
ownership of a valid copyright with a Copyright Office registration. This
should be straightforward; however, we are aware of one case where a plaintiff
brought suit on the basis of a copyright it had assigned to a third party, while
that third party pursued a suit of its own in a different district, based on the
same copyright.35 In some cases there have also been discrepancies between
the plaintiffs copyright registrations and the works it claimed were
infringed.36
Some defense lawyers may want to question whether pornographic works
are entitled to copyright protection, either as a matter of public policy or
because they fail to display sufficient amount of original authorship or
creativity. In general, this is a losing argument; pornography has long been
considered copyrightable7 However, at least one judge has suggested, in an
order denying Malibu Media leave to issue a third-party subpoena, that
obscene materials may not be copyrightable.38 Nevertheless, this argument is
not likely to have much traction, and attorneys tempted to pursue that route
should be aware that a determination that a work is obscene requires a jury
and a fairly steep standard of proof because of First Amendment concerns.39
33. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § io6(1) (2012).
34. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
35. See Declaration ofJ. Christopher Lynch in Support of Defendant's Reply Memorandum
in Support of His Motion to Compel at 3, Elf-Manl, LLC v. Lamberson, No. 2:1 3 -cv-003 9 5 -TOR
(E.D. Wash. July 3, 2014) (citing Complaint at 7-8, Vision Films Inc. v. Does 1-4 1, No. 3:13-cv-
00128, 2013 WL 11 0oo187 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 8, 2013)) (stating that, at the time of the litigation,
the copyright was owned by a third party).
36. See Complaint-Demand for Jury Trial, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-cv-
04441, 2015 WL 6471355 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2015). As a starting point, we suggest a brief check
of the copyright status of the registration on the U.S. Copyright Office website. Public Catalog,
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?DB=local&PAGE (last
visited Oct. 28, 2017).
37. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5 th Cir. 1979)
("Requiring authors of controversial, unpopular, or new material to go through judicial
proceedings to validate the content of their writings is antithetical to the aim of copyrights.").
38. SeeMalibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15 -cv-o4 3 69 -AKH, 2015 WL 4092417, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 2015) (noting that "if the Motion Picture is considered obscene, it may not be eligible for
copyright protection" (quoting Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v.John Does 1-27, 284 F.R.D. 165, 171
(S.D.N.Y. 2012))).
39. SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
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2. Lack of Authorization
In many ways, the Prenda Law firm pioneered this form of copyright
trolling. Prenda is now defunct as a firm. One of Prenda's principals, Paul
Duffy died in 2015, and the remaining principals,John L. Steele and Paul R.
Hansmeier, were placed under federal indictment in December 2016 for "an
elaborate scheme to fraudulently obtain millions of dollars in copyright
lawsuit settlements by deceiving state and federal courts throughout the
country."40 In addition to lying to the court,41 forging documents,42 and
practicing identity theft,43 the Prenda firm went so far as to "seed" their
clients' movies on BitTorrent networks to make them available for
download.44 This self-seeding was proven in one case45 and suspected in
others. If any plaintiffs (or their lawyers or service providers) were continuing
this practice today, it would negate their complaint altogether, as such an
uploading would likely amount to an authorization to download. However,
Prenda is long gone, and as spectacular as such a discovery would be, we do
not believe that defense lawyers need to go down this particular path of
investigation.
3. ImproperJoinder
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow plaintiffs to join multiple
individual defendants in a single action in certain circumstances.46 To
understand thejoinder issues raised in these cases, we need to explain some
of the features of BitTorrent. The BitTorrent protocol is such a powerful and
40. Indictment, United States v. Hansmeier, No. i6-cr-oo 3 3 4 -JNE-KMM, 2o16 WL 7403809(D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2016). John L. Steel has now plead guilty to these charges. See Plea Agreement
and Sentencing Stipulations, Hansmeier, 16-cr-0033 4 -JNE-KMM (Mar. 6, 2017); see also
Lightspeed Media Corp. v. Smith, 761 F.3 d 699, 712 (7 th Cir. 2014) (affirming orders for
sanctions and an order holding Duffy, Steele, and Hansmeier in civil contempt); Lightspeed
Media Corp. v. Smith, No. 3:12-cv-oo88 9 -GPM, 2013 WL 6225093, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2013)(stating that "the Court has no doubt that Duffy, Steele, and Hansmeier are closely associated
and acted in concert to file and prosecute this frivolous lawsuit"); Ingenuity 13 LLC v.John Doe,
No. 2:12-cv-o8 3 3 3 -ODWJCx, 2013 WL 1898633, at *2, 3, 5 (C.D. Cal. May 6,2013) (finding that
"the Principals engaged in vexatious litigation designed to coerce settlement" and that "Plaintiffs
have demonstrated their willingness to deceive not just this Court, but other courts where they
have appeared" and awarding sanctions against lawyers Steele, Hansmeier, Duffy and Gibbs, the
Prenda Law Firm, and their clients, AF Holdings and Ingenuity 13, based on the "Plaintiffs'
brazen misconduct and relentless fraud").
41. SeeIngenuity 13 LLC, 2013 WL 1898633, at *4.
42. Id.
43. Id. at*i.
44. Cyrus Farivar, Prenda Seeded Its Own Porn Files via BitTorrent, New Affidavit Agues, ARS
TECHNICA (June 3, 2013, 8:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/o6/prenda-
seeded-its-own-porn-files-via-bittorrent-new-affidavit-shows.
45. See, e.g., Declaration of Delvan Neville at s , First Time Videos, LLC v. Oppold, No. 6:12-
cv-o14 9 3 -CEH-KRS (M.D. FlaJune 3, 2013), ECF No. 37-11.
46. SeeFED.R.CIV.P. 20(a).
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popular tool for file sharing because of the way it handles large files. At the
beginning of the process, a BitTorrent client (software that implements the
BitTorrent protocol) segments a large file into thousands of smaller "pieces"
that can be downloaded in any order and reassembled by the end user.47 This
initial process is called "seeding." Each piece of the original seed file is
assigned a unique alphanumeric identifier and the client records each piece's
hash identifier within the torrent descriptor file.48
Once a file has been broken into pieces in this way, it can be downloaded
by multiple individuals simultaneously.49 A group of individuals downloading
the seeded file is known as a "swarm."5 One advantage of BitTorrent is that
there is no need to maintain a connection between the original seeder and
the downloader for the duration of the download; any participant in the
swarm can download any piece from any other participant who already has
it.5' "Piece" in this context does not mean any old chunk of ones and zeros; it
refers specifically to the pieces into which the initial seeder broke up the file.5
Swarm members are typically downloading and uploading pieces from and to
other computers in the swarm at the same time.53
Participants in a BitTorrent swarm are not like criminals planning a bank
heist. The "peers" who constitute the swarm do not directly communicate with
each other and they are separated by time and distance. Swarms can last for
months, during which their respective memberships may constantly change,
and most participants in a BitTorrent swarm have direct connections with only
a few other members of that swarm.54 According to one expert, the average
peer (a swarm member who is not the initial seeder) interacts with less than
i% of the total number of swarm participants.55
There are two requirements for joining multiple individual defendants
in a single action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) (2). First, the
complaint must be asserted against the defendants "jointly, severally, or in the
47. Bran Cohen, The BitTorrent Protocol Specification, BiTToRRENT.ORG (Feb. 4, 2017, 12:58
PM), http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep0ooo3.html.
48. Malibu Media, LLC v. Reynolds, No. i:s2-cv-o6672, 2013 WL 87o618, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 7, 2013).
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id. at 1 -2.
51. Id. at *l.
52. Id. at *2.
53. Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-68, No. 12-cv-o6675, 2013 WL 5423872, at *4-5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013).
54. See Declaration of Expert Delvan Neville at 9, Dall. Buyers Club, LLC, v. Does 1-20,
No. 1:1 4 -cv-o11 4 2-WTL-MJD (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2014) ("[T]he average peer contacts only o.61%
of the total number of swarm participants over the course of their time in the swarm, with a
standard deviation of 1.35%. This indicates that a typical peer contacts only a sliver of all swarm
participants, and while this distribution is also highly variable, 95% of swarm participants would
have contacted between just a single peer to a maximum Of 3.247%.").
55- Id.
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alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences."56 Second, there must be common
questions of fact or law.57 There is no clear consensus as to whether all of the
participants in a BitTorrent swarm are involved in a "series of transactions or
occurrences" that are sufficiently related to allowjoinder. Certainly, "merely
committing the same type of violation in the same way does not link
defendants together for purposes of joinder."sS A number of courts have
determined that mere participation in a swarm is not enough for joinder,
because the plaintiff could not prove that any two defendants actually
exchanged any information or that any two defendants participated
concurrently.59 Some courts have pointed to the vast network of uploads and
downloads within a swarm as being simply too loosely conglomerated to
permitjoinder,6o and one court has laid out a rule requiring all joined parties
to have directly exchanged data. 6' Other courts have been reluctant to allow
discovery to proceed when the only basis forjoinder is that all defendants used
the same ISP or and were part of the same BitTorrent swarm.62 However, a
56. FED.R.CIV.P. 20(a)(2)(A).
57. Id. R. 20(a)(2)(B).
58. LaFace Records, LLC. v. Does 1-38, No. 5 :o7 -cv-29 8-BR, 2o08 WL 544992, at *2
(E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2008).
59. See, e.g., SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-57, No. 8:12-cv-ooo22, 2012 WL 1415523, at *2
(D. Md. Apr. 20, 2012) (denying joinder); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1-23, No. 1i -cv-
15231, 2012 WL 1019034
, 
at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (severing the Doe defendants
because the infringement of the film via BitTorrent did not constitute a "series of transactions or
occurrences"); SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-3036, No. 11-4220 SC, 201 1 WL 600262o, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2011) (severing Doe defendants because defendants did not satisfy test for
permissive joinder); MCGIP, LLC v. Does 1-149, No. 11-cv-02 3 3 i-LB, 201 1 WL 4 3 5 21 1o, at *3(N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011 ) (finding misjoinder where plaintiff "has failed to show that any of the
149 Doe defendants actually exchanged any piece of the seed file with one another"); Hard Drive
Prods., Inc. v. Does i -188, 8o9 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 201 1) (finding no concerted
action where plaintiff conceded that defendants "may not have been physically present in the
swarm on the exact same day and time"); Boy Racer, Inc. v. Does i-6o, No. i 1-cv-o1738-SI, 2011
WL 365252 1, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 201 1) (severing defendants where plaintiff did "not plead
facts showing that any particular defendant illegally shared plaintiff's work with any other
particular defendant").
6o. See reFX Audio Software Inc. v. Does 1-85, No. 1:13-cv-o179o, 2014 WL 1293816, at *5(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2014) (granting dismissal for improperjoinder) ("This application of 'series'
of transactions or occurrences is at too high a level of generality, sweeping in Does who are
multiple (maybe even hundreds or thousands of) levels away from Doe 1. All told, [plaintiff] is
treating the 459 downloads/uploads that would be depicted in the diagram as one transaction or
occurrence, or one series of transactions or occurrences." (footnote omitted)).
61. Id. at *6 ("A plaintiff may only join as defendants those swarm members who have
directly exchanged a part of a copyrighted work (identified by the same unique hash identifier)
with one particular individual. In other words, a plaintiff can join with any one alleged infringer
all the other alleged infringers who downloaded content directly from or uploaded content
directly to that same infringer.").
62. SeeInterscope Records v. Does 1-25, No. 6:o 4 -cv-ooI97-Orl-22DAB, 200 4 WL 6065737,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2004), report and recommendation adopted, 2004 WL 7078585 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 27, 2004) (recommending sua sponte that multiple defendants be severed because the only
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number of other courts have taken a more permissive view, holding that, so
long as there is at least some logical connection between each defendant,
joinder is proper and that it is not necessary to prove that defendants acted in
concert or specifically exchanged information. 63 Under this view,
participation in a swarm is a "cooperative endeavor," regardless of time or
distance, because each member willfully assists in others' infringement.64
Even if participation in a swarm is sufficient to allowjoinder, courts still
have the power under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to disallowjoinder
for discretionary reasons. 65 Courts are more likely to deny joinder on
discretionary grounds in the earliest stages of litigation, particularly when a
defendant opposesjoinder in conjunction with a motion to quash a subpoena.
They are also more likely to do so if the number of defendants is so high as to
seem unwieldy. Some judges have allowed joinder on the express
understanding that these cases are never intended to go to trial and that
joining defendants is an efficient way to handle the initial third-party discovery
phase of the case.66 Other judges have denied joinder on discretionary
grounds in view of the practical problems that would result from aggregating
connection between them was the allegation that they used the same ISP and same file-sharing
network to infringe); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does 1-5 1, No. A-o4 -CA-7 o 4 -LY (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 17, 2004) (dismissing all but the first named defendant in four separate file-sharing cases
with a total of 254 defendants); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Does 1-12, No. 04-cv-04862
WHA, 2004 WL 3241669, at *s (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2004) (staying discovery on all but the first
named defendant in file-sharing case until properjoinder was demonstrated); BMG Music v. Does
1-203, No. Civ.A. 04-650, 2004 WL 953888, at "s (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2004) (severing the improper
joinder of 203 defendants).
63. See, e.g., Bicycle Peddler, LLC v. Does 1-12, 295 F.R.D. 274, 277 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Pac.
Century Int'l v. Does 1-31, No. 11-cv-o9o64, 2012 WL 2129003, at *2 (N.D. IlI.June 12, 2012)
(allowing joinder where "the anonymous defendants participated in the same 'swarm'"); Patrick
Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-39, No. s 2-cv-ooo96-AW, 2012 WL 1432224, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 24, 2012);
Dig. Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); First Time Videos, LLC v. Does
1-76, 27 6 F.R.D. 254, 257 (N.D. Ill. 2o11).
64. TCYK, LLCv. Does 1-62, No. 13-cv-o3842, 2013WL6671675, at*3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18,
2013) ("Every member of a swarm joins that cooperative endeavor knowing that, in addition to
downloading the file, they will also facilitate the distribution of that identical file to all other
members of the swarm." (quoting TCYK, LLC v. Does 1-87, No. 13-cv-03845, 2013 WL 3465186,
at *4 (N.D. Ill.July 10, 2013))).
65. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 21 provides that the court may add or drop a party on
motion or on its own "onjust terms." FED. R. Crv. P. 21. The court may also sever any claim against
a party. See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does 1-38, 941 F. Supp. 2d 153, 156-57 (D. Mass. 2013)
(finding that, although "joinder of the defendants may be permissible under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a),
the interests of justice and judicial economy would best be served if all of the defendants except
Doe Number i were severed and dropped from the case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 21").
66. Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,o62, 7 7
° F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (D.D.C. 201 1)
("[P]laintiffs would face significant obstacles in their efforts to protect their copyrights from
illegal file-sharers and this would only needlessly delay their cases. The plaintiffs would be forced
to file 5,583 separate lawsuits, in which they would then move to issue separate subpoenas to ISPs
for each defendant's identifying information."). Note this reasoning has most likely been reversed
by the holding in AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1o8, 752 F. 3 d 990 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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large numbers of tenuously connected defendants into one case.67 Still others
have refused to allowjoinder en masse because of its associations with "abusive
litigation tactics."68 It is hard to predict in advance which courts will object to
suits "solely to facilitate demand letters and coerce settlement, rather than
ultimately serve process and litigate the claims"69 and which will not.
4. Personal Jurisdiction
The defendant in a civil case can challenge personal jurisdiction at any
time before filing the answer to the complaint. After that, the defense is
waived.70 ISPs usually notify individual defendants whose personal
information is subject to third-party subpoena before complying with such a
subpoena. This gives the defendant an opportunity to challenge the subpoena
before her personal information is revealed and she is named as a defendant.
In the context of copyright trolling cases, it particularly makes sense to
challenge personal jurisdiction when contesting the plaintiffs third-party
subpoena, or in the alternative, in the context of a Rule 12 (b) (2) motion to
dismiss.7, However, lack of personal jurisdiction can also be raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer to the complaint.72
67. Third Degree Films, Inc. v. Does 1-131, 280 F.RD. 493, 499 (D. Ariz. 2012) ("[T]he
Court would effectively sever these cases for trial, and conduct over a hundred separate trials with
different witnesses and evidence, eviscerating any 'efficiency' ofjoinder."); see also Malibu Media,
LLC v. Doe, No. 12-cv-o6 9 4 5 , 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44053, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2013) (stating
that its "ability to efficiently manage the pretrial phases of this action with the present number of
defendants could be compromised by permittingjoinder, causing a strain on judicial resources");
Bubble Gum Prods., LLC v. Does i-8o, No. 12-cv-20367, 2012 WL 29533o9, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July
19, 2012) (stating that "the sheer number of [d] efendants ... would cause an overly burdensome
discovery process if [d]efendants remain joined").
68. Third Degree Films v. Does 1-47, 286 F.R.D. 188, 189-91 (D. Mass. 2012) ("In recent
months, this Court has grown increasingly troubled by 'copyright trolling,' specifically as it has
evolved in the adult film industry .... Against this backdrop of mass lawsuits and potentially abusive
litigation tactics, courts nationwide have become skeptical of allowing the adult film companies
unfettered access to the judicial processes of subpoenas and early discovery." (footnote omitted));
see also Patrick Collins, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d at 156-57 (recommending that plaintiffs claims against
defendants other than the first namedJohn Doe be dismissed without prejudice); Kick Ass Pictures,
Inc. v. Does 1-25, No. 12-cv-lo81o-MLW, 2013 WL 1497229, at *1-2 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 2013)
(ordering plaintiff to show cause why its claims against defendants other than the first namedJohn
Doe defendant should not be dismissed without prejudice to being refiled as individual cases); Pac.
Century Int'l Ltd., 2 011 WL 5117424, at *2 (denying motion for expedited discovery and severing
defendants other than the first namedJohn Doe defendant).
69. Third Degree Films, 286 F.YRD. at 1 9o; see also Hard Drive Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-go, No.
11-cv-0382 5 -HRL, 2012 WL 1094653, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) ("Plaintiff seeks to enlist
the aid of the court to obtain information through the litigation discovery process so that it can
pursue a non-judicial remedy that focuses on extracting 'settlement' payments from persons who
may or may not be infringers. This the court is not willing to do.").
70. FED. R. Cv.P. 12(h)(1)(B).
71. Id. R. 12(b)(2).
72. Id.R. 12(b).
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As the Supreme Court explained in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires that for personal
jurisdiction to attach, a defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'73 John Doe
defendants may not have minimum contacts in anyjurisdiction other than the
state in which they live. In the beginning of the copyright trolling era,
plaintiffs paid very little regard to personal jurisdiction and would seek
discovery against thousands of IP addresses in a single action without any
investigation of the account holder's likely location.74
There is something of a Catch-2 2 here: If plaintiffs do not know the name
and address of the IP address account holders, it is difficult for them to be
confident about personal jurisdiction until they subpoena theJohn Doe's ISP.
The solution to this problem is to employ geolocation services that purport to
match IP addresses with physical locations. The standard practice of copyright
trolls at the moment is to simply assert that they have used such geolocation
technology.75 Some courts in the Ninth Circuit have refused to issue third-
party subpoenas to ISPs until the plaintiff is able to provide sworn testimony
regarding the use of this technology.76 Courts in the Second Circuit have
taken the same course.77 Requiring more than a simple assertion that
geolocation technology was used is appropriate in our view because
geolocation technology is not always reliable. For example, some geolocation
trackers will assign an IP address to a random geographic location within a
country if it cannot identify a more specific location.78 In addition, IP
addresses are commonly spoofed or hacked using a variety of methods as
73. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Note that personal jurisdiction always exists in the defendant's domicile.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,924 (2011) ("For an individual,
the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile .... ").
74. See, e.g., AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1-1o58, 752 F.3 d 99
o
, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[W]e
think it quite obvious that AF Holdings could not possibly have had a good faith belief that it could
successfully sue the overwhelming majority of the ,o58John Doe defendants in this district.").
75. An assertion that is terribly vague considering the various meanings that could be
ascribed to geolocation and the varieties of geolocation technology available.
76. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v.John Doe, No. 3:16-cv-442 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2o16), ECF
No. 5; Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, Docket No. 3:16-cv-00447 (S.D. Cal. April 26, 2016), ECF No.
5 (order denying motion for early discovery); Malibu Media, LLC v.John Doe, No. 3:15-cv-o2931
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2o6) (order denying plaintiffs ex parte motion for leave to serve a third-
party subpoena).
77. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v.John Doe, No. 16-cv-osoo6-WHA, 2016 WL 3383830, at
*4 (N.D. Cal.June 20, 20 16) (staying compliance with third-party subpoena); In re Malibu Media
Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, No. 2:15-cv-03504 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2015) (staying
court's previous order pending resolution of defendant's motion to quash).
78. Kashmir Hill, How an Internet Mapping Glitch Turned a Random Kansas Farm into a Digital
Hell, SPLINTER (Apr. 10, 2016, o:oo AM), http://splinternews.com/how-an-internet-mapping-
glitch-turned-a-random-kansas-f-1 793856052.
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described below.79 We address how to challenge a complaint based on lack of
personal jurisdiction in Part IVA.
5. Reliance on IP Addresses
Even if one accepted the results of the plaintiffs' black box process on
faith, all that it shows is that some anonymous person on the Internet initiated
a file transfer of part of a copyrighted work through the defendant's IP
address. The plaintiff's inability to bridge the divide between an IP address
and a specific person is a fundamental weakness that cannot be cured by a
better black box.
IP addresses are not people. Indeed, IP addresses are often used by
multiple people in ways that make it very difficult to be sure who is responsible
for what activity. Routers are left unsecured or with factory defaults; passwords
are shared with family members, roommates, guests and neighbors;
unsecured guest accounts are created and then forgotten; passwords are
cracked;80 passwords are reused across different contexts (and once a
password is guessed or compromised in one context it is worthless in all of
them) ;81 and backdoors are opened up by malwarel2 and unsecure devices,
including printers and even refrigerators.83
In addition, there are a variety of ways that a hacker can hide their own
IP address by using someone else's.84 Regardless of whether IP addresses can
be tracked reliably in other contexts, they may be particularly unreliable in
the BitTorrent context, because the BitTorrent protocol was designed to allow
high-bandwidth connections and thus "does not perform ... source IP
address validation."85 In practice, this means that the header information
79. See Matthew Tanase, 1P Spoofing: An Introduction, SYMANTEC, https://www.symantec.
com/connect/articles/ip-spoofing-introduction (last updated Mar. 1 1, 2003).
8o. Dan Goodin, How I Cracked My Neighbor's WiFi Password Without Breaking a Sweat ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 28, 2012, 9:46 AM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/
o8/wireless-password-easily-cracked (describing the ease with which one can crack WiFi
passwords using widely available tools).
81. See Swati Khandelwal, Hacker Selling over r Million Decrypted Gmail and Yahoo Passwords on
Dark Web, HAcKER NEWS (Mar. o6, 2017), http://thehackernews.com/2017/03/gmail-yahoo-
password-hack.html (noting that in 2016 billions of accounts were compromised and exposed on
the Internet after hacks of LinkedIn, Tumblr, MySpace, Last.FM, YahooI, and VK.com).
82. Thomas Fox-Brewster, Shockingly Simple taw Leaves 'Millions of Home Routers Open to
Attack,' FORBES (May 19, 2015, 10:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/
2015/05/1 9/home-routers-vulnerable-to-netusb-attack.
83. Indeed, with the advent of technologies such as smart-home lighting, temperature
control, and garage-door control, those seeking to exploit technology are faced with a growing
number of opportunities for infiltration.
84. See generally Anirudh Ramachandran & Nick Feamster, Understanding the Network-Level
Behavior of Spammers, SIGCOMM'o6, Sept. 11-16, 2oo6 (discussing IP spoofing in the context of
span email).
85. Lucian Constantin, BiTorrent Programs Can Be Abused to Supercharge Denial-of-Service Attacks,
PCWoRLD (Aug. 17, 2015, 8:56 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/297s 892/security/bittorrent-
programs-can-be-abused-to-amplify-distributed-denialofservice-attacks.html.
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(think of the envelope on a letter in the postal system) transmitted by a swarm
participant can display someone else's IP address.8 6 This problem is
compounded by the fact that many sites coordinating BitTorrent swarms
"inject random IP address [es] into their swarm list results."8 7
The boilerplate complaints used by plaintiffs in John Doe file-sharing
cases do not plead the identity of the defendant with specificity. Contrary to
modern pleading standards, the plaintiffs rely on IP addresses and typically
provide nothing to link the named defendant-the subscriber to the Internet
account-to the act of infringement. Ironically, this problem becomes more
acute once the plaintiff learns the identity of the IP address account holder.
If we suspend our disbelief as to the plaintiffs black box process, it may seem
reasonable to allege that an unknown person using an IP address,
91.2 20.139.137, for example, 88 infringed its copyright in a particular manner
at a particular point in time.a9 However, when the plaintiff amends its
complaint to replace 'John Doe using IP address 91.220.139.137" with the
name of whoever pays the bill on a particular Internet account, it is asserting,
usually without any evidence, that the account holder and the John Doe are
one and the same.
Courts have repeatedly found that the mere fact a defendant pays for the
Internet account linked to an IP address does not prove that particular
defendant was the infringer;9o nor does it prove that she is somehow
86. See Expert Report of Bradley Witteman at 23-24, Malibu Media v. John Doe, No. 3:15-
cv-o 4 4 4 i-WHA, 2017 WL 2987894 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017).
87. Id. at 24.
88. This is a fake, randomly-generated IP address. SeeIPAddress Generator-Test Data Generation,
FYICENTER, http://sqa.fyicenter.com/Online-Test Tools/TestIP AddressGenerator.php (last
visited Oct. 28, 2017).
89. See Malibu Media v. John Doe, No. ': 3-cv-o6312, 2o 16 WL 464045, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 8, 2016) (observing that "[e]vidence of a link between an IP address and Malibu's movies
may be enough to justify discovery, but it is not enough to prove liability").
9o . See, e.g., PTG Nev. v. Chan, No. i6-cv-o1621, 2017 WL 168188, at *2 (N.D. IlI.Jan. 17,
2017) ("This Court agrees with those courts that have found that the plaintiff needs to allege
more than just the registration of an IP address to an individual in order to proceed against that
individual for copyright infringement."); Cobbler Nev. v. Gonzales, No. 3:1 5 -cv-oo866-SB, 2016
WL 3392368, at *3 (D. Or.June 8, 2016) (dismissing claim where plaintiff did not allege specific
facts tying defendant to infringing conduct); Dall. Buyers Club v. Doughty, No. 3:15-cv-oo176-
AC, 2016 WL 169oo9o, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 27, 2016) ("To show the defendant himself violated
the plaintiffs exclusive rights and not someone else, the plaintiff must provide more than the
mere fact that the IP address associated with the infringing activity is registered to the plaintiff.");
Elf-Man, LLC v. Cariveau, No. 13 -cv-00 5 07-RSL, 2014 WL 202o96, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17,
2014) (dismissing direct infringement claim where plaintiff did not "provide specific facts tying
the named defendant to the infringing conduct," and instead merely alleged that the defendant's
IP address "was observed infringing Plaintiffs motion picture"); AF Holdings LLC v. Rogers, No.
12-cv-01 5 19 -BTM-BLM, 2013 WL 358292, at *2 (S.D. Cal.Jan. 29, 2013) (" U]ust because an IP
address is registered to an individual does not mean that he or she is guilty of infringement when
that IP address is used to commit infringing activity."); In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright
Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 8o, 84 (E.D.N.Y 2012) ("[I]t is no more likely that the subscriber
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contributorily or vicariously liable for the infringement of others who use her
IP address.9' However, district courts are hardly unanimous in this approach.92
In Part IV, we discuss how this potentially fatal weakness should be addressed
as part of the defense strategy.
6. Reliance on Propensity Evidence
Even innocent defendants may not be angels. It is entirely possible that a
defendant's hard drive will contain file-sharing applications including a
BitTorrent client. However, there are perfectly legitimate uses of BitTorrent
and similar software. Furthermore, any suggestion that, because the
defendant has used a file-sharing application in the past, she is likely to have
used one to infringe the plaintiffs work, is overreaching.93 It would also be
propensity evidence which is inadmissible in civil trials under the Federal
Rules of Evidence.94 Evidence that a defendant has installed a file-sharing
application would be admissible to impeach or contradict defendant's other
testimony, but it is not proof of infringement and cannot be considered as
propensity evidence.95
7. Using the Lack of Evidence as Evidence
At the end of the day, for reasons that will become clear in the next
section, the plaintiffs' best hope of proving their accusations is to find
evidence of infringement on the defendants' hard drives. However, in several
cases where no such evidence was found plaintiffs tried to make lemonade out
of lemons by arguing that, since the defendant must be guilty, the absence of
evidence on his or her hard drive simply indicates that the defendant
spoliated evidence by deleting the relevant files.96
Certainly, a party who was on notice that litigation had commenced and
had deleted evidence would be subject to a presumption that such spoliated
to an IP address carried out... the purported illegal downloading... than to say an individual
who pays the telephone bill made a specific telephone call.").
91. See Dall. Buyers Club, 2016 WL 569oo9o, at * i ("[Plaintiff] 's attempt to liken a shared
Internet bill to a scenario in which an individual or entity knowingly received financial benefits
in exchange for the availability of infringing activity would be an unwarranted extension of the
Copyright Act.").
92. See Countryman Nev., LLC v. Pitts, No. 6:1 4-cv-o04 93-Orl-4oGJK, 2014 WL 7178077, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2014) (collecting cases holding that bare factual allegations are sufficient
to survive a Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss).
93. See, e.g., Dal. Buyers Club, 2o16 WL 169oo9o, at *4 (opinion and order denying in part
and granting in part defendant's motion for summaryjudgment).
94. SeeFED.R.EVID. 4 04 (a)(i).
95. See, e.g., Dall. Buyers Club, 2016 WL 1690090, at *4.
96. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 2, Malibu
Media, LLC. v. Doe, No. 1:13-cv-o6312 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2015).
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evidence was helpful to the opposing party.97 Defense attorneys need to
strongly caution their clients against spoliation of evidence, and they should
explain that a freshly-erased hard drive can be even harder to explain than a
hard drive with evidence of infringement. However, spoliation is a serious
accusation, and it requires proof beyond the plaintiffs belief that the
evidence must have existed.98 The plaintiff must show that files were deleted,
not simply that the defendant knew how to delete files, and that this was done
after the defendant was on notice of litigation,99 and that the deleted files
were relevant to the litigation. °° Asserting spoliation in the absence of such
evidence is merely a tactic used to harass the defendant and delay the
inevitable.
B. INSLDE THE BLACK Box
1. No Evidence of a Copy Being Made
The plaintiffs in the cases we have examined rely on records generated
by a black box process. Those records strike us as entirely inadequate, and the
limited available evidence suggests the process itself is unreliable, if not
incredible. In this Section, we focus on why the records produced by the black
box process are insufficient, even if one accepts their veracity. The heart of
the problem is that the plaintiffs' technology providers do not appear to
actually collect evidence that any individual John Doe has actually copied a
substantial portion of any copyrighted work. Indeed, although the typical
complaint alleges that the John Doe defendantjoined a BitTorrent swarm, it
97. Nation-wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1stCir. 1982)
("The evidentiary rationale [for the spoliation inference] is nothing more than the common
sense observation that a party who has notice that [evidence] is relevant to litigation and who
proceeds to destroy [evidence] is more likely to have been threatened by [that evidence] than is
a party in the same position who does not destroy the [evidence].").
98. See DalU. Buyers Club, 2016 WL 169oo9o, at *7 ("[Plaintiff] does not indicate when it
believes [Defendant] allegedly deleted the folder used to store and share downloaded files on his
computer. Indeed, the only evidence in the record comes from [Defendant], who states he used
BackBlaze and Apple software to restore his laptop in January 2015 and this may have resulted
in a loss of data not subject to backup.").
99. See id. ("[T] here is no indication, and [Plaintiff] has provided none, that [Defendant]
was on notice that litigation against him was likely to commence when he allegedly destroyed the
evidence on his laptop that could be relevant to this litigation. While [Plaintiff] may argue the
Comcast e-mails [Defendant] received in 2014 should have put him on notice of potential
copyright-infringement litigation, the e-mails provide no indication litigation was imminent; in
fact, they made no mention of litigation at all. Moreover, there is no indication in the record
[Defendant] received an e-mail pertaining to the specific copyrighted work at issue in this case,
Dallas Buyers Club. Thus, [Defendant] had no notice litigation was likely to be commenced; he
therefore had no duty to protect potential evidence contained on his laptop.").
aoo. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 82 F. Supp. 3 d 65o, 658 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ("[Plaintiff] of
course has no standing to complain of alleged infringement of works to which it does not hold
the copyrights. Because the alleged spoliation is not relevant to [Plaintiff]'s claims in this
case ... we hold there has been no actual suppression of relevant evidence .... .").
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falls short of alleging that the defendant actually made a copy of the work.
This is not an oversight.
The black box process produces records of IP addresses that are
supposedly matched to specific file exchanges.0° Understanding what these
records do and do not show requires a short digression into Internet design
and a brief discussion of some technical details about BitTorrent. As we have
mentioned already, every time a file is seeded using BitTorrent, it is broken
down into pieces. Each piece has a "hash value" identifier, as does the seed
file itself. In computer science, a hash function is used to map information of
indeterminate size to a string of letters and digits of fixed size. A "perfect"
hash function will generate a unique hash for each unique input. For
example, as shown in Figure 2 below, the 128-bit hash for the Gettysburg
Address changes entirely if we change only the fourth last word from "perish"
to "vanish."
Figure 2: Text to Hash Value Illustration °2
e8oe6 5 afdl 3c24f7fc5 25 ce128 5 fab18
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation
or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a
great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a
final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It
is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But in a large sense, we
cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave
men, living and dead who struggled here have consecrated it far above our poor
power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say
here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living rather to be
dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far
as nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task
remaining before us-that from these honored dead we take increased devotion
to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion-that we here
highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under
God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the
people, for the people shall not UgiM from the earth.
101. Our understanding is that an agent of the plaintiff joins a BitTorrent swarm and sends
out requests for pieces of the target file. The agent receives pieces, but any request made to the
agent's software to send a piece of the file is rejected.
102. For this illustration, we used the text of the Gettysburg Address at, Abraham Lincoln,
The GettysburgAddress, ESERVER http://history.eserver.org/gettysburg-address.txt (last visited Oct.
28, 2017), and an online hash value generator, MD5 Hash Generator, DAN'S TOOLS,
http://www.md5hashgenerator.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
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Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are
created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation
or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure. We are met on a
great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a
final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It
is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But in a large sense, we
cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this ground. The brave
men, living and dead who struggled here have consecrated it far above our poor
power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say
here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living rather to be
dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far
as nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task
remaining before us-that from these honored dead we take increased devotion
to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion-that we here
highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under
God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the
people, for the people shall not vanish from the earth.
Hash identifiers are used in BitTorrent to check errors. The hash
identifier for a particular piece is compared to the hash identifier recorded
in the torrent descriptor file for that piece every time it is downloaded. Courts
sometimes say, "the hash identifier works like an electronic fingerprint," but
this is only true if that piece is downloaded in full. Information does not flow
across the Internet like water flows from a hose. Instead, it is bundled into
discrete "packets." The fact that packets can be transmitted along different
routes and received out of order makes the Internet flexible and resistant to
central attack. Packets each contain instructions for delivery and assembly,
i.e., where they should go and how they fit with other packets. Each packet is
very small. A typical packet is around 1,5oo bytes; a standard motion picture,
even in the compressed formats popular on file-sharing networks, is around
900,000,000 bytes. This means that about 6oo,ooo packets of data are
required to download an average film using BitTorrent. Critically, the smallest
piece of any file is still much larger than the standard packet, and thus even
individual pieces are transmitted in several packets.
The plaintiffs' black box process records some individual packets of data
associated with a given IP address, but these packets do not add up to much
by themselves. Combined with other packets, they may add up to a piece of
the copyrighted work at issue, or they may not. So, if we think of a file as a
completed jigsaw puzzle with a unique identifying number, then the pieces of
that puzzle are like the pieces that BitTorrent breaks the file down into.
However, as illustrated in Figure 3, the data transmitted in one single packet
is like a fragment of a piece of a puzzle.
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Figure 3: File, Piece and Packet Illustrated as Puzzle, Piece and Fragment
Puzzle/File Puzzle Piece/Piece Fragment/Packet
The plaintiffs' black box records individual packets along with a
timestamp and a hash value. These records are kept in Packet Capture files
("PCAPs") and are stored in a file format that ensures they cannot be altered
after the fact. Plaintiffs often describe in great detail the inviolability of the
'"ORM" drives they use to secure these recordings,°3 but this is largely a
distraction from the gaps in their evidence. In the cases we have been able to
examine, the plaintiff's technology provider does not record the entire work
being transmitted to or from the John Doe; it does not even record an entire
piece of the work-piece in the technical sense meaning a piece as defined
by the initial seeder.104 Instead, it simply records a few packets of data, which
are just tiny fragments of pieces of the work.°5 One of the frequently used
technology providers, Excipio, apparently records 16 kilobytes of data for
each member of a swarm.
How small is 16 kilobytes?
In Elf-Man, LLC v. Lamberson, the 16,397 bytes of data transmitted
between the investigator's machine and the IP address associated the
defendant was, 0.002196195 1 % of the estimated 746,609,456 bytes that the
file itself comprised. - 6 In seconds, this amounts to 115 milliseconds of an 87
minute long film.l°7 In literary terms this would amount to the words "Mr.
and" from the first line of the 76,944 words in Harry Potter and the Philosopher's
103. WORM stands for Write Once Read Many and describes a data storage device in which
information, once written, cannot be modified.
104. Cohen, supra note 47 ("[P]iece length is almost always a power of two, most commonly
2 [to the power of] 18 = 256 K (BitTorrent prior to version 3.2 uses 2 [to the power of] 20 = 1 M
as default).").
105. See Expert Report of Bradley Witteman, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 3:15-cv-
o 4 4 4 i-WHA, 2017 WL 2987894, at *37 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017), ECF No. 144-5; Elf-man, LLC
v. Lamberson, No. 2:1 3 -cv-00 3 9 5 -TOR, 2014 WL 11513119, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2014).
1 o6. Declaration of J. Christopher Lynch in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees,
Elf-man, LLC v. Lamberson, No. 13 -CV-o3 9 5-TOR, (E.D. Wash. August 11, 2014), ECF No. 95.
107. Id.
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Stone.'° 8 There is no technical reason that would prevent the technology
provider from recording more data to show that an entire work was
transmitted. The reason for this limited gathering of evidence appears to be
related to the cost of storage.'°9
One problem here is that although anyone can verify the hash value of a
piece-and thus determine that piece X, is part of file X-no one can verify
the hash value of less than the complete piece. Anything less than the original
piece would by definition have a different hash value. No doubt, there are
other ways to compare the content of less-than-a-piece to the original file, but
it is far from clear that the plaintiffs contention that their technology
provider observed the hash value of the fragment exchanged with defendant
proves anything. Imagine if the only evidence of a traffic violation was a
declaration that some custom-made software had recorded a particular
license plate going through a red light. Naturally, the defendant would want
a chance to examine that software, have it tested, find out who used it, and
validate how it had been used. No defendant would simply accept a
spreadsheet printout that showed only a street address and her license plate
number as incontrovertible evidence of her guilt. This is why government red
light cameras provide photos and notjust lists of license plates.l Io
This raises a fundamental problem. The plaintiffs PCAP evidence fails to
prove that the defendant reproduced a substantial portion of any copyrighted
work. The spreadsheet of hash values and timestamps plaintiffs usually
provide with their complaints only purport to show a one second connection
between the John Doe's IP address and the plaintiff's black box data
collector-a snapshot of a download that supposedly occurred. Plaintiffs
could easily do a better job here. The pieces that a peer has obtained are
specified in a "bitfield" and this information is transferred at the beginning of
the connection between any two peers.' Thus, the bitfield should be at the
beginning of the packet capture-in other words, it is in the PCAP files
already if anyone would care to look. It should be easy for the plaintiff to show
that a particular swarm member had downloaded anywhere from o% to i oo%
of the file in question. Plaintiffs must have this data, but they do not include
it in their pleadings or in any of their usual exhibits. It may be that this is
because plaintiffs do not wish to confine their accusations to IP addresses that
have in fact been associated with downloading substantial portions of their
works.
so8. Id.
1 o9. See, e.g., Declaration of Plaintiffs Expert at 4-5, Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe, 1: 13-
cv-o6312, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2013) (describing the use of expensive WORM drives to store
investigation data).
iso. See, e.g., City Yellow Lights Too Short, Judge Says Before Tossing Red Light Tickets, EXPIRED
METER (Aug. 12, 2014), http://theexpiredmeter.com/2o1 4/o8/city-yellow-lights-too-short-judge-says-before-tossing-red-light-tickets (illustrating notice of violation).
1 11. Cohen, supra note 47.
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Several courts have rejected this so-called "snapshot theory" of pleading
in BitTorrent cases because a snapshot does not prove what happened next.
If plaintiffs want to allege a copy was made, they should collect evidence that
a copy was made, not simply that a small fraction of a copy was made.
Moreover, copying a small fraction does not amount to copyright
infringement in these circumstances because a small fraction of a piece of the
copyrighted work is not sufficiently "substantially similar" to the original to
prove infringement.-2
Furthermore, a digital file that is too incomplete to play is not technically
a "copy" of the work at all under the Copyright Act. Section 1o6(1) of the
Copyright Act provides that "the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive right[] ... to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies."",3 Section
ioi defines copies in the following terms:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
"copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.,4
In ordinary circumstances, a person who reproduced one chapter of a
copyrighted novel would seem to have reproduced a substantial part of the
work in a copy. Assuming copying in fact has been established, the test for
whether the threshold for infringement has been met by an act of partial
reproduction is usually expressed in terms of whether the ordinary observer
would regard the two works as substantially similar or whether the amount
reproduced is quantitatively and qualitatively significant.,'5 Prior to the
substantial completion of a BitTorrent download, a file is simply "an
112. See, e.g., Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:12-cv-o8 3 3 3 -ODW-JC, 2013 WL 765102, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013) ("This snapshot allegedly shows that the Defendants were downloading
the copyrighted work-at least at that moment in time. But downloading a large file like a video
takes time .... In fact, it may take so long that the user may have terminated the download. The
user may have also terminated the download for other reasons. To allege copyright infringement
based on an IP snapshot is akin to alleging theft based on a single surveillance camera shot: a
photo of a child reaching for candy from a display does not automatically mean he stole it. No
Court would allow a lawsuit to be filed based on that amount of evidence."); see also Malibu Media,
LLC v.John Doe, 82 F. Supp. 3 d 65o, 658 (E.D. Pa. 2015) ("As to the snippet of 'Good Night
Kiss,' ... [i]t is not a copy of the work itself. Our Court of Appeals's 'substantial similarity' test
obliges us to determine whether Doe copied from the plaintiffs work and whether the copying,
if proven, constitutes an improper appropriation. Here we determine as a matter of law that there
was no improper appropriation because no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that
the data snippet bears a 'substantial similarity' to Malibu Media's copyrighted work.").
113. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C§ o6(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
114. Id. § 1o1 (emphasis added).
115. See, e.g., Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3 d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In most cases, the test for
substantial similarity is the 'ordinary observer test,' which queries whether an average lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.").
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encrypted, unusable chunk of zeroes and ones"-it is not a "copy" at all within
the legal definition.",6 It is not a copy because it is not a material object in
"which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."-7 The argument that a few
fragments of a single piece of a work could ever meet the substantial similarity
threshold seems tenuous in any context. However, in the context of partial
digital files, it should be a nonstarter. We say should be because we are not
aware of anyone that has made this argument before, but to us it is
compelling.
2. The Black Box Has Credibility Problems
The reason we describe the plaintiffs' system for identifying supposed
instances of infringement and alleged infringers as a black box is because the
corporate entities, people, software, and processes relied upon to prove
infringement are somewhat shadowy and opaque. All of the key plaintiffs in
the John Doe file-sharing cases from 2015 and 2o16-8 rely, at least in part,
on investigation and technical assistance based in Germany.-9 The corporate
identity of the German company or companies providing this assistance is a
matter of some speculation, but there are overlaps and coincidences to
suggest that these companies--Guardaley, IPP International, Excipio Gmbh,
and MaverickEye UG-are all essentially the same entity or are at least
controlled by the same people.120
We cannot stress enough how strange it is that the plaintiffs rely on
overseas technical advisers to collect their evidence. BitTorrent is somewhat
technical, but the skills required are hardly unique to Germany. Connecting
to peers, downloading data, performing packet captures, and storing and
parsing the PCAP files are all well-understood tasks. Furthermore, most of
these tasks can be performed using open source versions of the BitTorrent
client and other off-the-shelf products.
Why Germany is one question; another is: Who exactly are these
technical advisors? The corporations and people that comprise the black box
(or boxes) form such a labyrinth that the only way to make sense of it is to
pull on a thread and see where it leads. We begin with the Crystal Bay Corp.
In at least 485 cases, plaintiffs have relied upon evidence gathered by Crystal
116. Ingenuity 13 LLC, 2013 WL 765102, at *3.
117. 17 U.S.C § 101 (emphasis added).
118. See infraAppendix A (listing plaintiff filing lo or moreJohn Doe suits in 2015 and 2016).
1 19. It might seem that KillerJoe Nevada, LLC is the exception to this rule. KillerJoe Nevada,
LLC has obtained early discovery without providing any underlying declaration in several cases.
See, e.g., Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion to Expedite Discovery, Killer Joe Nev., LLC v. Doe, No. 3:15-
cv-01772 (D. Or. Sept. 18, 2015), ECF No. 3. In other cases, KillerJoe Nevada relied on "Darren
M. Griffin" of Crystal Bay Corp.
120. See infra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
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Bay Corp. and its "software consultant," Darren M. Griffin.12 However,
Darren M. Griffin does not appear to exist, and Crystal Bay Corp. seems to be
merely a "shelf corporation.", 22
Another figure associated with Crystal Bay Corp. is Daniel Macek."3
Daniel Macek is also apparently a consultant to MaverickEye UG, and his
declarations in that capacity are almost identical to his ones on behalf of
Crystal Bay Corp.124 Yet he also works at IPP.125 We know that Mr. Macek exists,
because he has been cross-examined in an Australian court, and during the
course of that cross-examination, Macek admitted to not preparing his own
affidavit." 6 Macek's declarations are quite similar to those of Daniel Arheidt,
who is also a consultant to MaverickEye UG"7 and, at other times, IPP." 8 At
other times, Arheidt is the Director of Data Services for GuardaLey,
International.,9 More curious still, when a defense attorney in Elf-man, LLC
v. Lamberson telephoned the number for Mr. Macek (who declared himself to
be a consultant for Crystal Bay Corp.) provided in his Initial Disclosures, the
121. See, e.g., Declaration of Darren M Griffin in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to
Take Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference at 1, Zambezia Film (Pty,) Ltd. v. Does 1-37, No.
1:1 3 -cv-oo 3 9 2-WYD-MEH (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2013). We have included a list of 485 such cases,
sorted by district, in Appendix F. See infra Appendix F.
122. See Declaration of J. Christopher Lynch in Support of Defendant's Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions at 1 o, Elf-Man, LLC v. Lamberson, No. 2:13-cv-oo395 (E.D. Wash. July 21, 2014), ECF
No. 81. Over s go Declarations of a "Darren M. Griffin" have been filed in multiple Districts on
behalf of multiple BitTorrent plaintiffs. See infra Appendix F.
123. See Declaration of Daniel Macek in Support of Plaintiff, Countryman Nevada, LLC's,
Motion for Leave to Serve Non-Party Subpoena Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference at i, Countryman
Nev., LLC v. Doe 38, No. 8:1 4 -cv-oo7 61-JDW-TBM (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2014), ECF No. 6-2;
Declaration of Daniel Macek in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Take Discovery Prior
to Rule 26(f) Conference at s, Dall. Buyers Club, LLCv. Does 1-39, No. 1:14-cv-o2153 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 7, 2014).
124. Declaration of Daniel Macek in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Take
Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference, Automata Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-19, No. 1:1 5-cv-06423
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2015); Declaration of Daniel Macek in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to Take Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference, Clear Skies Nev., LLC, v. Does 1-3 o , No. 1:15-
cv-05736 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2015).
125. Declaration of Tobias Fieser at 1, Malibu Media, LLC v. Bui, 1:1 3 -cv-00162-RJJ (W.D.
Mich. May 14, 2014).
126. Ben Grubb, Pirate HunterDanid Maeks Evidence, Integrity UnderFme in Australian Landmark Web
Piracy Case, SYDNEYMORNINGHERALD (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-
news/pirate-hunter-danie-maceks-evidence-integrity-under-fire-in-austraian-andmark-web-piracy-
case-20150217-13hlnd.html.
127. See, e.g., Declaration of Daniel Arheidt in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Take
Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference at i, Criminal Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-22, No. 2:16-cv-
oi9 68-RFB-CWH (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2016).
128. See, e.g., Affidavit of Daniel Arheidt, Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:14-cv-00223 (D.
Md.Jan. 27, 2014).
129. See, e.g., Declaration of Daniel Arheidt in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Take
Discovery Prior to Rule 26(f) Conference, Nu Image, Inc. v. Does s-6,5oo, No. 1:i i-cv-00301-
RLW (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2011).
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phone was answered "GuardaLey."'13 Guardaley, LLC is controlled by Ben
Perino and Patrick Achache and a recent lawsuit by James S. Davis, a former
plaintiff's lawyer in several BitTorrent cases, suggests that the various other
technical services providers are merely fronts for Guardaley. In July 2017,
Davis filed suit against another plaintiffs lawyer and several copyright trolls
alleging that those parties deceived him into participating in a copyright
litigation campaign by withholding "numerous material facts ... which would
have cast doubt on the value and ethical propriety of' that campaign.,3, The
Davis lawsuit refers to "Guardaley and its front companies."132
What does this rather unedifying game of six degrees of separation show?
Without further discovery, it is difficult to say, but given the corporate shell
games and game of musical chairs played by the various declarants,
defendants surely will have questions about the credibility of the black box.
These credibility questions are compounded by the admission that at least one
technology provider was working on a contingency fee basis in Malibu Media
cases.' 3 As the First Circuit explained in Crowe v. Bolduc, "The majority rule in
this country is that an expert witness may not collect compensation which by
agreement was contingent on the outcome of a controversy. That rule was
adopted precisely to avoid even potential bias."'134 In some states this amounts
to an ethical violation by the lawyer who procured the testimony. Surprisingly,
nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly bars testimony from
contingent fee experts, but such evidence may be excluded in some
jurisdictions. At the very least, the contingency fee arrangement is grounds
upon which the fact finder may discount the witness's credibility.'35
13 o . Declaration of J. Christopher Lynch in Support of Defendant's Motion for Attorney's
Fees, supra note io6, at 2o.
131. Complaint at 5, Davis v. Crowell, No. 3 7 -201 7 -00024 9 09 -CU-BT-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 03, 2017).
132. Id. at 4 .
133. The plaintiff in Malibu Media, LLC. v. Doe, No. 1:13-cv-o6312 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
responded to an interrogatory on this issue as follows:
IPP International UG, is a fact witness who will testify that its technology detected
that a person using Defendant's IP address was downloading and distributing
Plaintiff's copyrighted works. Pursuant to an oral contingency fee agreement, IPP
International UG is entitled to a small portion of the proceeds from the resolution
of this case in consideration for the services it provides.
Motion to Bar Testimony of IPP International UG and for an Order Requiring Malibu to Show
Cause Why It and Its Counsel Should Not Be Sanctioned Pursuant to § 1927 & This Court's
Inherent Authority at 6, Malibu Media, LLC. v. John Doe, No. 1:1 3-cv-o6312 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4,
2013 ), ECF No. 27.
134. Crowe v. Bolduc, 3 3 4 F.3 d 124, 132 (st Cir. 2003); see also 3 3 A FEDERAL PROCEDURE,
LAWYERS EDITION § 80:369 (2017) ("In order to avoid even the potential for bias, a contract to
give evidence for a compensation contingent upon the outcome of the case is illegal.").
135. In rejoy Recovery Tech. Corp., 286 B.R. 54, 69 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002).
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3. Defendants Never Get to See Inside the Black Box
More importantly, by relying on a black box (or even multiple black
boxes) located in Germany, whose activities are distributed between various
corporate entities, employees, and "consultants," the principals behind the
BitTorrent monetization litigation have made it very difficult to scrutinize the
inner workings of the black box.3 6 For example, in Malibu Media, LLC. v. Doe,
the plaintiff relied on evidence from two supposedly distinct companies, but
relied on a witness who was only passingly familiar with one.37 That witness
provided no real insight into the black box process, as he had not actually
seen the PCAP files that supposedly evidenced infringement,,s 8 and he had
no relevant expertise with the software used to create them.,s9
By setting up the black box (or black boxes) overseas, the plaintiffs make
it very hard to depose witnesses or to investigate their technology. By dividing
the functions of the black box into layers, the plaintiffs add another layer of
obfuscation: They claim that the workings of the software are a trade secret
and thus undiscoverable. Essentially, the plaintiffs seek to rely on the results
of a black box process without providing any details of how the process works
or, indeed, if it works at all.14o We do not suggest that the plaintiffs never
identify actual infringers, but we know that they often identify targets who can
136. To see just how murky the black box is, take for example Michael Patzer. Patzer has
been a key witness for Malibu Media, and he apparently wrote the software that various plaintiffs
rely upon. In a Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe case filed in Maryland, Patzer identifies himself as an
employee of IPP Limited. However, when Malibu's counsel suggested that, "you don't actually
work for IPP, Limited. You said you work for a firm that provides these services to IPP, Limited,
correct?" Patzer agreed. Nonetheless, he continued to refer to IPP as "we" throughout his
deposition. See ISP Subscriber's Reply in Support of Motion for an Order to Show Cause as to
Why All Evidence and Data from Tobias Fieser and His Company IPP Should Not Be Precluded
and These Cases Dismissed at 14, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:14-cv-o0223-MJG (D.
Md..Jan. 27, 2014), ECF No. 27. More confusing still, in Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-
cv-3504 (JFB) (SIL), 2016 BL 273204, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016), Michael Patzer is described
as "Senior Assistant Architect for the German copyright infringement detection firm Excipio,"
but in Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 13-cv-6312, 2016 BL 34458, at *3 (N.D. 111. Feb. 8,
2016), he is "Excipio's independent contractor, Mr. Michael Patzer."
137. See Response to: Plaintiff's Notice Advising that Record Expert Evidence from Patrick
Paige Explains PCAP Computer Files at 2, Malibu Media, LLC. V. Doe, No. ':I 3-cv-o6312 (N.D.
Ill. February 8, 2016), ECF No. 174 ("Mr. Paige asserts he inspected IPP's software, not the
Excipio software used in this case.").
138. See id. ("Moreover, Paige cannot provide sufficient foundation for any PCAPs involved
in this case. Otherwise editable PCAPs are kept on WORM drives that Malibu does not have and
will not bring to trial. ECF Doc 100-2, p. 2 (WORM drives are not in Malibu's control and none
will be presented as evidence at trial). Nothing indicates Paige has seen the PCAPs involved in
this case.").
139. See id. ("Finally, nothing in Patrick Paige's Curriculum Vitae suggests or intimates that
he is an expert in networking protocols governing the transfer of data on the Internet. Indeed,
the opposite is true.").
140. Patzer was deposed for the first time on October 13, 2016. See Exhibit 24 Transcript of
the Deposition of Michael Patzer on October 13, 2016 at 1, Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 3:15-
cv-o4 4 4 i-WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017), ECF No. 144-24.
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prove they were out of town or overseas at the time of the supposed
infringement and others who are supposed to have downloaded movies in
languages they do not speak.'4' Once a process has been shown to be prone
to error, it seems reasonable to question how common those errors might be,
what caused them, etc. Answering these questions means getting inside the
black box. The plaintiff's "expert" reports insisting that the technology
provider's processes are foolproof must be treated with some skepticism if
they fail to explain why infallible systems result in false positives from time to
time.
Plaintiffs have also sought to avoid scrutiny by presenting expert witnesses
who set up and monitor the black box system as merely fact or lay witnesses.142
The argument is that anybody could testify to the same facts after merely
downloading and running the monitoring software and reviewing the
resulting list of alleged instances of infringement. This keeps the experts from
being deposed in a normal fashion and ensures that they can provide their
testimony from the comfort of their home countries.'43 This strategy failed
spectacularly in Malibu Media v. John Doe.,44 In that case, forensic examination
of the defendant's electronic devices produced no evidence of
infringement.145 Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that technical evidence
gathered by its forensic investigators in Germany demonstrated that the
defendant had copied and distributed its works. The plaintiff relied on
declarations by Tobias Fieser and Michael Patzer for that evidence but failed
to disclose those witnesses as experts under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.4 6 In her memorandum opinion and order granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Magistrate Judge noted that,
when challenged to identify exactly which pieces of the plaintiffs copyrighted
work came from the defendant, Malibu's counsel said:
It is very technical, your Honor. And perhaps the remedy for the issue
is for them to have an expert look at the PCAP []s, the SQL files in
the spreadsheets that we have given them, because that's all we
141. Notice of Appeal by Defendant Leo Pelizzo at 4, Malibu Media LLC v. Pelizzo, No. 14-
1 1795, 604 Fed. App'x 879 (1 ith Cir. 2015) (defendant tendered evidence that he was out of
the country at the time of alleged infringement).
142. See, e.g., Malibu Media LLC. v. John Doe, No. 1:I 3-cv-o6312, 2016 WL 464045, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2016) ("[The expert] also states that he has testified 'as a fact witness' in a trial
of consolidated cases for Malibu, and that he is not paid by Malibu for his testimony.").
143. There are significant obstacles to deposing a witness in Germany under the Hague
Convention on the taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of 1970. Hague
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, apened for signature
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
144. Malibu Media LLC, 2016 WL 4 64 04 5 .
145. Id. at *5.
146. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a) (2) requires a formal disclosure of any witness
who is to give testimony based on scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge. FED.
R Civ. P. 26(a) (2).
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have... They are trying to get us to interpret that data for them
when, first of all, I can't do it, my client can't do it.147
In another exchange, Malibu's counsel also admitted, "It is very
complicated. And I'm not going to stand here and say that I understand the
technical aspects of it because it is way over my head."4 The court had little
choice but to conclude that the proffered testimony was that of a "witness who
is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or
education" under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, as opposed to lay witness
opinion under Federal Rules of Evidence 701. The testimony of both
witnesses required familiarity with specialized software and with reading and
analyzing data in the form of PCAPs. As underscored by Malibu's own
counsel's protests quoted above, this is something no lay witness would
comprehend, let alone be able to perform. As far as we know, this software is
not documented, and has not been authenticated.149 What is more, any
evidence produced by the black box software is vulnerable to an attack under
Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which requires the trial judge to act
as a gatekeeper against evidence that is not reliable.,5o Under Daubert, a court
should consider (1) whether a theory or technique "can be (and has been)
tested"; (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication"; (3) "the known or potential rate of error"; and
(4) whether it is generally accepted in the scientific community.'5' The black
box software is none of these things, because it has never been seen or tested
by anyone not connected to a plaintiff in file-sharing litigation.
C. WHYDO SucH WEAK CASES PERSIST?
In light of all of the weaknesses in the plaintiffs case addressed thus far,
the obvious question is why do so many people settle? There are many possible
answers to this question. Some defendants may settle because they know they
were in fact responsible for the infringement and they reason it is better to
pay now than to pay more later. The threat of statutory damages up to
$15o,ooo per work infringed plus attorneys' fees is obviously also a great
motivator for settlement. In the Malibu Media cases, some defendants may
also wish to avoid being named in a lawsuit involving pornography. For
reasons that are well documented, many people targeted by copyright trolls
will not seek legal assistance and will be overawed by the evidence that
147. Malibu Media LLC, 2016 WL 464o4 5, at*9 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at *1o (emphasis added).
149. See Exhibit 5 Expert Report of Bradley Witteman, December 15, 2016, Malibu Media, LLC v.
Doe, No. 3:15-cv-o444 1-WHA, 2016 WL 3383758 (N.D. Cal.June 20, 2016), ECF No. 144-5.
15o. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
151. Id. at 5 9 3- 94 .
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supposedly exists against them.152 Furthermore, defendants may seek legal
advice from attorneys who do not know enough about copyright litigation to
realize how weak the plaintiff's case is or who rightly conclude on a cost-
benefit analysis that it would be cheaper to settle than to properly investigate
the strength of the claim. Finally, and most dishearteningly, some defense
lawyers prefer to settle every case, even when presented with concrete proof
that the defendant could not have infringed.153
As stated in the Introduction, our objective in this Article is to make it
easier for lawyers without substantial experience in copyright law or a deep
understanding of the Internet to defend their clients against copyright trolls.
In our view, lawyers should not charge large fees to settle weak allegations but
instead should either charge low fees for quick settlements for actual
infringers or reasonable fees to defend their non-infringing clients. In the
next Part, we map out a strategy for fighting copyright trolls that takes into
account each of the weaknesses addressed thus far.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST COPYRIGHT TROLLS
In this Part, we map out a fairly comprehensive strategy for defending
against copyright trolls. We have compartmentalized the strategy into four
distinct stages: Stage I begins with the copyright owner's complaint and
addresses motions to quash and motions to proceed anonymously; Stage II
begins when the plaintiff amends its generic complaint to name an individual
defendant; Stage III spans from discovery to summary judgment; and finally,
Stage IV encompasses the trial.
Compartmentalizing the various stages of litigation in this fashion should
give lawyers and their clients some idea of what to expect. We also recognize
that clients vary in terms of their social capital, financial resources, attitude
toward risk, culpability, and sense of moral outrage. We have tried to
anticipate some of this variation in the strategies we outline below, but we
recognize that generic responses to generic accusations of copyright
infringement can only go so far.
A. STAGE I: CoMPLAINT, SUBPOENA, THREAT LETTER, AND RESPONSE
The first stage begins with the plaintiff s initial John Doe complaint,
spans third-party discovery and the plaintiffs threat letter, and concludes with
a letter on behalf of the defendant. Many cases will crumble at the end of
Stage I, and lawyers should consider offering representation up to the end of
Stage I for a low fixed fee (in the hundreds, not thousands). In most cases, all
152. See Latonia Haney Keith, Poverty, the Great Unequalizer: Improving the Delivery Systemfor Civil
LegalAid, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 55, 66 (2o16).
153. In a conversation with one of the authors, one defense attorney, when presented with
exactly this fact pattern, said, "I could get you a pretty good settlement, maybe $1,500 or so."
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that the defense lawyer needs to do at Stage I is to interview the client and
respond to a boilerplate complaint with a general denial.154
1. The Complaint
Stage I begins when the plaintiff files a complaint alleging that one or
more John Does infringed its copyrights by engaging in online file sharing.
The complaints are boilerplate and contain almost no specifics other than a
list of copyrighted works and IP addresses. At this stage, the complaint is
primarily a pretext to obtain third-party discovery orders to compel various
ISP's to disgorge the account details of their subscribers.
2. Subpoena, Motions to Quash and to Sever
Typically, an ISP will notify its customers before responding to a
subpoena. This gives the defendant a chance to challenge the subpoena
before her information is revealed, i.e., before the issue becomes moot.
Defense attorneys, or even pro se defendants, may wish to consider a motion
to quash the plaintiff's subpoena, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45(c (3) (A).'55 Ordinarily, "[a] party may not seek discovery from any source
before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a
proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a) (1) (B), or
when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order";5 6 however,
a court may allow early discovery for good cause.?57 Countering the plaintiff's
arguments for good cause is key to quashing its subpoena.
One argument against early discovery is that, even when the plaintiff
obtains the account holder's personal information, it will not be any closer to
making a prima facie case connecting a specific defendant to the alleged
infringement. Courts take different views as to whether the inference that the
account holder is the infringer is strong enough to sustain a third-party
subpoena.' 58 As one court noted: "[Plaintiff] has not established a violation
154. See infra Appendix B.
155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) (3) (A).
156. IdR. 26(d)(/).
157. See Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F-3 d i lo, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that five
factors to consider in a determination of whether good cause exists are "(1) [the] concrete[ness
of the plaintiffs] showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm.... (2) [the] specificity of
the discovery request, ... (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the subpoenaed
information .... (4) [the] need for the subpoenaed information to advance the claim .... and
(5) the [objecting] party's expectation of privacy" (quoting Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does
1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))).
158. For an example, see Malibu Media, LLC v.John Doe, No. 1:1 4 -cv-2o213 -UU, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18532 4 , at *4-5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2014) (inference that account holder is infringer
or is able to identify infringer is not sufficient to grant subpoena); the opposite inference is made
every time ajudge grants a subpoena based on an IP address.
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by the individual to whom the relevant IP address is registered.",59 In our view, a
court should not allow early discovery to reveal the personal information of
the account holder linked to an IP address unless and until the plaintiff
presents credible evidence regarding the methodology used to associate the
IP address with a particular act of infringement. Plaintiffs in several cases have
relied on experts who had no personal knowledge of the facts about which
they testified and have instead simply asserted that the methods used by the
plaintiffs were the same as those used by law enforcement and that, in other
contexts, the account holder is always the infringer., 60 Even just as a basis of
discovery, this level of proof is utterly inadequate. 61e
Even if a court was inclined to allow discovery to determine the account
holder behind an IP address in some circumstances, it may refuse to do so
because of other weaknesses in the plaintiff's initial case. An essential part of
the plaintiffs good cause argument is that it can establish a prima facie claim
for copyright infringement. The problem here is that, as discussed in Part II,
plaintiffs do not appear to collect enough evidence to establish infringement.
As one court noted in this context, "[Plaintiff] conspicuously fails to present
any evidence thatJohn Doe either uploaded, downloaded, or even possessed
a complete copyrighted video file.' ' i62 Another court candidly found that
"individual BitTorrent file pieces are worthless... [and] that [plaintiff] 's case
is weak if all it can prove is that the Doe Defendants transmitted only part of
all the BitTorrent pieces of the copyrighted work."'63
In multiple-defendant cases, a defendant can challenge the plaintiffs
subpoena on the basis of improper joinder. This can be done either as a
motion to quash or as a motion to sever.164 Motions to sever the defendant
from a large number of other defendants are typically granted,165 while attacks
onjoinder for smaller numbers of defendants may or may not be successfu,66
159. See, e.g., Order and Opinion at 9, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:I5-cv-04369-
AKH, 2015 WL 4092417, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); VPR Internationale v. Does 1-1017, No.
1I-CV-O2o68, 2011 WL 8179128, at *1-2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 201 1) ("IP subscribers are not
necessarily copyright infringers.... The infringer might be the subscriber, someone in the
subscriber's household, a visitor with her laptop, a neighbor, or someone parked on the street at
any given moment.").
16o. See, e.g., Declaration of Patrick Paige at 2, Good Man Prods., Inc. v. John Doe, No. 2:14-
cv-0 7 9 o2-SRC-CLW (D.NJ Dec. 22, 2014).
161. See, e.g., Memorandum and Order, Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:15-cv-0 1 88 3 -LTS-
KNF (S.D.N.Y.June 5, 2015), ECF No. 20.
162. Order and Opinion at i o, Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:1 5 -cv-o4 3 6 9 -AKH (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 2015).
163. Malibu Media, LLC v. Does 1-io, No. 2:12-cv-03 62 3 -ODW-PJWx, 2012 WL 5382304, at
*3 (C.D. Cal.June 27, 2012).
164. For discussion of the merits ofjoinder, see supra Part IIIA.3.
165. See, e.g., Elf-man, LLC v. Lamberson, No. 13 -cv-o395-TOR, 2014 WL 11513119, at *8
(E.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2014).
166. For the reasons addressed supra Part IIIA.3 .
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In the alternative, the defendant can challenge the subpoena for lack of
personal jurisdiction.167
In addition to these specific objections, some courts have refused to allow
early discovery due to their concerns about the connection between file-
sharing litigation and abusive litigation tactics., 68 One judge described the
problem succinctly: "[Plaintiff's] corporate strategy relies on aggressively
suing for infringement and obtaining accelerated discovery of the IP address
holder's identity from the ISP. It then seeks quick, out-of-court settlements
which, because they are hidden, raise serious questions about misuse of court
procedure."169 This argument is more persuasive when directed to plaintiffs
or law firms with some history of stepping over the line. An attorney for Malibu
Media, for example, has been sanctioned for repeatedly including irrelevant
information in filings designed to embarrass defendants.7o
A strong note of caution is appropriate: Filing a motion to quash may
simply put the defendant in the plaintiffs cross hairs and could actually
reduce the chance of a voluntary dismissal. It may also consume defense
resources that are better spent elsewhere.
167. For the reasons discussed supra Part I.A.4 .
168. See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 8o, 89
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The most persuasive argument against permitting plaintiffs to proceed with
early discovery arises from the clear indicia. .. that plaintiffs have employed abusive litigations
tactics to extract settlements from John Doe defendants."); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does
1-37, No. 2:12-cv-o12 5 9 -JAM-EFB, 2012 WL 2872832, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2012)
(observing that the federal courts are not flexible enough to be shaped into "cogs in a plaintiffs
copyright-enforcement business model" and admonishing that "[t]he Court will not idly watch
what is essentially an extortion scheme, for a case that [P]laintiff[s] ha[ve] no intention of
bringing to trial."); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-5, No. 12-cv-o29 5 o-JPO, 2012 WL
2001968, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) ("This Court shares the growing concern about
unscrupulous tactics used by certain plaintiffs, particularly in the adult films industry, to shake
down the owners of specific IP addresses from which copyrighted adult films were allegedly
downloaded."); Dig. Sins, Inc. v. John Does 1-245, No. 1-cv-o817o-CM, 2012 WL 1744838, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) ("In these BitTorrent cases ... numerous courts have already
chronicled abusive litigation practices."); SBO Pictures, Inc. v. Does 1-2o, No. 12-cv-o392 5 -SAS,
2012 WL 2034631, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.June 5, 2012) ("[E]arly discovery has been used repeatedly in
cases such as this one to harass and demand of defendants quick settlement payments, regardless
of their liability."); Dig. Sin, Inc. v. Does 1-176, 279 F.R.D. 239, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[P]laintiffs
have used the offices of the Court as an inexpensive means to gain the Doe defendants' personal
information and coerce payment from them. The plaintiffs seemingly have no interest in actually
litigating the cases, but rather simply have used the Court and its subpoena powers to obtain
sufficient information to shake down the John Does." (quoting Memorandum Order at 4,
K-Beech, Inc. v. Does 1-85, No. 1 1-cv-oo 4 69-JAG (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011), ECF No. 9)).
169. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 1:15-cv-0 4 369-AKH, at 7 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 28,2016) (order
denying leave to serve a third-party subpoena).
170. Id. at 8 ("[A] district court sanctioned [plaintiff] when it learned that [it] did not even
own the copyrights for the titles [included as exhibits in the complaint]; rather, it had gratuitously
listed them to coerce larger, faster settlements .. " (citing Malibu Media LLC v.John Doe, No.
3:13-cv-00205, 2013 WL 4 821 9 11, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 1o, 2013))); Malibu Media, LLC v.John
Doe, No. 2:13-cv-00536, 2013 WL 6579338, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2013).
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3. Motion to Proceed Anonymously
At this stage, lawyers should consider whether to file a motion to proceed
anonymously. These motions are routinely granted in pornography cases, and
we have included a sample in Appendix C.1'7 There is a presumption in civil
litigation that the parties' identities are public information. However, that
presumption, and any prejudice that concealment may cause the opposing
party, can be rebutted by a showing that harm to the party seeking to proceed
anonymously "exceeds the likely harm from concealment."172 To that end, a
court has a "duty to determine whether exceptional circumstancesjustify such
a departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts."'73
Such "exceptional circumstances" are present when anonymity is necessary
"to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature."74
This is especially true if the disputed work is pornographic, as "[a] n allegation
that an individual illegally downloaded adult entertainment likely goes to
matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature, including one's sexuality."' 75
In cases involving pornography, courts have proved receptive to the
argument that the Doe defendant would be embarrassed by the litigation and
potentially intimidated into settlement if named. Although courts have
recognized that plaintiffs have relied on the coercive power of social stigma
and tread very close to "extortion" in some cases, 76 no finding of bad faith or
sharp practice by the plaintiff should be necessary for the court to reach this
conclusion. Courts will generally permit defendants to proceed under a
pseudonym until the end of all dispositive motions in the case.
4. Threat Letter
The threat letters sent on behalf of various plaintiffs are all of a piece. We
focus here on the standard letter sent by PTG Nevada, as this letter is not
materially different from others we have seen.'77 The letter informs the
defendant that a lawsuit has been filed and his or her information has been
obtained from his or her ISP. PTG Nevada's standard letter states: "Your
contact information was supplied to us by your ISP as one of the [d] efendants
171. See infra Appendix C.
172. Jane Doe v. City of Chicago, 36o F.3 d 667, 669 (7 th Cir. 2004).
173. John Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United ofWis., 112 F.3 d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3 d 1448, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam)).
174. Does 1-23 v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F. 3 d 1058, io68 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
James v.Jacobson, 6 F. 3 d 233, 238 (4 th Cir. 1993)).
175. Third Degree Films v. Does 1-3577, No. 1 I-cv-o27 68-LB, 201 1 WL 5374569, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2011).
176. For judicial condemnation of "what is essentially an extortion scheme" and similar
statements, see supra note 27.
177. See infta Appendix E.
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who has illegally obtained or shared our client's copyrighted motion picture
through a peer-to-peer network .... 178
This statement is misleading because the ISP has not identified the
account holder as the infringer but has instead merely identified the
defendant as the account holder of a given IP address. The standard letter
continues:
According to our records, you have placed a media file which
contains the copyright-protected film content of our client's motion
picture entitled [name of film] in a shared folder location on your
computer .... In addition, we have evidence of the P2P client
software that you used to obtain or share the film, and evidence of
your file hash factor (a mathematical function through which a file
can be identified with certainty) which was [a long number, such as
A5 A78 4 63 69 4 R9 004 9 5 03 4 B5 B1 3 7 4 A2DEA 51 3 3 ]. We have also
obtained the file name of the movie, the file size and the GUID, all
corresponding to an IP address that was assigned to your ISP account
at the time the infringing activity occurred.79
This letter creates the impression that the plaintiff has detailed
knowledge of the inner workings of the defendant's computer, which is
almost certainly untrue. More significantly, these claims of omniscience are
difficult to square with the plaintiffs reluctance to provide such detailed
information in the course of discovery. The letter then moves on to explain
that copyright infringement is a very serious problem for the entertainment
industry and that the law provides various remedies, including attorneys' fees
and statutory damages in the range of $750 to $15o,ooo per work infringed.
The letter then proposes a settlement in the following terms:
In exchange for a comprehensive release of all legal claims which will
enable you to avoid becoming a named Defendant in the lawsuit,
our firm is authorized to accept the sum of $3,9oo as for settlement
for its claims. This offer will expire on [a date 14 days after the date
of the letter]. Thereafter, our client will accept no less than the sum
of $4,900 to settle this matter, but this increased settlement offer will
expire on [a date approximately one month from the date of the
letter] .... If you decide not to settle by [said date], we may add you
to the list of Defendants to be served with a copy of the complaint in
this lawsuit.,so
In short, you can avoid being named as a Defendant in the lawsuit if
you act now. You can pay the settlement amount by cashier's check,
178. Defendant's Rule 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss Exhibit B at 27-1, PTG Nev., LLC v. Does
1-24, No. 1:16-cv-oi621 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2016).
179. Id.
i8o. Id.
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money order or by credit card. Please contact us to arrange payment
and so we can forward a Release and Settlement Agreement. Once
we have processed the settlement, we will confirm that your payment
has been processed and that you have been dismissed from the
lawsuit.' 8
The letter then continues that the plaintiff will seek the $30,000
maximum in statutory damages for non-willful infringement and attorneys'
fees and that the plaintiff will attempt to establish willful infringement and
thereby seek the maximum statutory damages of $1 50,ooo.182 The letter notes
that, in Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the plaintiff was awarded
$675,ooo, an amount which breaks down to $22,500 for each song illegally
downloaded in that case. 8S In short, the threat letter appears to make a
compelling case for settling for a few thousand dollars now, rather than tens
of thousands or even hundreds of thousands later.
5. Letter in Response
The plaintiff's threat letter is primarily a bluff at this stage. The best
response to this bluff depends on the client: whether evidence of
infringement exists, his or her attitude to risk and uncertainty, financial
resources, etc. At a minimum, the response letter should indicate that the
defendant understands the weaknesses of the plaintiffs case, and it should
include any specific explanation available as to why the defendant could not
or would not have been the infringer. Of course, if the defendant would be
absolutely unable to pay any settlement amount and that information can be
communicated in a credible manner, this may be the easiest way to discourage
the plaintiff from pursuing the case.
B. STAGE II" AMENDED COMPLIANT, MOTION TO DISMISS, AND ANSWER
Stage II begins with the plaintiffs decision to move forward and amend
the complaint to name the defendant and ends with: (i) a successful motion
to dismiss; (2) a judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff; or (3) the
filing of an answer to the complaint. Lawyers could consider representing
innocent clients on a pro bono basis or relying on an award of attorneys' fees
to provide compensation for such representation.
1. Strategic Considerations
The most important strategic considerations at this stage are whether
there is incriminating evidence against the defendant, and whether to pursue
attorneys' fees. Contrary to the usual American Rule in civil litigation, the
Copyright Act provides that "the court in its discretion may allow the recovery
181. Id. at 27-2.
182. Id.
183. Sony BMG Music Entm't. v. Tenenbaum, 66o F. 3 d 487, 490 (ist Cir. 2011).
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of full costs by or against any party other than the United States" and that "the
court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part
of the costs." 8 4 For present purposes, it is sufficient to understand that the
defendant is unlikely to be entitled to attorneys' fees if it files a motion to
dismiss and the plaintiff responds with a voluntary dismissal.18 5 In order to
clearly satisfy the statutory requirement of being the "prevailing party," the
defendant seeking reimbursement for attorneys' fees should file an answer to
the complaint. This should be enough to secure prevailing party status.
However, some defendants have gone further and made counterclaims for a
declaration of noninfringement to stop the plaintiff from wriggling off the
hook. We do not recommend a counterclaim in this form; it adds nothing to
the denial of infringement and merely invites a tit-for-tat motion to dismiss
adding to the cost and complexity of litigation.
The advantage of attorneys' fees is obvious. However, pursuing attorneys'
fees may make the plaintiff's attorneys more likely to drag a case out and fight
for a draw if they are deprived of the option of simply walking. A motion to
dismiss allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to withdraw without additional
cost may better serve some clients.
2. When to Settle and How
Representing defendants with evidence of infringement on their
computer hard drive raises some additional strategic questions. Regrettably,
some clients will insist on their innocence even in the face of strongly
incriminating evidence. Defense lawyers need to know with certainty at some
point whether there is incriminating evidence on their client's hard drive. We
believe Stage II is the appropriate time to take that step or, at the very least,
get the defendant's hard drive "imaged," i.e., copied. If the client's hard drive
is clean, there is almost no reason to settle for anything less than the plaintiff
walking away. Lawyers should resist agreeing to nuisance value settlements
and settlement agreements that impose gag orders. In our view, the copyright
trolling business model has only lasted this long because of information
asymmetries. Plaintiffs tend to insist on settlement terms that perpetuate these
asymmetries. Thus, while we recognize that lawyers need to act in the best
interests of their clients, we are hopeful that, if made aware of this paradigm,
clients may wish to consider the social harm of private nuisance value
settlements and resist such terms.
If the client's hard drive is not clean, negotiating a reasonable settlement
becomes the top priority. However, lawyers should keep in mind that even
these cases could be won on a motion to dismiss that focuses on the plaintiff's
failure to satisfy modern pleading standards. Furthermore, demonstrating a
willingness to pursue a motion to dismiss is vital to obtaining a fair settlement.
184. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
185. See infra Part IV.B. 7 .
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Another prerequisite to obtaining a fair settlement is estimating the client's
potential exposure. This should be the basis of the defendant's best and final
offer position.
We suggest calculating the defendant's best and final offer position in
terms of the plaintiff's award based on minimum statutory damages, filing
fees, and a small allowance for attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs business model
operates at a very low marginal cost, and prior to discovery there should be
almost no costs or attorneys 'fees specifically attributable to the defendant's
case. To minimize exposure, the defendant should consider making an "Offer
ofJudgment" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. Rule 68 provides that
an offer of judgment can be made at any time more than 1o days before the
trial begins. 86 The offer must be definitive, unconditional, in writing, and
served upon the plaintiff.,87 If the offer is not accepted and "the judgment
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer."' 8 Ideally this would
mean that if the plaintiff rejects an offer of judgment that is more favorable
than its eventual recovery, the defendant is entitled to her attorneys' fees post-
offer. However, courts have not always applied Rule 68 this way in copyright
cases. At least some circuits hold that a losing copyright defendant cannot
recover his attorneys' fees under Rule 68 because it would contravene the
limitation of attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party" under § 505 of the
Copyright Act.'89 Paty on Copyright acknowledges that this is the majority
interpretation, and yet argues that it leads to absurd results and should be
rejected.90 We agree. The Eleventh Circuit and one district court have held
the defendant in a Rule 68 scenario is entitled to her attorneys' fees post-offer,
so the question remains open.,9,
Even under the less favorable interpretation of Rule 68, there are
significant benefits to making a valid Rule 68 offer ofjudgment if the plaintiff
prevails in an amount less than the offer. In this scenario, "(1) the plaintiff
may not collect its post-offer costs or attorneys' fees, and (2) [the] plaintiff
must pay defendant its postoffer costs."192
186. FED. R- CIv. P. 68.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); Harbor Motor Co. v. Arnell Chevrolet-Geo, Inc.,
265 F. 3 d 638 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Crossman v. Marcoccio, 8o6 F.2d 329 (st Cir. 1986).
19
o
. WILLIAM F. PATRY, 6 PATRYON COPYRIGHT § 22:218 (2017).
191. Jordan v. Time, Inc., III F. 3 d 102, 105 (ilth Cir. 1997) (copyright case); see also Lucas
v. Wild Dunes Real Estate, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 172, 178 (D.S.C. 2000) (awarding attorneys' fees); cf
Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., 298 F.3 d 1238, 1246 n.6 (l 1th
Cir. 2002) (noting criticism of Jordan).
192. PATRY, supranote 190 , § 22:218.
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If an offer is to be made, it should be made as early as possible and
calculated with the following factors in mind:
Minimum statutory damages ($750 per work)
Filing fee of $400
$350 for attorneys' fees.193
In a single-defendant, single-work case, the offer ofjudgment could be as
low as $1,5oo. Whether to offer anything more than this is a judgment call.
The higher the offer, the greater the plaintiffs risk that at the end of drawn
out process it is left with no additional costs or attorneys' fees. We believe that
even at our minimum recommendation there is a substantial risk for the
plaintiff here. For example, in Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Cerritos, the court
awarded costs and minimum statutory damages totaling $1275 and declined
to award attorneys' fees.194 Technically, the offer amount could be even lower
in a single-work, multiple-defendant case because the filing fee should be split
between defendants.'15 Appendix D contains a sample offer ofjudgment.9 6
3. The Motion to Dismiss
Copyright trolls rely on generic and boilerplate complaints to cast their
net as widely as possible. This is the key to their success, but it is also one of
their critical weaknesses. The complaints we have examined tend to be far too
vague to satisfy modern pleading standards and should thus be attacked with
a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12 (b) (6).
In Twomblyin 2007 and again in Iqbalin 2009, the Supreme Court raised
the standard for a well-pleaded complaint,197 requiring that it "contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'"s We note with interest the efforts of a plaintiff in a
recent case to assert that Twombly only requires "fair notice" and "grounds
193. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). As far as we know, Malibu Media is the only
plaintiff currently targeting defendants for the alleged infringement of multiple copyrighted
works. This makes Malibu Media cases more difficult to settle.
194. Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Cerritos, No. 3:15-cv-o1228-SB, 2016 WL 7177527, at *5 (D. Or.
Dec. 9, 2016).
195. LHF Prods., Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 2:16-cv-o1o17 (W.D. Wash.June 30, 2016) (granting in
part plaintiffs motion for defaultjudgment); see infra Part IV.B.7.v.
196. The appendix is based on the Offer of Judgment in Cobbler Nevada, LLC, v. Cerritos,
No. 3:15-cv-o1228-SB, 2o16 WL 7177527 (D. Or. Dec. 9, 2016).
197. Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
198. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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upon which the claim rests."'99 That is precisely the standard in Conley v.
Gibson,200 which the Supreme Court renounced in Twombly.20° Twombly
requires more than fair notice and grounds; a complaint must state sufficient
factual context to make the claim plausible, rather than merely possible.202
The Supreme Court in Twombly said that a complaint's factual details "must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and that
"[w]hile a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a
cause of action's elements will not do."203
It is true that the compliant does not need to be proven to survive a
motion to dismiss, but it must provide a sufficient factual context to suggest
that a substantial copy of the copyrighted work at issue was made and that this
act was performed by the defendant. The complaints we have reviewed do not
allege any evidence that a substantial copy of the copyrighted work was made
and have nothing to show that the defendant was the person using the IP
address for that purpose. As the court in Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Gonzales noted,
"While it is possible that the subscriber is also the person who downloaded the
movie, it is also possible that a family member, a resident of the household,
or an unknown person engage[d] in the infringing conduct.204 Bare
possibility clearly falls well below modern pleading standards. The typical
complaint alleges only that an unknown device used the defendant's IP
address to participate in a file-sharing swarm and that this swarm unlawfully
reproduced and distributed the plaintiffs copyrighted work. That falls far
short of suggesting any facts upon which one could conclude that someone
using the defendant's IP address made a substantial copy of the copyrighted
work or that the named defendant was that person.
Plaintiffs appear unwilling to accept that they carry the burden of proof
in a claim of copyright infringement and that the defendant is under no
199. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at 2,PTG Nev.,
LLC. v. Chan, No. 1:16-cv-o1621, 2016 WL 8541547 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2017) ("Plaintiffs
Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint must contain a 'short
and plain statement' giving 'the defendant fair notice' of what the 'claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-56)).
200. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (stating that a complaint "should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief").
201. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 ("But the passage so often quoted [referring to the passage
in ConLey above] fails to mention this understanding on the part of the Court, and after puzzling
the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.").
202. See id. at 5 7 o.
203. Id. at 545 (citations omitted).
204. Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Gonzales, No. 3 :15 -cv-oo866-SB, 2o16 WL 3392368, at *3 (D. Or.
June 8, 2016).
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obligation to submit evidence she is not liable.205 Defendants in copyright
cases do not need to disprove their own liability; a defendant is perfectly
entitled to insist on the plaintiffs filing of a well-pleaded complaint before
going to the bother and expense of marshaling evidence of her innocence.
The key arguments to make in a motion to dismiss are:
(1) The plaintiff failed to meet the legal standard. As noted above, in
order to survive a Rule 1 2(b) (6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'2o6 As both Twombly and Iqbal recognize, there is a world of difference
between alleging facts and circumstances in which the defendant possibly
acted unlawfully and alleging facts and circumstances in which the defendant
plausibly did so.
(2) The person paying an Internet bill may not be the purported
infringer.207 IP addresses are used legitimately and illegitimately by multiple
people, and frequently without the account holder's knowledge.2o8
(3) Discovery should not be used for fishing expeditions.09 This is
particularly significant where the plaintiff admits in its complaint that it
intends to use the discovery process to discover "additional infringing
parties."2o
(4) Either the plaintiff has failed to allege that an actual copy was made
or the plaintiffs assertions that defendant "infringed" or "reproduced" the
work are conclusory and unsupported by any factual allegations. To allege
that a device associated with defendant's IP address participated in a
205. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at
1, Dall. Buyers Club, LLC. v. Doughty, 3 :15 -cv-00176-AC, 2016 WL 6831278 (D. Or. Jan. 14, 2o16)
("Defendant submits no evidence that he is not liable beyond his personal denials.").
2o6. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
207. SeeVPR Internationale v. Does -' 017, No. 1 1-cv-02o68, 2011 WL 8179128, at *2 (C.D.
Ill. Apr. 29, 201 1) ('"Where an IP address might actually identify an individual subscriber and
address[,] the correlation is still far from perfect .... The infringer might be the subscriber,
someone in the subscriber's household, a visitor with her laptop, a neighbor, or someone parked
on the street at any given moment."); Malibu Media, LLC v. Reynolds, No. 12-cv-o6672, 2013 WL
87o618, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2013); TCYK, LLC v. Doe, No. 13-cv-03828, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8 8402, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2013) ("[T]he increasing ubiquity of wireless networks
undermines the copyright holder's assumption that the ISP subscriber is the copyright
infringer."); see also In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 8o, 84
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[I]t is no more likely that the subscriber to an IP address carried out.., the
purported illegal downloading... than to say an individual who pays the telephone bill made a
specific telephone call.").
2o8. See supra Part II.A.
209. Pac. Century Int'l, Ltd. v.John Does 1-37, 282 F.R.D. 189, 195 (N.D. 111. 2012) (finding
that there must be "a reasonable calculation that the individuals connected to the subpoenaed
IP addresses will have any discoverable information related to the current defendants").
2 10. See, e.g., Complaint at il, PTG Nev., L.L.C. v. Does 1-24, No. 1:16-cv-o62 1 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 29, 2016) ("Plaintiff... believes that additional information obtained [in discovery] will lead
to the identification of additional infringing parties, as monitoring of online infringement of
Plaintiff's motion picture is ongoing.").
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file-sharing swarm is not the same as alleging that a device associated with that
address actually made a copy of the work.
(5) Copyright law does not recognize any offense of attempted
reproduction. Even if the allegation that defendant participated in a swarm
was proven, it would not show that anyone in the swarm-let alone a device
associated with the defendant's IP address or the defendant-actually made a
copy. Assertions that the defendant participated in a swarm "deliberately" and
"willfully" are entirely beside the point. For copyright infringement to occur,
a copy must be made that is substantially similar to the original and able to be
viewed by an audience.211
(6) Courts have already rejected attempts to prove infringement by
snapshot, wherein the allegation that a defendant made a copy is supported
only by the assertion that the defendant transferred certain packets of
information. As explained in detail in Part III, the few packets of data
recorded by the plaintiff are just a fragment of a piece of a copyrighted work.
Those fragments do not meet the statutory definition of a copy, because they
are useless junk without the rest of the file. Those fragments also do not meet
any of the usual threshold tests for what amounts to a substantial copy.
Moreover, a mere snapshot that allegedly shows that the defendant was
downloading the copyrighted work does not prove she succeeded.
(7) Complaints vary, but a not uncommon assertion is that the defendant
or the defendant's IP address "was observed" infringing the plaintiff's
copyright. No employee or agent of the plaintiff is described as performing
this observation-the passive invocation of "was observed" is used here to
elide the fact that no human witness actually saw anything relevant to the
plaintiff's case; the case is entirely reliant on records produced by software. It
would thus be more accurate to say that it has software that reports certain
events to have occurred, but doing so would invite further questions as to the
origin, nature, reliability, and operation of that software-questions that
plaintiffs would rather avoid. Advocates should challenge as unacceptably
vague, if not misleading, a statement that something was observed, but not by
what or by whom.
(8) The lawsuit is part of a broader litigation strategy that relies on the
risks of large statutory damages, attorneys' fees, and the high cost of litigation
to coerce innocent defendants into nuisance value settlements.212 Allowing
the plaintiff to proceed on factual allegations that are imprecise, incredible,
and inconsistent with requirements of the Copyright Act allows it to "tak[e]
up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value."13 There is no doubt that
21 1. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
212. SeeSag, supra note 5, at 1 105-46.
213. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
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online infringement is a problem for the creative industries, but coercing
innocent people into settlements and using federal court litigation as a forum
for conducting fishing expeditions is not a good answer to that problem.
It is also worth considering the merits of not filing a motion to dismiss,
even in the face of a poorly pleaded complaint. Some judges are less receptive
to motions to dismiss than others, and assuming there is no smoking gun on
the defendant's hard drive, the same arguments may be more persuasive at
the close of discovery. However, in most scenarios, defendants will be well
advised to file a motion to dismiss to seek to avoid the significant cost and
inconvenience of discovery and depositions.
4. Motion for Early Discovery
Attorneys should consider a motion for early discovery, with a specific
plan in mind.214 This plan has three goals: to prove that the plaintiff does not
have the evidence it claims to have; to minimize the client's discovery burden;
and to lay the foundation for a motion for summaryjudgment. Therefore, any
such motion should ask for two things: for the plaintiff to produce the
evidence upon which its complaint is based-the PCAPs; and for the
defendant to produce a copy of his or her hard drive for examination by a
qualified expert-either one agreed to by both parties or one appointed by
the court. The motion should ask that searches of the hard drive be limited
to searches for the hash value of the file allegedly downloaded or uploaded.
Plaintiffs will, in our experience, want to impose a much more burdensome
discovery protocol, seeking to depose the defendant's friends, neighbors, and
others who may have used the IP address. This invasive and unwarranted
fishing expedition should be resisted.2-5
Under Rule 26 (d), discovery may not be conducted prior to the discovery
conference required by Rule 26(f), except "by stipulation, or by court
order." 6 Unfortunately, the Federal Rules do not give us any further
guidance, and federal courts across the nation have adopted a wide range of
214. In the alternative, defendant could make a Motion for a More Definite Statement under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). The rule provides that "[a] party may move for a more
definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague
or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made
before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details
desired." FED. R. Ctv. P. 12(e).
215. SeePac. Century Int'l, Ltd. v.John Does 1-37, 282 F.R.D. 189, 195 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("To
have relevance to the actions currently pending, however, the requested discovery must bear on
the civil conspiracy and copyright claims against the currentJohn Doe defendants. In light of the
structure of the BitTorrent system, subpoenas seeking the identity of users of non-party IP
addresses are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence relevant to the
pending claims.").
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d) (1).
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standards,'7 although most have adopted either a preliminary injunction
standard' 5 or a "good cause" standard.2 9 Therefore an attorney will need to
determine the local standard before pursuing a motion to allow early
discovery.
In general, any such motion will need to cover three main points: (1) why
the defendant will be irreparably harmed without early discovery; (2) why the
plaintiff will not be unduly burdened by early discovery; and (3) why early
discovery will be more efficient for the court. These arguments should be
made with the defendant's circumstances in mind, but a few points are
common to all file-sharing cases and can be stressed. First, allowing the
plaintiff carte blanche access to defendant's hard drive is incredibly invasive
of a person's personal lifes2o and it is deeply unfair to allow plaintiffs
attorneys and experts free reign to search and view every part of the
defendant's hard drive on a bare assertion that someone using defendant's IP
address may have infringed. Thus, a directed discovery plan that only allows
plaintiff to search for a specific hash value will greatly reduce the invasiveness
of discovery. Second, a directed discovery plan will be cheaper for all involved:
Both parties can save money on expert witnesses if the court appoints an
expert (for which the parties can split the cost) and the court saves time and
resources by keeping discovery disputes and motions to compel to a
minimum. Third, unless the plaintiff is able to locate a copy of the disputed
work with the hash value it claims to have identified, it cannot connect
defendant to the instance of wrongful copying it claims as the basis for its suit.
217. SeeJesse N. Panoff, RescuingExpeditedDiscovey from Courts &ReturningIt toFRCP26(d)(i):
Using a Doctrine's Forgotten Histoy to Achieve Legitimacy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 651, 651 (201 1) (noting
that "courts have developed more than twenty standards for construing Rule 26(d) ()").
218. The preliminary injunction standard established by Notaro v. Koch is generally used in
jurisdictions that require a preliminary injunction standard to be met for early discovery. Notaro
v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403,405 nn.3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). This standard is a four-part test that requires
the movant to show: (1) that it would suffer irreparable harm without early discovery; (2) a
"probability of success on the merits; (3) some connection between the expedited discovery and
... irreparable [harm]; and (4) some evidence that the injury that [would] result" if discovery is
denied would be greater than the harm the opposing party would suffer if discovery were ordered.
Id. at 405 n. 2.
219. The factors considered under a "good cause" standard vary widely betweenjurisdictions,
but in general, "[g]ood cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in
consideration of the administration ofjustice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding party."
Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 2o8 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Other factors
typically considered by courts include: "(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the
breadth of the discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery;
(4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the
typical discovery process the request was made." Am. LegalNet, Inc. v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d
1o63, 1o67 (C.D. Cal. 2oo9) (quoting Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 234 F.R1D. 4 , 6 (D.D.C. 2oo6)).
220. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (finding that awarrantless search
of a cellphone would violate the Fourth Amendment because of privacy interests).
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5. Answer
If the motion to dismiss is denied, the answer should deny the specific
allegation of copyright infringement. The answer could also raise a defense
of de minimis non curat lex defense-in essence, that whatever infringement
plaintiff can prove is too incomplete for the court to take notice. We do not
suggest that file sharing is not a serious problem, but if the only proof the
plaintiff offers is that the defendant shared a small piece (or just a fragment
of a piece) of the work, there is no proof of infringement.2 2 This defense
should be raised in the context of the plaintiffs inability to prove or allege
that a copyrighted work has been downloaded in its entirety.
In addition, certain affirmative defenses are worth considering. However,
opinions differ as to whether adding counterclaims is an effective use of
defendant's resources. Defendants have answered with counterclaims for a
declaratory judgment of noninfringement in the past, but we do not
recommend them. Counterclaims risk distracting the court from the weakness
of the plaintiff's case. Also, the answer that plaintiff has failed to state a claim
can also be couched as an affirmative defense.222 We note, without necessarily
recommending, that defendants have also argued that the damages requested
are unconstitutionally high.23 and that the plaintiff has unclean hands as a
result of its unethical, extortionate litigation model.224
6. How Does Stage II End?
Stage II can end a number of different ways. If the defendant presents
the plaintiff with actual evidence of innocence and files a motion to dismiss,
we anticipate voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff. In this scenario, the
defendant will not be eligible for attorneys' fees, but the case will be over.
Assuming that the plaintiff persists, the complaints that we have reviewed
should, in our opinion, be dismissed under 12 (b) for their failure to comply
with modem pleading standards. In this optimistic scenario, the dismissal
should be with prejudice and thus sufficient to support an award of attorneys'
fees to the defendant. However, succeeding on a motion to dismiss is not
guaranteed. Recently, in the Northern District of Illinois, for example, nearly
identical motions to dismiss were successful in one case and not in another.225
221. See supra Part III.B.I-2.
222. See, e.g., Declaration of J. Christopher Lynch in Support of Defendant's Lamberson's
Response to Plaintiffs Motions in Response to Defendant's Second Amended Answer and
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Elf-Man, LLC v. Lamberson, No. 2:13-cv-00395 (E.D.
Wash.July 21, 2014).
223. See, e.g., id. at 26.
224. See id.
225. Compare PTG Nev., LLCv. Does 1-24, No. 1:16-cv-o1621 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 17, 2017) (order
granting defendant's motion to dismiss), with Clear Skies Nev., LLC v. Does 1-3o, No. 1: 15-cv-
o67o8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2016), ECF No. 62 (order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss).
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If the defendant's motion to dismiss is unsuccessful and the defendant's
hard drive contains incriminating evidence, it may be in her best interest to
answer the complaint with an admission. The defendant would presumably
then file a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and the attorney's role is
simply to argue for the minimum award of statutory damages and attorneys'
fees. Almost every case should end at Stage II. However, if the defendant's
motion to dismiss is unsuccessful and the defendant is in possession of a clean
hard drive, she will need to proceed to Stage III.
7. Attorneys' Fees and Statutory Damages
i. Attorneys'Fees
The Copyright Act empowers, but does not require, courts to award costs
and attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in copyright cases-any such award
is "a matter of the court's discretion."22 6 The Supreme Court has twice granted
certiorari in copyright cases where the prevailing defendant was denied
attorneys' fees. In its unanimous 1994 decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the
Court expressly rejected a "dual standard" favoring plaintiffs and disfavoring
defendants.27 The text of the Copyright Act provides no basis for preferring
prevailing plaintiffs over prevailing defendants; it simply says "prevailing
party."21S Looking beyond the text of the Act, the Court found further support
for a unitary standard in the Act's purpose, recognizing that " [w] hile it is true
that one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to discourage infringement, it is
by no means the only goal of that Act."229 As the Court explained, the entirety
of the Act reflects Congress's attempt to create, "a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest .... The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good."23o
Yet even after Fogerty, courts in some circuits appeared to carry on a de
facto dual standard, denying attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants as a
matter of course.23, The defendant in the long running case of Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., prevailed on the merits on a fairly nuanced point of
statutory interpretation regarding the scope of copyright's first-sale doctrine,
226. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994); see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 13 6 S. Ct. 1979, 1985 (2o16) (discussing the holding from Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.).
227. Fogerty, 51o U.S. at 53 4 .
228. Id. at 522,524 n.11 (discussing and interpreting the language in the Copyright Act of 1976).
229. Id. at 526.
230. Id. at 526-27 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
231. See PATRY, supra note 19o, § 22:21o (describing the Ninth Circuit's objective
unreasonableness standard as "a mere semantic trick used to continue to apply the dual system
rejected in Fogerty").
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but only after appealing to the Supreme Court.232 In spite of this famous
victory, the district court (which had sided with the plaintiff in the first
instance) denied the defendant's request for attorneys' fees, placing
"substantial weight" on the objective reasonableness of the plaintiffs
position.233 In doing so, the court may have shaded from substantial weight
into presumption. Given that the court agreed with the plaintiff's position, it
is not surprising that it thought it was objectively reasonable. The Second
Circuit agreed with the lower court,34 and Kirtsaeng returned to the Supreme
Court to argue the point. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
denial of attorneys' fees, because, although it agreed that a district court
should give substantial weight to the objective reasonableness of the losing
party's position, it insisted that courts must still take into account all other
circumstances relevant to granting fees.235
ii. The Defendant's Case for Attorneys'Fees
In Fogerty, the Court explained that "' [t] here is no precise rule or formula
for making these determinations,' but instead equitable discretion should be
exercised."23 6 The Court reiterated the point in Kirtsaeng, when it said that
district courts have "wide latitude to award attorneys' fees based on the totality
of circumstances in a case."s7 In Fogerty, the Supreme Court accepted in a
footnote that the exercise of discretion could be aided with reference to
nonexclusive factors, such as "frivolousness, motivation, objective
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the
case) and ... considerations of compensation and deterrence."238 However,
the Court also cautioned that "such factors may be used to guide courts'
discretion, so long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the Copyright
Act and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded
manner."239
232. Kirtsaengv.JohnWiley&Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363-66 (2013) (holding that the
first-sale doctrine applies to works lawfully made overseas).
233. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. o8-cv-o78 3 4 -DCP, 2o13 WL 6722887, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013).
234. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 605 F. App'x 48,49 (2d Cir. 2015).
235. Kirtsaeng v.John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1983 (2016) ("But the court must
also give due consideration to all other circumstances relevant to granting fees; and it retains
discretion, in light of those factors, to make an award even when the losing party advanced a
reasonable claim or defense. Because we are not certain that the lower courts here understood
the full scope of that discretion, we return the case for further consideration of the prevailing
party's fee application.").
236. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424,436 (1983)).
237. Kirtsaeng, 13 6S. Ct. at 1985.
238. Fogeyty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.s9 (quotingLiebv. Topstone Indus.,Inc., 7 88 F.2d 151, 156(3 d Cir. 1986)).
239. Id.
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Whether the prevailing defendant in copyright trolling cases should be
entitled to attorneys' fees is a matter for the district court's discretion.
However, there are several factors that support the appropriateness of
exercising that discretion in the defendant's favor. The business model of
copyrighted trolling places no premium on differentiating the guilty from the
innocent. In one particularly troubling case, Cobbler Nevada filed against an
Internet subscriber that it knew based on depositions was not "a regular
occupant of the residence or the likely infringer.24° As a result, the court had
little trouble concluding that its "concerns about the motivation behind
Plaintiffs overaggressive litigation of this case and other cases" was a "factor
weigh[ing] in favor of fee shifting.241 In light of the coercive effect of
statutory damages, if prevailing defendants are not entitled to their attorneys'
fees, it is very difficult to see how any innocent defendant would be able to
resist a plaintiffs demands. It stands to reason that attorneys' fees are most
needed to promote the objectives of copyright law when the prevailing party
otherwise obtains little in monetary compensation. And of course, the
prevailing defendant "receives not a small award but no award" and is thus in
the greatest need of attorneys' fees.242
Given the availability of third-party discovery under Rule 45, there is no
reason to tolerate the speculative naming of defendants that is currently the
norm in BitTorrent cases. When a copyright troll names a defendant in
federal litigation without a sufficient factual basis, its lawsuit is no more
meritorious than if it were advancing fanciful legal arguments. The Supreme
Court made clear in Fogerty that objective unreasonableness encompasses both
factual and legal reasonableness.243 In either case, there is significant public
interest in defendants resisting overreaching claims.44 We note that the Ninth
Circuit recently upheld a district court's award of over $5 million in attorneys'
fees to the prevailing defendant in Perfect io, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.245 In so
doing the court emphasized the Supreme Court's statement in Fogerty: "[I] t is
peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as
240. Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Gonzales, No. 3 :15-cv-oo866-SB, 2016 WL 8677323, at "s (D. Or.
Dec. 2, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 44948 (D. Or.Jan. 4, 2017) ("Despite
having acknowledged that Gonzales is not the likely infringer, Plaintiff filed a First Amended
Complaint on November 4, 2015, naming Gonzales as the defendant.").
241. Id. at *6.
242. Assessment Tech. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 361 F.3 d 434, 437 (7 th Cir. 2004); see
also DeliverMed Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming
award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing defendant).
243. Foger,51oU.S.at534n.19.
244. See Lumiere (Rights) Ltd. v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., 116 F.3d 484, 1998 WL 303244, *5
(9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (finding that where a party's "copyright claims are,
if not frivolous, at least factually unsupported... [a]n award of fees may deter other such suits").
245. Perfect lo, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F. 3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2017).
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clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek to advance a variety of
meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them .... "246
iii. Is the Defendant the "Prevailing Party ?"
The Copyright Act limits an award of attorneys' fees to the "prevailing
party" but leaves that term undefined.247 While it is self-evident that a party
who obtains judgment on the merits of the claim in its favor is the "prevailing
party," the law in relation to dismissals is more nuanced. In Buckhannon Board
& Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, the
Supreme Court held that a litigant "prevails" for the purpose of fee-shifting
statutes when it obtains a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties."248 This material alteration standard is not met simply by a voluntary
change in the other party's conduct.249 Elaborating on this standard, the
Second Circuit has held that to be a prevailing party requires a 'judicially
sanctioned" material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.250
Applying this standard, it seems clear that, if the plaintiff voluntarily
dismisses an action without prejudice,251 there has been no judicially
sanctioned material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties and thus
the defendant is not a prevailing party under § 505 of the Copyright Act.2's
The plaintiff can only take this course with either: "(i) a notice of dismissal
before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary
judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared."253
The defendant is the prevailing party in any case in which the plaintiff's
action is dismissed with prejudice, whether by court order, at the plaintiffs
own instigation, or by agreement between the parties. If a judge orders
dismissal with prejudice, there has clearly been a judicially sanctioned
material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties and the defendant
is eligible for attorneys' fees.254 If the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action
246. Id. at 675 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527).
247. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
248. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 603-o4 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
782,792-93 (1989)).
249. Id. at 604.
250. Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3 d 75, 79-81 (2d Cir. 2003).
251. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a)(1), the plaintiff may dismiss an action
without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an
answer or a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIv. P. 41 (a)(i). That dismissal is without
prejudice unless the notice states otherwise. Id.
252. See, e.g., Cadkin v. Loose, 569 F.3 d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2009).
253. SeeFED.R.CIv.P. 4 1(a).
254. Nemaizerv. Baker, 793 F.2d 5 8,6o (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that "[a] dismissal with prejudice
has the effect of a final adjudication on the merits favorable to defendant and bars future suits brought
by plaintiff upon the same cause of action"); Ninox Television Ltd. v. Fox Entm't Grp., Inc., No. o4-cv-
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with prejudice, moreover, the resulting material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties is still "judicially sanctioned," even though such
alteration required no ruling from the court.2 55 The judicial sanction is
embedded within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves.256 As the
court summarized in Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Gonzales-
A plaintiff's dismissal of a claim does not automatically "confer
prevailing party status upon the defendant," if the defendant
remains at risk of plaintiff re-filing the claim. However, if a plaintiff
is unable to re-file the dismissed claim in federal court, the
defendant is the "prevailing party" on that claim.257
iv. The Plaintiffs Case for Attorneys'Fees
Several district courts have exercised their discretion to deny attorneys'
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in copyright trolling cases.258 There are several
reasons for a court to deny the plaintiffs request for attorneys' fees. To begin
with, an award of even minimum statutory damages and court costs should be
sufficient to deter the defendant and third parties from illegally file sharing.-59
As the district court explained in Glacier Films (USA), Inc. v. Gallatin,
common sense supports a conclusion that a $750 financial penalty
for illegal[ly] downloading one movie is more than sufficiently
punitive to deter others from illegally downloading free movies on
the BitTorrent network. With knowledge that it will now cost $750
to watch a single movie on the BitTorrent network, consumers
078 9 1-DLC, 2oo6 WL 16433oo, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo6); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., No. 1:o3-cv-oo976-
GLS-DRH, 2005 WL 1843275, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that, when there is a dismissal with
prejudice, a defendant is the prevailing party even if no written decision is issued). But see Chambers v.
Time Warner, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
255. In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. London Music, U.K., the Sixth Circuit held to the contrary, i.e.,
that plaintiffs voluntary dismissal with prejudice did not make defendant a prevailing party.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. London Music, U.K., 226 F. App'x 491, 492 (6th Cir. 2007). This
position strikes us as clearly wrong, and Patty on Copyright finds it inexplicable. PATRY, supra note
190, § 22:211.
256. Such an impact is common in the federal rules. Rule 13, for example. See FED. R_ CIr. P. 13.
257. Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Gonzales, No. 3:1 5 -cv-oo866-SB, 2016 WL 8677323, at *2 (D. Or.
Dec. 2, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:1 5 -cv-oo866-SB, 2017 WL 44948 (D. Or.
Jan. 4, 2017) (citations omitted).
258. See Cobbler Nev, LLCv. Cerritos, No. 3:1 5 -cv-01228-SB, 2o16 WL 7177527, at*5-8 (D.
Or. Dec. 9, 2016) (holding that fee-shifting was inappropriate under Fogerty and because the
plaintiff had unnecessarily prolonged the litigation); Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Anonymous Users of
Popcorn Time, No. 3 :15 -cv-o1 5 5 o-SB, 2016 WL 4238639, at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 1o, 2016) (holding
that fee-shifting in a mass copyright litigation does not satisfy the factors in Fogerty); Glacier Films
(USA), Inc. v. Turchin, No. 3:15-cv-01817-SB, 2o16 WL 4 25 15 81, at *3-5 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2016),
appeal docketed, No. 16-cv-35688 (9 th Cir. Aug. 26, 2o16) (same); Countryman Nev., LLC v. Doe,
193 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1182-83 (D. Or. 2016) (finding that fee-shifting was inappropriate under
the totality of the circumstances).
259. See, e.g., CobblerNev., 2016 WL 7 17 75 27, at *5.
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should be motivated instead to spend a few dollars to rent the same
movie legally.26 °
Second, as the roughly 1o,ooo John Doe copyright cases filed between
201o and 2016 illustrate, plaintiffs have been vigilant and resourceful in
policing their copyrights. In Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Cerritos, the district court
required the defendant to pay a total financial penalty of $1,275, comprising
$750 in statutory damages and $525 in costs. 61 As the court explained:
In light of the substantial financial penalty already imposed, an
attorney fee award is not necessary to deter further infringement,
nor is a fee award necessary to encourage Plaintiff to continue to
protect its rights, where Plaintiff has been vigilant to date and has
the resources to police their copyright.262
Third, the plaintiffs degree of success has been characterized by courts
as minimal and insufficient in order to support the plaintiffs claims for fees
several multiples higher.26 3 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in a different copyright
context, stated "an award of attorneys' fees that is ten times the amount
recovered in damages seems unreasonable under the circumstances."26 4 Of
course, attorneys' fees might be necessary for the plaintiff to be able to
vindicate wrongs of nominal monetary damage, but the $750 minimum on
statutory damages hardly looks nominal for the pirating of a movie priced at
$14.99. Moreover, courts should query exactly why the fees claimed by
plaintiffs are so high in many cases. The answer may well be that the plaintiff
refused reasonable offers of settlement and deliberately ran up the total of
attorneys' fees. The plaintiff should not be rewarded for its intransigence, nor
its attempts to game the system. For example, in Countryman Nevada, LLC v.
Doe the district court declined to award attorneys' fees where the defendant
had acknowledged liability early in the case but the plaintiff insisted on a
settlement of $8,500.265 Denying plaintiffs fee motion, the court noted that
"it appears to this Court that one of the primary objectives of Plaintiff in
undertaking the litigation conduct described was to increase the bases for a
prevailing party fee petition.' ' 66 Other courts have noted similar behavior.267
260. Glacier Films (USA), Inc. v. Gallatin, No. 3:1 5-cv-o16 3 2-SB, 2016 WL 3148401, at *3
(D. Or. May 12, 2016).
261. CobblerNev., 2o16 WL 7177 5 27, at * 5 .
262. Id.
263. GlacierFilms (USA), 2016 WL 4 25 15 81, at *3.
264. Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Julien's Auction House LLC, 345 F. App'x 244, 249
(9 th Cir. 2009).
265. Countryman Nev., LLC v. Doe, 193 F. Supp. 3 d 1174, 1183 (D. Or. 2016).
266. Id.
267. Cobbler Nev., 2016 WL 7177527, at *6 ("In these BitTorrent copyright cases, the threat
of fee-shifting has emboldened Plaintiffs counsel to demand thousands of dollars to settle a
claim, even where the infringing defendant admits early in the case that he illegally downloaded
the movie.").
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It should be self-evident that prolonging litigation simply to accumulate legal
fees is inconsistent with the purposes of the Copyright Act, to say the least.268
Fourth, and most fundamentally, an award of attorneys' fees in these
BitTorrent file-sharing cases will not generally further the purposes of
copyright.269 Rather, the prospect of attorneys' fees simply encourages "the
continued overaggressive assertion" of speculative infringement claims.270 In
the online file-sharing cases, there is no doubt that infringement is
widespread, but there is significant doubt as to the liability of the targeted
defendants. The plaintiffs discussed in this Article target hundreds, even
thousands, of defendants at a time and pursue them with minimal
investigation. The plaintiffs extract settlements from the guilty and innocent
alike based on the in terrorem effect of statutory damages and attorneys' fees.271
Courts have recognized that "the resulting bargaining process is unequal, and
unfair."272 The threat of incurring tens of thousands of dollars of fees makes
it hard for even innocent defendants to take the risk of standing up to
unreasonable demands. The federal litigation system is not a vending
machine for hunting licenses; it is a means of seeking justice and resolving
disputes. Courts should be mindful of how copyright owners are using the
tools of civil litigation before compounding their reward with attorneys' fees,
and they "should make its tools available only with careful scrutiny, to avoid
the potential for abuse."273
Even if the court does decide to award attorneys' fees to a plaintiff, the
court must ensure that such fees are reasonable, proven, and specifically
attributable to the case at hand.274 For plaintiff to file hundreds or even
thousands of almost identical complaints and motions and then ask the court
to believe that it spent several hours on each one simply beggars belief. Courts
268. Id.
269. Glacier Films (USA), Inc. v. Turchin, No. 3 :15-cv-os817-SB, 2016 WL 4251581, at *4
(D. Or. Aug. 10, 2016) ("The Copyright Act, as it is being enforced in these BitTorrent cases, has
created results inconsistent with the goals of the Act.").
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Cobbler Nev., 2016 WL 7177527, at *6 ("When an individual who has illegally
downloaded a movie is contacted by Plaintiff's counsel, and faces the threat of a statutory damage
award that could theoretically reach $15o,ooo, as well as the threat of a substantial fee award, the
resulting bargaining process is unequal, and unfair." (citation omitted)).
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., GlacierFilm (USA), Inc., 2016 WL 4 25 15 81, at *5 ("Ordinarily, the 'federal court
system provides litigants with some of the finest tools available to assist in resolving disputes.'
Those tools can empower copyright-owners to enforce their rights, but they are also capable of
being used as instruments of abuse. Where abuse is likely, as it is here, courts should not make
those tools available without careful scrutiny.").
274. The party seeking fees "bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 437 (1983).
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in several BitTorrent cases have rejected plaintiffs' assertions as to their hourly
billing rates and the number of hours attributable to any given case.2 75
v. Statutory Damages
The choice between actual damages and statutory damages is an easy one
for the plaintiff to make in online file-sharing cases.27 6 Actual damages would
be the cost of a legal download-between $12 and $2o based on current
iTunes and Amazon prices.277 Statutory damages begin at $750 and could
theoretically be as high as $15o,ooo per work infringed.278 As one of us has
discussed at length, statutory damages are a useful part of the copyright
ecosystem, where damage is hard to prove or where deterrence is an
important consideration.279 However, in the context of individual file sharers,
a range beginning at $750 and ending at $30,000 in general-$150,000 in
the case of willful infringement-bears no relationship to the harm of
infringement, the need for deterrence, or generally accepted norms of
proportionality in the administration of penalties. 21o Fines for drunk driving
(which kills thousands of Americans every year)S1 are typically in the high
hundreds or low thousands.2s2 Fines for parking in spaces reserved for the
275. LHF Prods., Inc. v. Does 1-19, No. 16-cv-01 175 -RSM, 2017 WL 615197, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 15, 2017) ("Given that Mr. Lowe's work in this matter amounts to nothing more than
form pleading, the Court... will reduce Mr. Lowe's hourly rate to $300."); Qotd Film Inv. Ltd.
v. Starr, No. 1 6-cv-o037 1-RSL, 2016 WL 5817027, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2o16) (" [T]he Court
will reduce counsel's hourly rate to $350 per hour...."); Dall. Buyers Club, LLC v. Nydam, 14-
cv-o168 4 -RAJ, 2016 WL 7719874, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2016).
276. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5 o 4 (b), (c)(1) (2012) (allowing the copyright owner to
elect, at any time before final judgment, to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual damages
or restitution).
277. Scott Stein, iTunes vs. Amazon: What's the Best Video Service on the Pad?, CNET (Aug. i,
2012, 3:47 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/itunes-vs-amazon-whats-the-best-video-service-on-
the-ipad (finding the average price of iTunes and Amazon movie downloads were $14.99 to
$19.99 and $9.99 to $14.99, respectively, in 2012).
278. Ben Depoorter, Over-Claiming Willfulness: Statutory Damage Awards by the Numbers
8, io (working paper on file with the authors); see also id. at 31 (demonstrating that enhanced
damages based on willful infringement are often claimed in copyright cases but infrequently
awarded).
279. Sag, supra note 5, at x 119. See generally Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutoy
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need ofReform, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV. 439 (2009) (detailing
the inconsistencies of statutory damage awards in copyright cases with legislative goals).
28o. Sag, supra note 5, at 1119.
281. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, "[i]n 2015, 10,265 people died
in alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for nearly one-third (29%) of all traffic-related deaths
in the United States." Impaired Driving- Get the Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired-driving/impaired-drv-factsheethtm (last visited
Aug. 28, 2017).
282. See DUI or DWI Punishments and Penalties, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/
dui-or-dwi-punishnments-penalties-3 o3 2 ai.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2017) (noting that courts impose
fines for DUI or DWI ranging from $500 to $2,ooo, and that first-offense DUI or DWI is classified as a
misdemeanor punishable by up to six months injail).
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disabled usually range from $100 to $500.!,8 Like file sharing, these are
antisocial activities that may not always be detected and may not result in any
harm in any given instance but are harmful in the aggregate. Statutory
damages of $750 for individual file sharers still seems high, but it is probably
in the right ballpark given the need for deterrence; $3o,ooo and $15o,ooo
seem absurd.
The most important thing for district courts to understand about the
range of statutory damages is that the need for deterrence is already baked
into the statutory minimum. Courts should justify any departure from that
minimum with case-specific reasons rather than simply pulling multiples out
of the air. In addition, although statutory damages relieves plaintiffs of the
burden of proving their harm with particularity, the statutory scheme is not
an invitation to abandon notions of proportionality altogether.284 District
courts have "wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages
to be awarded,"28 5 and they ought to take into account whether "the recovery
sought is proportional to the harm caused by defendant's conduct." 8 6 Courts
may even chose to award a single unit of minimum statutory damages to a
plaintiff who has alleged that multiple defendants in the same case conspired
with one another to infringe the same digital copy of the copyright owner's
work, for which the defendants should be held jointly and severally liable.287
We are not aware of any authority applying such a single satisfaction rule
across separately filed cases.
C. STAGE III: DISCOVERY AND SUMMARYJUDGMENT
1. Discovery
Spanning from discovery to summary judgment, Stage III is less-well-
charted territory. The most important consideration in this stage is to manage
the discovery process. The plaintiff's most likely strategies are to drag out
discovery as long as possible and to attempt to raise the defendant's costs with
spurious motions alleging spoliation and the like. The best response to these
tactics is to urge the court to adopt a detailed discovery plan with a clear cutoff
date at the outset.
283. See, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 42001.5 (West 2016) (imposing a fine of $250 for parking
in disabled person's space or sidewalk access area).
284. Courts have a statutory obligation to ensure the 'just" application of statutory damages. See
CopyrightAct, 17 U.S.C § 504(c) (1) (2012) (providing that the award of statutory damages should be
"as the court considers just"). This obligation is also Constitutional. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8, 416 (2003) ("The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a torffeasor.").
285. Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984).
286. Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 725. F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (C.D. Cal. 201o).
287. SeeLHF Prods., Inc. v. Doe l, No. 2:16-cv-o0o17 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2017) (order
granting in part motion for default judgment).
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The full scope of discovery in online file-sharing cases could end up being
quite broad. Ideally, courts would initially adopt a limited discovery plan as we
suggested in Part IV.B.4 . The presence of the infringing file or the inadequacy
of the PCAP evidence would be an appropriate basis for summaryjudgment.
In general, defense lawyers will need to make repeated motions to
compel the production of relevant evidence under Rule 37. A motion to
compel cannot ordinarily be filed unless the opposing party is being evasive
or failing to respond to a discovery request,88 so counsel are advised to expect
a long haul and to document their requests. In the few cases that have reached
this stage, plaintiffs have tried to avoid providing the actual PCAPs upon
which they rely, by presenting one or more declarations from witnesses who
claim to have analyzed the PCAPs. When presented with a motion to compel,
plaintiffs argue that analyzing and extracting the PCAPs is expensive, as the
company that does so charges by the hour.28 9 Plaintiffs have also argued that
the evidence they rely upon is not in their possession.290 However, it is well
settled that actual possession is not necessary;29' so long as a litigant may
"obtain documents on demand," it must be disclosed.292 The terms
"possession, custody, or control" in the Federal Rules are disjunctive.293
Moreover, documents in foreign countries and those subject to confidentiality
claims are still discoverable.294 Claims of confidentiality are not sufficient to
avoid producing discoverable documents.
288. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (a) (3)-(4).
289. SeeMalibu Media LLC v. Doe, No. 1:13-cv-o6312, 2016 WL 4 64o4 5 , at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
8, 2016) ("Malibu objected to Doe's request that it produce all of the PCAPs allegedly captured
because IPP charges Malibu by the hour to extract the PCAPs." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We note that this is walking a fine line; if the plaintiff wants the court to consider its
experts to be lay "fact" witnesses, it should not be paying them. Any motion to compel should
press the court to recognize the troll's witnesses as experts, not lay witnesses.
290. See, e.g., id.
291. See, e.g., Sotov. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding actual
possession of documents is not required under Rule 34(a)).
292. United States v. Int'l Union of Petrol. & Indus. Workers, 87o F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.
1989) ("Control is defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand."); see also New
York ex rel. Boardman v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 233 F.R.D. 259, 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2oo6);
Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 636 (D. Minn. 2000) (holding that "control"
does not require ownership, just the ability to obtain a document on demand).
293. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (1); see also Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. S.-Coast Bank, 61o F. Supp. 193,
196 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (holding the phrase "possession, custody, or control" to be disjunctive and
requiring only one element be met).
294. Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 22o F.3 d 562, 567-68 (7 th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he tradition that
litigation is open to the public is of very long standing. People who want secrecy should opt for
arbitration. When they call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized
dispute resolution ... . Judicial proceedings are public rather than private property .... "
(citation omitted)); Novelty, Inc. v. Mountain View Mktg., Inc., 265 F.R.D. 370, 377 (S.D. Ind.
2009); see also In re Specht, 622 F.3 d 697, 701 (7 th Cir. 2010) ("Documents that affect the
disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to public view, even if the liigants strongly
prefer secrecy....").
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The most difficult question for the defense team is how aggressively to
scrutinize the plaintiffs black box process. One strategy is to conserve
resources and simply wait to see if the plaintiff offers any admissible evidence
on this front. At a minimum, the plaintiff should be required to produce: the
source code of the software that records the packets of information it
captures;95 an expert to explain how that software works; a fact witness to say
how that software was used in practice; and every person involved at every
stage of their investigative process. To date, this evidence has never been
produced in a satisfactory manner.*96
2. Disqualification of Plaintiffs Experts
As discussed in Part III, the plaintiffs all rely on expert witnesses who are
based overseas. These witnesses, who supposedly identify instances of online
infringement, are undoubtedly not mere fact witnesses, yet they may not be
experts either. If the plaintiff seeks to rely on evidence about PCAPs without
filing a Rule 26 disclosure, the defendant should make a motion to strike.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, a plaintiff s undisclosed
expert testimony should be automatically excluded unless the failure to make
a Rule 26 disclosure is substantially justified or harmless.297 In determining
whether a failure to disclose is harmless, a court should consider several
factors, including "the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the
evidence is offered," and "the bad faith or willfulness involved in not
disclosing the evidence at an earlier date."29 s In Malibu Media, LLC. v. Doe, the
court held that a plaintiffs failure to disclose evidence under Rule 26 was not
harmless when the plaintiff's entire case rested squarely on its experts'
depositions299 referred to earlier and the plaintiff had been reminded
multiple times of the need to make expert disclosures.3oo
295. If the software constitutes a valuable trade secret, it can be subject to a protective order.
296. Defendants have sought production of the relevant PCAP files in several cases. To our
knowledge they have only ever been produced, and after considerable delay, in three cases.
297. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); see also Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3 d 753, 758 (7 th Cir.
2012) (concluding that defendant police officers' failure to disclose Assistant State's Attorney as
an expert witness was not justified and not harmless and ordering a new trial); Musser v. Gentiva
Health Servs., 356 F.3 d 751, 758 (7 th Cir. 2004) (holding that expert testimony proffered in
opposition to summary judgment was properly excluded as discovery sanction there was
reasonable basis for district court's finding that sanctioned parties' failure to disclose experts
lacked substantial justification and was not harmless).
298. David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3 d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003).
299. Malibu Media, LLC. v. Doe, No. 1:13-cv-o6312 (N.D. Ill. Sept 04, 2013), ECF No. i8o
("Without the [experts'] declarations, there is no evidence linking Doe or Doe's IP address to
[plaintiff's] work. The failure to disclose them under Rule 26(a) (2) was not harmless.").
300. Id. at *23 ("Weighing heavily in favor of exclusion is the fact that the court drew
[plaintiff's] attention to the need for formal expert disclosures at the hearing on January 23,
2015 .... If [plaintiff] had, in fact, moved for and been given leave to serve additional expert
disclosures even at that late date, the schedule could have been adjusted to allow Doe appropriate
2018]
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Assuming that the plaintiff does make the required Rule 26 disclosure,
its evidence should be challenged under a Daubert motion30° on the grounds
that it has not produced the data upon which it relied. The trialjudge has the
authority and duty to act as gatekeeper for expert evidence, allowing only that
which is both relevant and reliable.3os This authority extends not merely to
scientific evidence but also to technical evidence, as well as "other specialized
knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact,"303 and the judge must determine
"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert's] testimony
is scientifically valid."304 For evidence from an expert to be admissible, it must
be both relevant and reliable.305
Evidence about the plaintiffs black box is definitely relevant, but the
court cannot make a determination of whether it is reliable unless the plaintiff
presents the data upon which the expert relies. If the court cannot make this
determination, the evidence must be excluded. The plaintiff may argue that
it cannot present the PCAP data because it is expensive to retrieve and
analyze. But this is not persuasive; the party whose expert is challenged carries
the burden of proof-by a preponderance of the evidence-that the expert's
testimony is admissible.3o6
In addition to being unreliable for not presenting the data relied upon,
the plaintiffs experts may simply be unreliable altogether. In Dallas Buyers
Club, LLC v. Doughty, the plaintiffs expert had no experience with peer-to-
peer software and the only support he relied on for his statements about the
software at issue was a Wikipedia page.30 7 The court found his "statements to
be highly unreliable" and his testimony was stricken.soS As this incident
demonstrates, nothing in these cases should be taken at face value.
3. SummaryJudgment
Eventually discovery will end, and if the plaintiff has not dismissed or
settled the case by then, a motion for summaryjudgment will be appropriate.
The issue at summary judgment is whether the plaintiff has proven or can
prove by admissible evidence that a defendant copied or distributed its
time to deal with those disclosures. Malibu did not so move .... That Malibu ignored the court's
admonition is evidence of at least willfulness, if not bad faith.").
301. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (describing the
standard for admission of scientific evidence).
302. Id. at 580; FED. R. EVID. 702.
303. FED. R_ EVID. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 137, 147 (1999).
304. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
305. Id. at 5 89 .
3o6. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
307. Dall. Buyers Club, LLC v. Doughty, No. 3:1 5 -cv-oo176-AC, 2016 WL 169oo9o, at *2- 3 ,
(D. Or. Apr. 27, 2016).
3o8. Id.
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works.3o9 If the plaintiff cannot, there is no genuine dispute of material fact.
As is well known, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving
party bears the burdenlo of producing evidence that a reasonable jury could
use "to return a verdict for that party"31 but also enjoys the benefit of the
court's construction of all reasonable and justifiable inferences in its favor.3,2
The key issue-the presence or absence of the plaintiff's work on the
defendant's computer-is not simply a matter of opinion. Where the
defendant makes a statement of fact that she does not have a copy of the work
on any of her devices, the plaintiff cannot simply respond by disputing the
fact without any evidence to support the dispute. If forensic discovery shows
the file is or was present on the defendant's computer, the plaintiff meets this
burden. If instead the absence of the file is disputed without supporting
evidence, the defendant's denial is considered admitted.3,3
In the absence of evidence that defendant's devices contain any copies of
the plaintiff's work, the only evidence the plaintiff could possibly have to rely
upon is the defendant's IP address, which was allegedly used to infringe. But,
as we have discussed in detail earlier, an IP address only identifies a location
in digital space, not an individual actor.3'4 Indeed, courts have held that
"[e]vidence of a link between an IP address and [the work] may be enough
tojustify discovery, but it is not enough to prove liability."s'5
Moreover, even if evidence linking an IP address to an instance of
infringement were enough to prove liability, the typical plaintiff still cannot
meet its burden, because the isolated "bits" of the movie that it supposedly
received from the defendant's IP address do not meet the standard for
copyright infringement.3, 6 In the cases that we have studied, the plaintiffs
have offered declarations that the defendant's IP address was observed
transmitting data with a certain hash value. That hash value, it is alleged, is
the same as the hash value of a piece that the witness combined with other
pieces to create a file identical to the copyright owner's work. But note that
these other pieces were not downloaded from a device associated with the
309. See, e.g., Malibu Media v. Doe, No. 1:13-cv-o6312 (N.D. Ill. Sept 04, 2013 ), ECF No. i8o
(order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
31o. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F. 3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996).
311. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
312. Id. at 255.
313. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2); N.D. Ill. L.R- 5 6.1 (b) (3) (B); see also Cracco v. Vitran Express,
Inc., 559 F.3 d 625, 632 (7 th Cir. 2009) ("When a responding party's statement fails to dispute
the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts
are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion."); Malibu Media, LLC. v. Doe, No. 1:13-cv-
6312 (N.D. Ill. Sept 04, 2013), ECF No. i8o.
314. In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.IRD. 8o, 84 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) ("An IP address provides only the location atwhich one of any number of computer devices
may be deployed, much like a telephone number can be used for any number of telephones.").
315. Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. ':13-cv-o6312 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2013).
316. Id.
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defendant's IP address and were instead downloaded from other members of
the swarm.3' 7 Moreover, note that these declarations say nothing about the
size or contents of the portions of the work actually downloaded from the
defendant's IP address. In essence, the plaintiff can only state truthfully that
its software observed the defendant's IP address transmitting a fraction of the
work.3s'
Evidence that a fragment of a piece of copyrighted work was transmitted
is not sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to rely upon to return a verdict
for the plaintiff. As we explained in Part III.B.2, a fragment of piece of file is
merely a chunk of useless zeros and ones and thus is not a "copy" as that term
is defined by the Copyright Act.s,9 Furthermore, even if it were a copy in the
statutory sense, it still may not meet the threshold of substantial similarity
required for copyright infringement. As the Supreme Court noted in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., "Not all copying... is copyright
infringement.32o Even where the fact of copying is conceded or established,
"no legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is
substantial."32
D. STAGE IV- TRIAL
There is no Stage IV.
Our search of the LexMachina database shows 9,956 file-sharing cases,
of which 4,290 were filed in 2015 and 2016 alone.322 Plaintiffs have voluntarily
dismissed 7,019 of these cases, with a further 1,240 stipulated dismissals.
Defendants have obtained 397 dismissals under Rule 12B(6). Defendants
have prevailed in one default judgment and one motion for summary
judgment. Working with the LexMachina database, we determined that
plaintiffs have obtained 273 default judgments, 120 consent judgments, one
317. See, e.g., id.
318. Id. ("There is nothing in either declaration that would allow the court to conclude that
the 'bits' and 'pieces' captured by [plaintiff's experts'] technology as allegedly distributed from
Doe's IP address meet the standard of originality justifying a finding that they are protectable
elements of the works. Even if the hash value captured in the PCAP corresponds to portion of a
digital file that is 'identical, strikingly similar or substantially similar to' [plaintiff's] copyrighted
work, there is nothing before the court that describes the audio/visual material that is
represented by that hash value. Is it the entire movie or is it some portion so small that it would
not be identifiable as part of the movie? There is nothing in this record to answer that question.").
319. Ingenuity 13 LLC v. Doe, No. 2:1 2-cv-6662-OD-JCx, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16952, at *7
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2013).
3 2o. Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
321. 4 MELVIILEB.NIMMER&DAiDNIMMER, NIMMERONCOPYRIGHT§ 13 .o3(A) (rev. ed. 2017).
322. We conducted this search in mid-February 2017. The LexMachina figures are slightly
different than our own calculations, which were made directly with the PACER data, but the
differences are not significant. While generally we prefer working with the PACER data directly
for the sake of transparency and replication, LexMachina has richer data in terms of case
disposition.
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favorable summary judgment,323 one judgment on the pleadingss'4 and one
victory at a bench trial.325 The plaintiffs were not put to proof in any of these
cases.
The aforementioned summaryjudgment andjudgment on the pleadings
victories came about as follows. In Malibu Media, LLC v. Bui, the plaintiff
prevailed on summary judgment because the defendant conceded that he
ordered the plaintiffs' films from KickassTorrents, a website that provided a
directory for torrent files to facilitate peer-to-peer file sharing using
BitTorrent.326 In spite of this admission, the defendant maintained "the
copying and downloading were done by KickAss Torrent, and not by him."327
In Countryman Nevada v. Doe, the plaintiff obtainedJudgment on the Pleadings
after the defendant admitted that he used his wife's computer to participate
in peer-to-peer BitTorrent file sharing and to download the plaintiffs
copyrighted work without its knowledge or permission.s28
The plaintiff's bench trial victory hardly merits being labeled as a trial at
all. In 2013, Malibu Media, prevailed in a bench trial in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.329 The trial was framed by the court as a "Bellwether" trial to
assess the merits of several Malibu Media cases that had been filed in that
district.33o Following expedited pretrial proceedings, the court convened a
non-jury trial onJune 10, 2013.33,' None of the defendants contested liability;
indeed, all but one had settled with the plaintiff and were merely used as
witnesses for the prosecution.332 Mr. White, the one defendant who had been
expected to contest his liability, authorized his counsel at the last minute "to
admit that he had downloaded Plaintiff's copyrighted works, had 'wiped
323. Malibu Media, LLC v. Bui, No. 1:1 3 -cv-oo162-RJ (W.D. Mich. July 21, 2014).
LexMachina listed Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v. Doughty, No. 3:15-cv-0o1 7 6-AC (D. Or. 2016), as
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, whereas in fact the court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on direct infringement and granted its motion on claims for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. LexMachina also listed Malibu Media, LLC v.
Doe, No. 2:14-cv-01 28o (E.D. Pa. Feb 2, 2015), as summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
whereas in fact, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was denied and the defendant's
motion for summaryjudgment was granted.
324. Countryman Nev., LLC v. Doe, 193 F. Supp. 3 d 1174, 1175 (D. Or. 2016).
325. Malibu Media, LLC v.John Does 1,6, 13, 14, 950 F. Supp. 2d 779, 78o (E.D. Pa. 2013).
326. Order at 1-2, Malibu Media, LLCv. Bui, No. 1:13-cv-00162, 2014 WL 12469955 (W.D.
Mich.July 21, 2014).
327. Plaintiffs Motion for SummaryJudgment at 3, Malibu Media, LLC v. Bui, No. 1:13-cv-
00162, 2014 WL 872 7 o68 (W.D. Mich. May 14, 2014).
328. CountrymanNev., 193 F. Supp. 3d at 179.
329. Malibu Media v.John Does, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 78o.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.; Transcript of Bench Trial at 3, Malibu Media, LLC v.John Does 1, 6, 13, 14, 950 F.
Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 12-2078) (on file with the authors).
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clean' his desktop computer and installed a new operating system to conceal
the downloading, and had testified falsely at the Rule 104 hearing."333
The trial, such as it was, was for the purpose of determining the
appropriate statutory damages to be assessed against White.334 Even so, it was
a surreal affair. White was represented by a criminal defense lawyer with no
apparent copyright experience. White's attorney was not present at the
beginning of the trial, asked no questions, and neither examined nor cross-
examined witnesses. In fact, he said virtually nothing other than to admit
liability on behalf of his client.335
At the trial, one of the principles of Malibu Media, Colette Pelissier-Field,
testified about how illegal file sharing affected her business and the difficulty
of taking enforcement action against websites that facilitate illegal file
sharing.336 She was not cross-examined. No one asked her, for example, how
much money Malibu made from file-sharing litigation or why Malibu Media
does not use industry standard countermeasures against piracy. Michael
Patzer testified that he "designed, created, and implemented" the software
used by Malibu's technology provider, IPP, Ltd., but that he did not work for
IPP.337 Patzer explained that he worked for a different company that provides
services to IPP, Excipio. He was not cross-examined. Tobias Fieser, an
employee of IPP, testified that he verified that the copyright owner's work was
the same as "the BitTorrent that has been downloaded."ss5 He was not cross-
examined. A consultant named Patrick Paige testified that he conducted
certain tests test as to IPP's IP detection software.339 He was not cross-
examined.
In short, to call Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1,6,13,14 and 16 a
"Bellwether trial"34o is absurd. A trial where liability is admitted, no one is
cross-examined, and nothing is contested, is not even a trial in the ordinary
sense of the word.
V. CONCLUSION
We have attempted to provide lawyers with the information essential to
defend clients, especially innocent clients, against the claims of copyright
333. Malibu Media, LLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
334. Id, at 787 ("Thus, the entire focus of the non-jury trial was to establish a record, following
which I would make a determination as to the amount of damages to be found against White.").
335. Transcript of Bench Trial, supra note 332, at 159, 161.
336. Id. at 24-53.
337. Id. at 54-89. In various declarations Patzer identifies himself as the creator of the
software used by IPP/Excipio/Crystal Bay Corp. All of those declarations are notably short on
details such as Patzer's education, qualifications, or experience. See, e.g., Declaration of Michael
Patzer, Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 3 :15 -cv-o4 4 4 1-WHA, (N.D. Cal. February 2, 2017),
ECF No. 144-8.
3 3 8. Id. at 92-1o2.
339. Id. at 1o9 - 4 2.
340. See Malibu Media, LLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
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trolls. In our opinion, the current model of file-sharing litigation is often both
abusive and exploitative. Lawyers have played no small part in bringing about
this situation and allowing it to continue. Our hope is that, armed with the
information and legal analysis this Article provides, lawyers will find it easier
to represent their clients and fight for justice.
However, lawyers are not the only ones with a social and ethical
responsibility to take the problem of copyright trolling seriously. District court
judges have the inherent authority to control their own proceedings, and
significant discretion to supervise discovery and to determine attorneys' fees
and statutory damages. District court judges see individual plaintiffs and
defendants; they do not always see the big picture. Those who do have tended
to take a more active role in managing these cases from the beginning. We
hope thatjudges will take steps to discourage the abusive use of civil litigation
and find ways to manage John Doe copyright litigation in the interests of
justice and the goals of copyright.
Finally, no discussion of copyright trolling would be complete without
noting the ongoing silence of the U.S. Copyright Office on this issue. The
Copyright Office has traditionally been an enthusiastic proponent of statutory
damages and has resisted calls for their reform. However, the evidence that
statutory damages are being used to harass and intimidate vast numbers of
defendants, many of whom have not infringed copyright, is now
overwhelming. Acknowledging the problem of copyright trolls may require a
more qualified enthusiasm for statutory damages but it is an issue that can no
longer be ignored.
2o18]
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Appendix B: Suggested Talking Points for Client Intake
The Accused Infringement
Have you seen this film ever in any context?
Where you at home at the time of the alleged infringement?
Did you do it?
Do you have any idea who might have done it?
The Household
Who is in your household?
Who has access to your household?
How do you normally watch movies/tv? (e.g., Netflix, cable, Amazon)
Computing Environment
How many and what devices do you have?
Desktop
Laptop
Tablet
External hard drives, thumb drives, other plug-in storage
iPhone (can't run the BitTorrent client)
Other brand of smartphone
Gaming consoles (e.g., PS4 , Xbox, etc.)
What is your internet set-up?
Do you have wifi?
Does it have a password?
Does it have a guest network?
Knowledge of Computers and BitTorrent
Do you know what BitTorrent is?
Do you use BitTorrent?
Do you use PopcornTime?
Do you know what PopcornTime is?
How proficient with computers are you?
Information to explain to a new client
Copyright Basics
File sharing is illegal, ignorance of the law is no excuse.
2o18]
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Plaintiff has to show that you did this, not just that your IP address
did this.
Statutory damages and attorneys' fees.
How copyright trolling works and options to respond.
Fee structure and conditions of representation.
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Appendix C: Sample Motion to Proceed Anonymously
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE [] DISTRICT OF []
[Plaintiff's name here]
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. []
[John Doe as described in
complaint
e.g. JOHN DOE subscriber [Judge's name]
assigned to IP Address
12.34.56.789],
Defendant.
Now Comes JOHN DOE subscriber assigned to IP Address 24.14.81.195
("Doe"), [either "pro se" or "by and through counsel,"], who moves this Court
for leave to proceed anonymously. In support of his/her Motion Doe states to
the Court as follows:
I. Introduction
[If the motion is unopposed] Based on [details of communication] on [date],
this Motion is unopposed. However, even if unopposed, this Court must still
consider the merits of the Motion and consider the harm to the public. Doe v.
Smith, 429 F. 3 d 7o6, 710 ( 7 th Cir. 2005). Being unopposed, it is respectfully
requested that presentment of the Motion be excused unless the Court seeks
oral argument.]
[Explain who John Doe is general terms]
[Explain who plaintiff is in general nonpejorative terms]
[Explain that plaintiff has accused John Doe of copyright infringement and
thatJohn Doe believes that it would be in the interests ofjustice to allowJohn
Doe to proceed anonymously unless and until the case goes to trial]
2o18]
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II. Argument
i. Legal Standard
While a party is required to provide both his/her name and "full residence
address" in their first filing with the Court, it is within the discretion of the
district court to grant the dispensation of anonymity, see United States v.
Microsoft, 56 F.3 d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Despite "this country's strong
tradition of access to judicial proceedings," there are situations in which "a
party's interest in privacy or confidentiality ... outweighs this strong
presumption in favor of public access." See Johnson v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp.
Corp., 951 F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
2. Shame and Embarrassment to Defendant
In many file-sharing cases, courts have recognized that the potential shame
and embarrassment of being accused of online piracy is often used as unfair
leverage by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sunlust Pictures v. Does 1-75, No. 12-cv-01546,
2012 WL 3717768, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2012) ('Judges within this district
have recognized that plaintiffs in these types of cases might unfairly threaten
to disclose defendants' identities in order to improperly leverage settlement
negotiations.") (citing Hard Drive Productions v. Does 1-48, No. 1 1-cv-oo962,
2012 WL 2196038 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2012). This is especially true when the
film defendant is accused of pirating is pornographic; at least one other has
court recognized that a fundamental component of the business-litigation
model is the fact that "the subscribers, often embarrassed about the prospect
of being named in a suit involving pornographic movies, settle." MCGIP, LLC
v. Does 1-149, No. I 1-cv-02331, 2011 WL 4 3 5 21 lo, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16,
2011).
Merely being named in a file-sharing case can be damaging. At this point in
litigation, plaintiffs have submitted no proof that defendant has committed
infringement, and yet because they are accused-and because they have been
required to file their correct contact information-their reputations may be
at permanent risk. Employers, landlords, and other interested parties can
identify defendants through publicly available information, and in some cases
such parties conducting a routine search of potential employees or tenants
may discover a defendant's involvement in a file-sharing case entirely by
accident. In at least one file-sharing case, a court has sua sponte recognized this
danger and ordered that all Doe defendants should proceed anonymously
until further notice. See Manny Film, LLCv. Doe, No. 3:15-cv-ooio3 (S.D. Ohio
2015), ECF No. 7 (order grantingJohn Doe defendant a protective order to
proceed anonymously).
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3. No Harm to the Public
An important consideration in whether to grant a motion to proceed
anonymously is whether allowing anonymity would harm the public. See Doe v.
Smith, 429 F.3 d 7o 6, 710 ( 7 th Cir. 2005) ("The public has an interest in
knowing what the judicial system is doing, an interest frustrated when any part
of litigation is conducted in secret."). There is no potential for public harm
from the granting of this motion, because anonymity will not substantially
affect this proceeding. Doe is merely seeking to proceed under a pseudonym
until dispositive motions, and aside from this pseudonym, no aspect of
litigation will change. Further, Doe is a defendant, inappropriately drug into
this embarrassing litigation by Malibu. He is certainly not a plaintiff availing
himself of this Court seeking to benefit from this litigation. A similar situation
existed in the Malibu Media v. Reynolds case. Malibu Media v. Reynolds, No.
12-cv-o6672 (N.D. Ill Mar. 7, 2013), ECF No. 51-11. In that case, involving
only the possibility of embarrassment, the Court allowed the Doe to proceed
anonymously.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Doe respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court grant leave for Doe to proceed anonymously through
dispositive Motions in this action, under the pseudonym of Doe [IP address].
Respectfully submitted,
[John Doe pro se or counsel details]
[Filing certification]
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Appendix D: Sample Rule 68 Offer ofJudgment
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE [ ] DISTRICT OF [ ]
[Plaintiffs name here]
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. []
[Defendant's name here], Offer of Judgment
Defendant.
To: Plaintiff [ ], by and through [plaintiffs attorney]
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 68, defendant hereby offers to settle this matter
and allow entry ofjudgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant (i) in
the sum of $[statutory damages], (ii) and $400 the cost of plaintiffs filing fee,
and (iii) injunctive relief as set forth in the addendum hereto, and (iv) legally-
recoverable costs and attorneys fees, if any, through the date of service of this
Offer ofJudgment and to be determined by the court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ
P. 54. Noting that in a copyright action, the court "may" award costs and
reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party, but is not required to do so.
See 17 U.S.C. § 505.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 68, this Offer of Judgment is not to be
construed as an admission for any purpose except in a proceeding to
determine attorney's fees and costs.
If this Offer of Judgment is not accepted within 14 days, it shall be
deemed revoked.
[Date and signature]
PLAINTIFF ACCEPTS/DECLINES Defendant's Offer OfJudgment.
Addendum-injunctive relief
Defendant agrees to a permanent injunction enjoining defendant from
infringing plaintiffs rights in plaintiff's motion picture including, without
limitation, by using the Internet to reproduce or copy plaintiffs motion
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picture, to distribute plaintiffs motion picture, automate plaintiffs motion
picture available for distribution to the public, except pursuant to a lawful
license or with the express authority of plaintiff, and defendant shall destroy
all unauthorized copies of plaintiffs motion picture in his possession or under
her control.
[Certificate of Service...
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Appendix E: Example of PTG Nevada Letter
This example is included so that the reader mayjudge for herself whether
the letter has been accurately quoted, characterized and otherwise described.
This critical and illustrative use is well within the parameters of the fair use
doctrine as set out in Section 107 of the Copyright Act and interpreted by
binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 5 10 U.S. 569
(1994).
RE: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF PAYTHE GHOST- Settlement Purposes Only-Not Admissible tinder FRE 408
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Civil Action No. 16-cv-1621
Plaintiff: PTG Nevada, LLC
Your IP Address: 67-176.170.180
ISP Providing nformaton: Comcast
Date of Alleged Infringement: September 18, 2015
Dear
Our law firm has filed a Federal copyright infringement lawsuit in the U.S- District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois on behalf of our client, PTG Nevada, ILLC. The suit was filed against 24 Doe Defendants. We subsequently
obtained identifying contact information for many of these Defendants from their Internet Service Providers (ISPs). A
copy of the Complaint is enclosed. Your contact Information was supplied to us by your ISP as one of the Defendants
who has illegally obtained or shared our client's copyrighted motion picture through a peer-to-peer network fOnutilla,
BitTorrent etc]. We are sending you this letter as a courtesy before we are required to take additional legal action
which would involve add Ing you as a named Defendant to the lawsuit.
According to our records, you have placed a media file which contains the copyright-protected film content for our
client's motion picture entitled Pay the Ghost in a shared folder location on your computer, This enables others to
download copies of this content In addition, we have evidence of the P2P client software that you used to obtain or
share the film, and evidence of your file hash factor (a mathematical function through which a file can be identified
with certainty) which was 0495EF034BSR1374A2DEA4513372A5A18F022848. We also have obtained the file name of
the movie, the file size and the GUID, all corresponding to an IP address that was assigned to your ISP account at the
time the infringing activity occurred.
Copyright infringement (in this case, obtaining a film without paying for it or sharing a film with others who have not
paid for it) is a very serious problem for the entertainment Industry- The law provides protections for copyright owners
through the Federal copyright statute found at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-506, which allows the copyright owner to impound
your material, recover their attorneys' fees, and seek damages of $750 - $150,00 per work, depending on the
circumstances surrounding the infringement. While it is too late to undo the illegal filesharingyou have already done,
we have prepared an offer to enable our client to recoup the damages incurred by your actions, and defray the costs of
preventing this type of activity in the future.
In exchange for a comorehensive release of all legal claims which wil enable you to avoid becoming a named
Defendant in the lawsuit, ourfirmi is authorized to accept the sum of $3,900 as full settlement for its claims. This offer
will expire on April 22, 2016. Thereafter, our client will accept no less than the sum of $4,9W to settle this matter, but
this increased settlement offer will expire on May 6, 2016. In addition, you must remove the file from the shared
folder or location where our client's film can be shared or copied within three (3) days of paying a settlement, If you
decide not to settle by May 6, 2016, we may add you to the list of Defendants to be served with a copy of the
complaint in this lawsuit
2018] DEFENSE AGAINST THE DARK ARTS 649
In short, you can avoid being named as a Defendant in the lawsuit if you act now. You can pay the settlement amount
by cashier's check, money order or by credit card. Please contact us to arrange payment and so we can forward a
Release and Settlement Agreement Once we have processed the settlement, we will confirm that your payment has
been processed and that you have been dismissed from the lawsuit
We look forward to resolving this matter without further legal action. However, if you do not comply with the above
requests, we may be forced to name you as a Defendant in the lawsuit and proceed directly against you on behalf of
our client If forced to do so, our client will be seeking to recover the maximum amount of fees provided under the
Copyright Act for copyright infringement, which is up to $30,000 per illegally downloaded film, plus attorneys' fees and
the costs of litigation. Because torrent file-sharing requires deliberate action by the uploader or downloader of a
movie, we may be able to provethat your actions were intentional, rather than just negligent. In the eventwe are able
to prove that the infringement was Intentional, our client will be seeking the maximum statutory damages allowed by
the Copyright Act in the amount of $150,000 per infringement, attorneys' fees and costs.
We believe that in light of the verdicts awarded in recent cases, our client's $3,900 settlement offer is extremely
reasonable. For example, in the case of Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum (D. Mass.l [1:07-cv-11446), a
$675,000 jury verdict against a Boston University graduate student for illegally downloading and sharing 30 songs has
been upheld. This means that the jury awarded $22,500 per illegally-shared song. We believe that by providing you
with an opportunity to settle our client's claim for $3,900 instead of you incurring thousands of dollars in attorneys'
fees and being at risk for a high jury verdict, our client is acting reasonably and in good faith.
You have been on notice of our client's claim since you received the notice from your ISP that we subpoenaed your
information_ Please consider this letter to constitute fornel notice that unless and until we are able to settle our
client's claim with you, we demand that you not delete any media fles from your computer. If forced to proceed
against you in the lawsuit, we will most certainly have a computer forensic expert inspectyour computer in an effort to
locate the subject movie file, or to determine if you have deleted any media files since receipt of the notice of the
subpoena from your ISP. If in the course of litigation the forensic computer evidence suggests that you did delete
media files following receipt of the letter from your ISP, our client will amend its complaint to add a spoliation of
evidence claim against you, Be advised that If we were to prevail on this additional claim, the court could award
monetary sanctions, evidentlary sanctions and reasonable attorneys' fees. ifyou are unfamiliar with the nature of this
claim in this context, please consult an attorney and review the following cases: Paramount Pictures Corm v, Davis 234
FRD. 102,77 U.S.P.cL2d 1933 (E.D. Pa. 2005); U.S.C.A. Arista Records, LLC, v. Tschirhart. 241 F.R.D. 462 (W-). Tex-
2006); and U.S. ex rel, Koch v. Koch Industries. Inc. 197 F.R.D. 488 (N.D. Okla. 1999)_
We strongly encourage you to consult with an attorney to review your rights and risk exposure in connection with
this matter.
We thank you in advwncefor your anticipated cooperation in this matter, and we look forward to resolving our client's
claim against you on an amicable basis, through settlement
Signsature
MAH:cb
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Appendix F: Cases with "Darren M Griffin" Declarations
Plaintiff District File No. Case Filed
TCYK LLC AL SD 1: i 3-cv-3o6 o6/o6/13
Riding Films Inc AZ 2:13-cv-299 02/11/13
Bleiberg Entertainment LLC AZ 2:13-CV-595 03/22/13
Bleiberg Entertainment LLC AZ 2:13-CV-597 03/22/13
Bleiberg Entertainment LLC AZ 2:1,3-cv-597 07/29/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-339 02/07/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-342 02/07/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-377 02/13/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-378 02/13/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-395 02/13/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-392 02/13/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd CO 1:13-cv-396 02/13/13
R&D Film 1 LLC CO 1:13-cv-413 02/15/13
R&D Film i LLC CO 1:13-cv-414 02/15/13
R&D Film i LLC CO 1:13-cv-431 02/19/13
R&D Film 1 LLC CO 1:13-CV-432 02/19/13
R&D Film i LLC CO 1:13-cv-433 02/19/13
Bicycle Peddler LLC CO 1:1 2-cv-671 03/14/13
Ledge Distribution LLC CO 1:13-cv-688 03/14/13
Thompsons Film LLC CO 1:13-cv-687 03/14/13
Voltage Pictures LLC CO 1: 1 3-cv-900 o4/o8/13
Voltage Pictures LLC CO 1:1 3-CV-902 o4/o8/13
Voltage Pictures LLC CO 1:1 3-cv-903 04/o8/13
Voltage Pictures LLC CO 1: 13-cv-1 121 04/26/13
Voltage Pictures LLC CO 1: 13-cV-1122 04/26/13
Voltage Pictures LLC CO 1:1 3-cv-1123 04/26/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC CO 1:13-CV-1292 05/17/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC CO 1:13-cv-1309 05/19/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC CO 1:13-cv-1340 05/22/13
R&D Film i LLC CO 1:13-cv-1343 05/23/13
TCYK LLC CO 1:13-cv-1461 o6/o5/13
TCYK LLC CO 1:13-cv-1476 o6/o9/13
TCYK LLC CO 1:13-cv-163o o6/20/13
TCYK LLC CO 1:13-cv-1691 o6/26/13
BKGTH Productions LLC CO 1:13-cv-1778 07/09/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-cv-2200 o8/15/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-cv-2214 o8/16/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-cv-2312 o8/28/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-CV-2 341 o8/3o/13
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Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-cv-2380 09/03/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-cv-2627 09/25/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-cv-2635 o09/26/13
Power of Few LLC CO 1:13-CV-2645 09/27/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-2911 10/24/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-2921 10/25/13
TCYK LLC CO 1:13-cv-2950 10/29/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-2974 10/30/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-Cv-2984 10/31/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-2998 11/01/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-3o26 11/05/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-3o56 11/o8/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-3071 11/12/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-3o79 11/13/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO I: 13-cv-3 100 11/14/13
TCYK LLC CO 1:13-cv-3197 11/21/13
Lynn Peak Productions Inc CO 1:13-cv-3203 11/22/13
Vision Films Inc DE 1:12-cv-1746 12/20/12
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd DE 1:13-cv-q1 O1/16/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd DE 1:13-cv-92 O/16/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC DE i: 13-cv-487 03/28/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC DE 1 :13-cv-488 03/28/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC DE 1:13-cv-489 03/28/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC DE 1:13-cv-677 o4/16/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC DE 1:1 3-cv-679 o4/16/13
Killer joe Nevada LLC DE 1:1 3-cv-68o o4/16/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC DE 1:1 3-cv-681 o4/1"6/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC DE 1:13-cv-682 04/16/13
Thompsons Film LLC ED MO 4:13-cv-577 03/27/13
Dead Season LLC FL MD 8:12-cv-2436 10/29/12
Dead Season LLC FL MD 8:12-cv-2435 10/29/12
Dead Season LLC FL MD 2:1 3-cv-24,35 11/07/12
Bait Productions PTY LTD FL MD 8:13-cv-171 03/05/13
Bait Productions PTY LTD FL MD 2:13-cv-86 o3/o8/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 8:13-cv-873 04/05/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 8:13-cv-874 04/05/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 8:13-cv-872 04/05/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 6:13-cv-567 04/09/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 6:13-cv-568 04/09/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 6:13-cv-569 04/09/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd FL MD 5:13-cv-172 04/09/13
Bicycle Peddler LLC FL MD 8:1 3-cv-9o5 04/1O/13
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Bicycle Peddler LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-9o6 04/10/13
Bicycle Peddler LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-595 04/11/13
Bicycle Peddler LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-594 04/11/13
Bicycle Peddler LLC FL MD 2:1 3-Cv-279 04/11/13
Thompsons Film LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-11ol3 o4/24/13
Thompsons Film LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-1 1o4 04/24/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-1 154 04/29/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-1155 04/29/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-1156 04/29/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC FL MD 2:13-cv-331 04/30/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC FL MD 2:13-cv-332 04/30/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-1154 o8/22/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-22o9 o8/27/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-22 1o o8/27/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-22 1 1 o8/27/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-2212 o8/27/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 8:13-cv-2213 o8/27/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-1343 o8/29/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-1344 o8/29/1
TCYK LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-1345 o8/29/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-1,346 o8/29/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-1347 o8/29/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 6:13-cv-1348 o8/29/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 5:13-cv-425 o9/o6/13
TCYK LLC FL MD 2:13-cv-643 o9/o6/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-882 03/20/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-886 03/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA ND 1: 13-cv-897 03/20/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-883 03/20/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-888 03/20/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-89o 03/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-892 03/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-893 03/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-894 03/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-895 03/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA ND 1:1 3-cv-895 03/20/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-o76 o4/o3/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-io78 04/03/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-lO82 04/03/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-io86 o4/o3/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-lo87 o4/o3/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-1o88 04/03/13
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Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND i: 13-cv-1 1o3 04/04/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND i:i 3-cv-1oq8 04/04/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:1,3-cv-l1OO 04/04/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1:1 3-cv-1 1 01 04/04/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC GA ND 1: 1 3-cv-1 1O2 04/04/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:1 3-cv-145o 04/30/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-1492 05/03/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND i:13-cv- 15o8 05/03/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1: 1'3-cv- 15 11 05/03/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:1.-cv-1513 o5/o3/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-1514 o5/o3/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:i3-cv-i515 05/03/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:1 3-cv-15i6 05/03/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1: 13-cv-1517 05/03/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-1525 o5/o6/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1:13-cv-1527 o5/o6/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC GA ND 1 : 13-cv-1529 o5/o6/13
Private Lenders Group Inc GA SD 4:13-cv-15 01/25/13
Riding Films Inc GA SD 4:13-cv-18 01/25/13
Riding Films Inc GASD 4:13-cv-20 01/25/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd GASD 4:13-cv-16 01/25/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd GASD 4:13-cv-16 O1/25/13
Maxcon Productions Inc GA SD 4:13-cv-38 02/14/13
Voltage Pictures LLC GA SD 4:13-cv-38 02/14/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC IA ND 5:1 3-cv-4o36 o4/26/13
TCYK LLC 1AND 2:13-cv-1o18 o6/17/13
TCYK LLC 1AND 2:13-CV-lO 9  o6/17/13
TCYK LLC LAND 2:13-CV-1020 o6/25/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC IA SD 3:13-cv-6o 04/25/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC IA SD 4:13-cv-192 04/25/13
TCYK LLC IASD j:13-cv-74 o6/12/13
TCYK LLC IASD 3:13-cv-77 o6/13/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 4:13-cv-4041 04/30/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 4:13-cv-4042 04/30/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 2:13-cv-20 04/30/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 3:13-cv-3124 04/30/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 3:13-cv-3125 04/30/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 313-cv3127 04/30/13
TCYK LLC IL CD 4:13-cv-4o81 o9/o9/13
R&D Film 1 LLC ILND 1:12-cv-9o36 11/09/12
R&D Film 1 LLC IL ND 1:12-cv-9041 11/09/12
R&D Film i LLC IL ND 1: 12-cv-9o43 11/09/12
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R&D Film 1 LLC IL ND 1:12-cv-9o39 11/09/12
Vision Films Inc IL ND 1:1 3-cv-64 01/04/13
Vision Films Inc IL ND 1:13-cv-66 01/04/13
Vision Films Inc IL ND 1:13-cv-67 01/04/13
Vision Films Inc IL ND 1:13-cv-68 01/04/13
Vision Films Inc IL ND 1: 13-cv-65 01/04/13
Vision Films Inc IL ND 1:13-cv-71 01/04/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-CV-1321 02/19/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-cv-1323 02/19/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-cv-1741 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-cv-1743 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-cv-1744 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd ILND 1:13-cv-1745 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-cv-1746 03/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd ILND 1:13-cv-1747 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd ILND 1:13-cv-1748 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd ILND 1:13-cv-1724 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd ILND 1:13-cv-1742 o3/o6/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd IL ND 1:13-cv-1749 o3/o6/13
RynoRyder Productions Inc IL ND 1:13-CV-2364 03/29/13
Thompsons Film LLC IL ND 1: 13-cv-2 368 03/29/13
Thompsons Film LLC IL ND 1:13-CV-2368 03/29/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3823 o5/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3824 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3825 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3826 05/23/13
TCYK LLC L ND 1:13-cv-3827 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3828 o5/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3829 o5/23/13
TCYKLLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3833 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1: 13-cv-3834 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3837 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1: 13-cv-3839 o5/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-384o 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3841 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3842 05/23/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3844 05/23/13
TCYK LLC ILND 1:13-cv-3845 o5/23/13
Elf-Man LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-3884 05/24/13
Elf-Man LLC IL ND 1:1 3-c-4293 o6/io/13
BKGTH Productions LLC IL ND 1:1 3-cv-4711 o6/28/13
BKGTH Productions LLC IL ND 1: 13-cv-4712 o6/28/13
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BKGTH Productions LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-4714 o6/28/13
Osiris Entertainment LLC IL ND l: 13-cv-49O1 07/09/13
BKGTH Productions LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-47 1 o8/20/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-6646 o9/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-665o 09/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1: 13-cv-6654 09/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-6657 09/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-666o o9/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND l:13-cv-6663 09/17/13
TCYKLLC IL ND 1: i 3-cv-6667 o9/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-6671 09/17/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-677o 09/20/13
TCYK LLC ILND 1:13-cv-6772 o9/20/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-6965 09/27/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-7o74 10/02/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-6727 o9/19/14
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-6728 09/19/14
TCYK LLC IL ND l: 13-cv-6729 09/19/14
Elf-Man LLC IL ND 1:13-cv-2362 02/29/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-Cv-320 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-Cv-459 09/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-cv-46o o9/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-cv-461 09/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-cv-462 o9/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-cv-463 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-cv-464 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-cv-465 o9/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-cv-466 o9/11/13
TCYKLLC ILND 2:13-cv-467 o9/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-cv-468 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-cv-469 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-Cv-470 09/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-Cv-471 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-Cv-472 o9/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:1-cv-473 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-cv-474 09/11/13
TCYK LLC ILND 2:13-CV-475 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 2:13-cv-476 09/11/13
TCYK LLC IL ND 1:13-Cv-296 1O/15/13
TCYK LLC IN SD 1:13-cv-1629 10/11/13
TCYK LLC LAED 2:13-cv-3o64 05/17/13
Power of Few LLC LA ED 2:1 3-cv-5oo6 o7/o8/13
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Power of Few LLC LA ED 2:13-CV-532o o8/08/13
BKGTH Productions LLC LAED 2:13-cv-531O 09/03/13
Sibling The Movie LLC LA ND 5:13-cv-4o59 o6/25/13
Sibling The Movie LLC LA SD 3:13-cv-6o o4/25/13
Sibling The Movie LLC LA SD 4:13-cv-271 o6/24/13
TCYK LLC MIED 2:13-cv-14322 10/11/13
TCYK LLC MN 0:13-cv-1727 07/02/13
TCYK LLC MN o:13-cv-1727 1O/O8/13
Battle Force LLC MO ED 4:12-cv-2020 10/30/12
Night of the Templar LLC MO ED 4:12-cV-2022 10/30/12
TriCoast Smitty LLC MO ED 4:12-cV-201 9  10/30/12
Vision Films Inc MO ED 4:13-cv-20 01/04/13
Private Lenders Group Inc MO ED 4:13-cv-285 02/15/13
Vision Films Inc MO ED 4:13-cv-2 9o 02/18/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC MO ED 4:13-cv-388 03/01/13
Elf-Man LLC MO ED 4:13-cv-576 03/27/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC MO ED 4:13-cv-832 04/30/13
Battle Force LLC NJ 1: 1-cv-6539 10/17/12
Dragon Quest Productions LLC NT 1:1 2-cv-66 1 1 1o/19/12
R&D Film 1 LLC NJ 1:12-cv-6633 10/22/12
Voltage Pictures LLC NJ 1:12-cv-6885 11/06/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:12-CV-2812 11/09/12
R&D Film i LLC OHND 1:12-cv-2822 11/12/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:12-Cv-2820 11/12/12
R&D Film i LLC OH ND 1:12-CV-2832 11/13/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2 831 11/13/12
R&D Film i LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2895 11/20/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2894 11/20/12
R&D Film i LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2919 11/26/12
R&D Film 1 LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2920 11/26/12
R&D Film i LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2929 11/27/12
R&D Film i LLC OH ND 1:12-cv-2951 11/30/12
Safety Point Productions LLC OH ND 1: 1 2-cv-2820 12/08/12
Night of the Templar LLC OH ND 1: 13-c-396 02/22/13
Night of the Templar LLC OH ND 1: 13-cv-397 02/22/13
D3 Productions LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-461 03/03/13
Ledge Distribution LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-459 03/03/13
Private Lenders Group Inc OH ND 1:13-cv-46o 03/03/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:1 3-cv-463 03/04/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:1 3-cv-464 03/04/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-465 03/04/13
Thompsons Film LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-595 03/19/13
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Elf-Man LLC OH ND 1: 13-cv-727 04/03/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1: 1 3-cv-8oo 04/1 o/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-8o1 04/10/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-802 04/10/1
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:1 3-cv-8o3 04/1O/ 13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-8o4 04/1O/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:' 3-cv-8o5 04/1O/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-8o6 04/10/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1:1 3-cv-8o7 04/1O/ 13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH ND 1: 13-cv-8o8 04/10/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-lO37 o5/o7/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH ND 1:13-CV-lo38 o5/o7/13
KillerJoe Nevada LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-1o39 05/o7/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH ND 1:13-CV-1O4O 05/07/13
Killei Joe Nevada LLC OH ND 1:13-cv-lO41 o5/o7/13
Safety Point Productions LLC OH SD 2:12-cV-1o9o 11/27/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:1 2-cv-1o9o 11/27/12
Safety Point Productions LLC OH SD 2:12-CV-1 102 11/30/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:12-CV-1 102 11/30/12
Safety Point Productions LLC OH SD 2:12-CV-1 110 12/03/12
Safety Point Productions LLC OH SD 2:12-CV-1 111 12/03/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:12-cv-1111 12/03/12
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:12-CV- 1112 12/03/12
R&D Film 1 LLC OHSD 2:12-CV-1112 12/04/12
R&D Film i LLC OHSD 2:12-cV-1113 12/04/12
R&D Film i LLC OHSD 2:12-cV-1115 12/04/12
R&D Film i LLC OH SD 2:12-cv-1116 12/04/12
R&D Film i LLC OH SD 2:12-CV-1 117 12/04/12
R&D Film 1 LLC OH SD 2:12-cV-1120 12/05/12
R&D Film i LLC OH SD 2:12-cv-1136 12/10/12
R&D Film 1 LLC OHSD 2:12-cV-1137 12/10/12
R&D Film i LLC OHSD 2:12-cv-1138 12/11/12
R&D Film 1 LLC OH SD 2:12-CV-1139 12/11/12
Bleiberg Entertainment LLC OH SD 2:1 3-cv-40 01 / 15/13
Bleiberg Entertainment LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-42 Ol/15/13
Night of the Templar LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-182 02/28/13
Night of the Templar LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-183 02/28/13
Private Lenders Group Inc OH SD 2:13-cv-193 03/03/13
D3 Productions LLC OH SD 2:13-c-194 03/03/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-196 03/04/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-197 03/04/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-198 o3/o4/13
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Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-201 03/04/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-2o2 03/04/13
Voltage Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-203 03/04/13
RynoRyder Productions Inc OH SD 2:13-cv-252 o3/18/13
Thompsons Film LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-2368 o3/29/13
Elf-Man LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-3o8 o4/03/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-389 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-CV-390 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-395 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-391 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-392 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-393 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-394 04/23/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-396 04/23/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-439 o5/o7/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-440 05/07/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-441 05/07/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH SD 2:13-Cv-442 o5/o7/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-525 o5/31/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-534 o6/o5/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-5 35 o6/o5/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-536 o6/o5/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-539 o6/o5/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-CV-540 o6/o5/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-688 o7/16/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-69o 07/17/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-691 07/17/13
Power of Few LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-839 o8/27/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-849 o8/28/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-848 o8/28/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-842 08/28/13
TCYK LLC OH SD 2:13-cv-843 o8/28/13
Dragon Quest Productions LLC TN ED 3:12-Cv-597 11/16/12
Dimentional Dead Productions TN ED 3:12-cv-602 11/19/12
LLC
Dimentional Dead Productions TN ED 3:12-cv-603 11/19/12
LLC
Solo Productions Incorporated TN ED 3:12-cv-599 1 1/1./12
Vision Films Inc TN ED 3:12-cv-642 12/12/12
Vision Films Inc TN ED 3:12-cv-643 12/12/12
Vision Films Inc TN ED 3:12-cv-644 12/12/12
NGN Prima Productions Inc TN ED 3:13-cv-37 01/25/13
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Voltage Pictures LLC TN ED 3:1 3-cv-58 02/01/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-75 02/13/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-76 02/13/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-77 02/13/13
Bleiberg Entertainment LLC TN ED 3:13-Cv-129 o3/o8/13
Vision Films Inc TN ED 3:13-cv- 128 o3/o8/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC TN ED 3:1 3-cv- 184 04/02/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-185 04/02/13
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC TN ED 3:13-Cv-186 04/02/1.
Georgia Film Fund Four LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-187 04/02/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:1 3-cv-2 17 04/21 / 13
Killer.joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-218 04/21/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-219 04/21/13
KillerJoe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-Cv-220 04/21/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-221 04/21/13
KillerJoe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-222 04/21/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-223 04/21/13
Killer.joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-224 04/21/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:1 3-Cv-225 04/21/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-226 04/21/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-227 04/21/13
KillerJoe Nevada LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-228 04/21/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-251 o5/o6/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-Cv-252 o5/o6/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-Cv-253 o5/o6/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-254 05/06/13
TCYK LLC TNED 3:13-Cv-255 05/o6/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-256 o5/o6/13
TCYK LLC TNED 3:13-cv-2.57 05/o6/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-Cv-258 o5/o6/13
Pounds Pictures Inc TN ED 3:13-cv-262 05/07/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-CV-259 05/07/13
TCYK LLC TN ED 3:13-cv-26o 05/07/13
Pounds Pictures Inc TN ED 3:13-cv-263 o5/o7/13
TCYK LLC TNED 3:13-Cv-261 05/o7/13
Night of the Templar LLC TN MD 3:12-cv-1 124 10/30/12
R&D Film 1 LLC TNMD 3:12-cv-1123 10/30/12
Riding Films Inc TN MD 3:12-cv-1247 io/30/12
Maxcon Productions Inc TN MD 3:13-cv-132 02/13/13
Private Lenders Group Inc TN MD 3:13-cv-15g 02/22/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN WD 2:13-cv-2 528 o7/16/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN WD 2:13-cv-2529 o7/16/13
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Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN WD 2: 13-CV-2.j30 o7/16/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN WD 2:13-Cv-2531 o7/16/13
Killer Joe Nevada LLC TN WD 2:13-cv-2532 o7/16/13
TCYK LLC TNWD 2:13-cv-255o 07/22/13
TCYK LLC TNWD 2:13-Cv-2551 07/22/13
TCYK LLC TNWD 2:13-cv-2552 07/22/13
TCYK LLC TNWD 2:13-CV-2553 07/22/13
TCYKLLC TX ND 3:13-cv-3927 o9/27/13
TCYK LLC TX SD 4:13-Cv-3082 lo/i8/i
Flypaper Distribution LLC WAWD 2:13-cv-63 01/09/13
Private Lenders Group Inc WAW 2:13-cv-194 01/31/13
D3 Productions LLC WAWD 2:13-cv-228 02/08/13
D3 Productions LLC WAWD 2:13-CV-228 02/12/13
Riding Films Inc WA WD 2:13-Cv-255 02/12/13
Riding Films Inc WA W 2:13-cv-256 02/12/13
Riding Films Inc WA W 2:13-cv-277 02/13/13
Riding Films Inc WAWD 2:13-cv-278 02/13/13
Riding Films Inc WAWD 2:13-cv-287 02/14/13
Riding Films Inc WA WD 2:13-cv-288 02/14/13
Riding Films Inc WAWI 2:13-cv-289 02/14/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-CV-315 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-316 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-317 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-307 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WA WD 2:13-cv-3o8 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-Cv-309 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-CV-310 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-311 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-312 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-313 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-314 o2/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-cv-318 02/18/13
Zambezia Film (Pty.) Ltd WAWD 2:13-CV-319 02/18/13
Ledge Distribution LLC WAWD 2:13-Cv-328 02/20/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WAWD 2:13-cv-455 03/13/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WAWD 2:13-cv-457 03/13/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WAWD 2:13-cv-458 03/13/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WA WD 2:13-cv-459 03/13/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WA WD 2:13-cv-46o 03/13/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WAWD 2:13-cv-461 03/13/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WA WI 2:13-cv-462 03/13/13
R&D Film 1 LLC WD WA 2:13-cv-5o oi/o8/13
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R&D Film 1 LLC WD WA 2:1,3-CV-51 O1/O8/13
R&D Film i LLC WD WA 2:13-cv-52 o/o8/13
R&D Film i LLC WD WA 2:13-CV-53 Ol/08/13
R&D Film 1 LLC WD WA 2:13-cV-54 o/o8/13
R&D Film i LLC WD WA 2:13-cv-55 o/o8/13
R&D Film i LLC WD WA 2:13-cv-56 ol/o8/13
R&D Film i LLC WDWA 2:13-Cv-57 ol/o8/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WD WA 2:13-cv-456 03/13/13
TCYK LLC WI ED 2:13-cv-539 O5/14/13
TCYK LLC WI ED 2:3-CV-5.54 o5/16/13
BKGTH Productions LLC WI ED 2:13-cv-666 o6/12/13
BKGTH Productions LLC WI ED 2:13-cv-667 o6/12/13
TCYK LLC WI ED 2:13-CV-1022 o9/1o/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-275 04/24/13
Riding Films Inc WI WD 3:13-cv-277 04/24/13
Breaking Glass Pictures LLC WI WD 3:13-cV-276 04/24/13
R&D Film i LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-279 04/25/13
R&D Film i LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-280 04/25/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-282 04/25/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-283 04/25/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WIWD 3:1 3-cv-281 o4/25/13
TCYK LLC WIWD 3:13-cv-2C)5 04/30/13
TCYK LLC WIWD 3:13-cv-296 04/30/13
TCYK LLC WIWD 3:13-cv-297 04/30/13
TCYK LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-298 o4/3o/1
TCYK LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-299 04/30/13
TCYK LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-3oo 04/30/13
Voltage Pictures LLC WI WD 3:13-cv-634 o9/11/13
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